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ABSTRACT
This dissertation encompassed quantitative research on probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
elements in homeland security and the impact on critical infrastructure and key resources. There
are 16 crucial infrastructure sectors in homeland security that represent assets, system networks,
virtual and physical environments, roads and bridges, transportation, and air travel. The design
included the Bayes theorem, a process used in PRAs when determining potential or probable
events, causes, outcomes, and risks. The goal is to mitigate the effects of domestic terrorism and
natural and man-made disasters, respond to events related to critical infrastructure that can
impact the United States, and help protect and secure natural gas pipelines and electrical grid
systems. This study provides data from current risk assessment trends in PRAs that can be
applied and designed in elements of homeland security and the criminal justice system to help
protect critical infrastructures. The dissertation will highlight the aspects of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). In addition, this
framework was employed to examine the criminal justice triangle, explore crime problems and
emergency preparedness solutions to protect critical infrastructures, and analyze data relevant to
risk assessment procedures for each critical infrastructure identified. Finally, the study addressed
the drivers and gaps in research related to protecting and securing natural gas pipelines and
electrical grid systems.
Keywords: homeland security, critical infrastructure, probabilistic safety assessment
(PSA), T-H-O-risks, domino effect, social network analysis (SNA), failure mode effect and
criticality analysis (FMECA)
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Overview
This dissertation will encompass a thorough quantitative research study on probabilistic
risk assessments (PRAs) in homeland security and critical infrastructure at the local level of
government. The goal is to contribute to future research on securing and protecting critical
infrastructure and key resources and provide a methodological approach to address domestic
terrorism, violent extremism, risks, and vulnerabilities related to critical infrastructure.
Background
In homeland security, to mitigate risk and vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures, risk
assessments are performed to help protect and secure facilities, system networks, operational
functions, and essential resources from unexpected events that can occur. In conducting PRAs, a
good starting point is examining the historical context, the impact on critical infrastructure and
key resources in society, homeland security, risk assessments, elements of domestic terrorism,
and theoretical perspectives.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Historical Context
According to Comiskey (2018), following the September 11, 2001, attacks on American
soil, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established and combined 22
agencies. Today, homeland security strategies are directed toward risk assessments and an allhazard approach to vulnerabilities, threat assessments, and risk analysis to protect critical
infrastructures and key resources. In addition, Comiskey noted that other elements of DHS have
specific frameworks and strategies for mitigation, “critical thinking, collaboration, cybersecurity,
emergency management, intelligence, law and policy, leadership, preparedness, risk
management, strategy, and terrorism” (p. 30). This also includes mitigating emerging elements
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of violent extremism and domestic terrorism, seen today as a direct threat to homeland security
and national security.
Comiskey (2018) further conveyed that homeland security features are centered on
leadership skills, risk management processes, security protocols, social identity, and terrorism
themes. The fundamental goals of homeland security are to protect the Nation from acts of
terrorism, protect critical infrastructures, provide national strategies to mitigate risk, recover
from man-made and natural disasters, and respond to accidents and incidents, technology
challenges, and malicious manufactured threats and hazards (Comiskey, 2018). Homeland
security initially evolved from counterterrorism strategies as a means to assess risk and design to
provide countermeasures to mitigate elements of international and domestic terrorist threats on
U.S. soil (Comiskey, 2018). Therefore, the dissertation will be focused on PRAs in addressing
critical infrastructure and elements of domestic terrorism as a direct threat to homeland security
and national security.
Tulumello and Falanga (2021) explained that the term “homeland” represents
conceptions of the emergence of community and local practices in public safety to protect
citizens from emerging threats. In addition, Tulumello and Falanga emphasized it means
cooperation, collaborations, and processes designed to address the “multiscalar geographies of
the good and evil made of the coexistence of centrifugal (pushing problems away) and
centripetal (incorporating any given outside) dimensions” (p. 1). The DHS provides a systematic
approach to homeland security and national security that involves agencies, activities,
antiterrorism, counterterrorism efforts, controlling borders, protecting critical infrastructure and
key resources, secret service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Today, Tulumello
and Falanga noted that dimensions of homeland security constitute a new scale or level of
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security that is multiscalar, global, and dimensional concepts that have evolved into a new
conceptualization of security and the role law enforcement agencies and community has in
public safety, public policy and policymaking. The initial idea of homeland security was
designed to legitimize U.S. actions against the emerging threat of global terrorism and respond to
emerging threats through the U.S. security apparatus to mitigate global threats and terrorism.
Tulumello and Falanga further noted that the DHS elements focus on current and future threats
and local efforts designed to promote long-term activity related to safety policies and prevention
elements in today’s environment.
According to Sedgwick et al. (2019), law enforcement agencies are encouraged to
collaborate and share intelligence and equipment, training, and tactics to mitigate risk,
vulnerabilities, and threats in the field of homeland security. The increasing cooperation between
law enforcement and federal-level agencies is essential for building community trust (Sedgwick
et al., 2019). However, there is little evidence to show collaboration between law enforcement
among local jurisdictions, mainly because of political and contextual climates and limits placed
on agencies on the local level. In homeland security, to successfully mitigate vulnerabilities and
threats, law enforcement agencies in local jurisdictions in a geographical area are required to
“increase levels of intergovernmental and interagency cooperation, coordination, and
collaboration” (Sedgwick et al., 2019, p. 167). According to Sedgwick et al., in the new era of
policing, law enforcement agencies must invest in risk assessment activities, and modern
technologies and conduct threat assessments. They must also gather and share intelligence on
potential threats and vulnerabilities and domestic terrorist groups identified as operating in the
local jurisdiction. The Homeland Security Council encourages interagency cooperation and
collaborations between the community and police to promote information sharing to engage in
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domestic terrorism preparedness. Interagency activities and cooperation in law enforcement
networks in homeland security so law enforcement and other agencies can discuss trends, threats,
and better ways to disseminate information. In large network meetings, a primary goal is to share
intelligence and brainstorm different approaches to communicating information to officers in the
field and their agencies (Sedgwick et al., 2019). In homeland security, effectively managing
critical infrastructures, and infrastructure protection, conduct risk assessments, and assess risks
and vulnerabilities at different levels. In PRAs in homeland security, as it relates to risk, security,
and securing critical infrastructure, there are conflicting views, which will be discussed in length
in the dissertation, such as how to differentiate probability and consequence and the significance
of assessing value against specific conditions and threats.
According to Heyerdahl (2021), to protect critical infrastructures in homeland security,
the areas to explore are how to distinguish the difference between risk and probability and
understanding the “relationship between the threat against a certain value [asset] and the value’s
level of vulnerability” (p. 1), as well as how to mitigate differences based on probabilities and
how to measure risk and link these aspects to risk management and decision-making. These are
also critical factors that will be addressed in the dissertation using various metrics. Heyerdahl
believed gaps in research should also examine the role probability has in risk assessment in
government.
Critical Infrastructure Historical Context
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was instituted in the United States
under the DHS Presidential Directive 7 and enacted in 2006 to protect critical infrastructure and
key resources (CIKR). In 2009, the NIPP was further updated to provide additional guidance and
policies to ensure preparedness and resiliency in the Nation’s critical infrastructure. Since 2013,
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under the DHS, the NIPP has been the main focal point of national security and for coordinating
the Nation’s response to critical infrastructure and key resources. To ensure there is an approach
to identifying CIKR requires establishing national priorities, goals, and requirements for CIKR
protection. In the past ten years, the NIPP has evolved to include cyber-security and an
additional role in identifying assets and systems with a statutory mission to ensure the Nation’s
critical infrastructure receives enhanced protection to help build resiliency, redundancy, and
prevent acts of terrorism. The dissertation will highlight case studies relevant to defining critical
infrastructure, conducting a risk analysis, probability risk assessments, and physical protection
measures. To address cyber security issues, the DHS created the Cyber-Security and
Infrastructure Agency (CISA) to address vulnerabilities and protect against cyber threats with
additional guidance provided to owners and operators of critical infrastructures.
According to Svegrup et al. (2019), critical infrastructures and key resources provide
citizens, businesses, and organizations with resources and services for basic human needs and
perform specific emergency and social functions in society. These critical infrastructures include
hospitals, communication and technology, food chains, police and fire, hospitals, emergency
services, transportation systems, electric power grid systems and transmission, and natural gas
providers and transmission lines. Svegrup et al. emphasized that risk assessments are essential in
the business environment and focus on factors that can lead to disruptions, affect delivery, and
severely underestimate infrastructure’s adverse effects leading to damage, disorders, and
convulsions. They noted that transmission systems that provide electric power and natural gas
produce an economic output and contribute to local economies through employment
opportunities (Svegrup et al., 2019). There are also adverse consequences associated with
disruptions in the high-order society and when operational functions and system networks lack
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continuity and redundancy to perform during disruptions. For processes that involve risk
assessments, decision-making, and vulnerabilities, the failure to prioritize these areas can
produce two direct consequences of vulnerability reduction measures. Measures are reliant on
how businesses take a comprehensive approach and require “identifying critical components and
adding system components to increase robustness and redundancy” (Svegrup et al., 2019, p.
1970).
Svegrup et al. (2019) explained that critical infrastructures and key resources must be
available and provide normal functions and emergency services when adverse consequences lead
to disruptions or delays in assistance, service, and help. In addition, Svegrup et al. suggested that
risk and vulnerability assessments be focused on factors related to negative impacts to allow
system managers and operators of critical infrastructures to mitigate challenges and problems
encountered and noted in the evaluation. Svegrup et al.’s views are two-fold, referring to
decisions made on vulnerabilities that can impact critical infrastructures and have societal
consequences. First, vulnerability-based decisions can require integrating and incorporating an
input-output model (Svegrup et al., 2019). Furthermore, Svegrup et al. suggested that for those in
a leadership role in critical infrastructure, decision-making is an essential part of the process.
Leaders must make decisions that minimize risk and negative consequences in the
infrastructure’s behavior, minimize societal impacts and, if necessary, require modeling to
determine the best approach (Svegrup et al., 2019). Lastly, Svegrup et al. stated that practical
decisions would “provide estimations of high precision and metrics that are accepted by the
infrastructure owner(s) and societal actors” (p. 1972).
Topping et al. (2021) noted another significant focal point of governments is assessing
targeted attacks against critical infrastructures such as electric power grid systems, natural gas
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pipelines, and water distribution systems in the United States. These are considered significant
infrastructures that provide essential resources to citizens and a substantial part of national
security. Topping et al. explained that many of these infrastructures comprise a sectorial and
cross-sectorial framework and are interdependent, have interconnectivity in system networks and
operational functions, and involve third-party suppliers and operators. According to Kampova et
al. (2020), a quantitative approach must also include conducting risk assessments of physical
protection measures to mitigate vulnerabilities associated with critical infrastructure. Mitigation
must also include countermeasures for physical protection and cyber-attacks by implementing
“Systematic Analysis of Vulnerability to Intrusion (SAVI)” (Topping et al., 2021, p. 1) with the
utilization of cyber-security software tools and in increasing physical measures. These are
elements that will be identified in the dissertation.
Domestic Terrorism Historical Context
Neudecker (2021) pointed out that around the mid-2000s in Western nations, terrorist
activities grew, and countries became targets of domestic terrorist movements, often linked to
international terrorism. An example of terrorist activity and events is the September 11, 2001,
attack on U.S. soil, the terrorist attack in London in 2007, the 2004 terrorist attack involving a
train bombing in Madrid, and the 2004 bombing in Istanbul. Neudecker further explained the
term “terrorism” is notorious for having different definitions and includes elements of violent
extremism, domestic terrorist threats, and international terrorism. In conducting a quantitative
meta-analysis of terrorism, Neudecker noted violent activities create fear by exploiting citizens
through coercion and organized violence. The goal is to achieve political and social objectives.
Domestic terrorism includes individuals and groups associated with separatist movements and
religious ideologies. It can consist of “liberalism, anarchism, communism, conservatism,
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fascism, single-issues, organized crime, right-left-wing, eco-terror, ethnic nationalist, and
terrorism perpetrated” (Neudecker, 2021, pp. 1–2) by organized groups and state sponsors of
terrorism. How terrorism is defined should derive from a valid and reliable source and research,
according to Neudecker.
According to Korstanje (2021), terrorism is not a new phenomenon. However, after
September 11, 2001, the dynamics of terrorism have dramatically changed in Western
democracies that have faced economic and political challenges and overcoming the COVID-19
pandemic and increases in the virus environment. Korstanje explained that “The War on Terror”
(p. 45) has impacted, mined, and eroded elements of democracy in parts of the United States and
has impacted checks and balances in federal agencies and institutions of faith. In America and
other Western societies, domestic terrorism associated with lone-wolf terrorism has also
threatened parts of society. Korstanje suggested lone-wolf terrorism involves a process of
radicalization and radicalizing new members through a process in which individuals dislocate
themselves from their culture, family, and community and redirect rage at an abstract object and
members of society and potentially critical infrastructures. Lone-wolf terrorism has been around
since colonial rule, and events after 9-11 have created a radical shift in the dynamics of terrorism
in industrial and modern societies. Korstanje explained that the radicalization process occurs
through risk associated with the internet, propaganda, and participation in extremist activities and
groups that support terrorism and radical ideologies and are isolated from interacting with others
and function in small groups, often geographically and separated from the community and
family. In the radicalization process, members develop an identity crisis and transform to support
violent extremism and conduct acts of terror. Future research should be focused on
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understanding this type of terrorism and investigate how the methodology impacts today’s
discipline (Korstanje, 2021).
Sinnar (2019) asserted there are comparative differences in domestic and international
terrorism defined in society according to law. Domestic terrorism is violence committed for
purely domestic political reasons and “its origins and intended impact” (Sinnar, 2019, p. 1333).
For Sinnar, there is a divide between domestic and international terrorism laws. The rationale
behind each form of terrorism is based on three factors related to the impact terrorism has on
civil liberties, views of federalism, consequences associated with the magnitude of the threat and
effects of a terrorist attack, and how acts of violence are perpetrated and performed. Sinnar also
explained that under U.S. law, and when there are acts of terrorism committed, a decision is
made on whether it is domestic terrorism in nature or linked to international terrorism. An
assessment of acts of domestic terrorism is reliant on evaluations conducted by the FBI and
based on the investigation, the police report, and prosecution, determining if an act of terrorism
is linked to a specific cause, ideology, political agenda, and community (Sinnar, 2019). In any
case, involving domestic or international terrorism, the FBI is the lead investigative agency.
Sinnar further suggested that critics believe terrorist behavior is associated with “race, religion,
or the ideological perspective of terrorists and whether government officials and the media
conceptualized such acts as terrorism” (Sinnar, 2019, p. 1335). Additionally, in cases when an
individual(s) suspected of having links to terrorism, and has phone conversations concerning
potential acts of terrorism, uses the internet to radicalize new members, provides material
support, and conspires with known terrorists, under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISA Court), law enforcement officials will obtain a search warrant in an attempt to “intercept
conversations and to obtain internet records” (Sinnar, 2019, p. 1335).
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In examining cases of terrorism in the United States, Tschantret (2020) noted that the
goal is to conduct a multilevel statistical analysis of events involving domestic terrorism in
America dating back between 1970 and 2015. For example, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing
involving the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and the 2016 Pulse Nightclub shooting in
Orlando, Florida, demonstrate how lethal domestic terrorist attacks can target critical
infrastructures and events (Tschantret, 2020). Furthermore, in 2020, another example of a
domestic terrorist attack took place in the U.S. capital, one of the most prominent government
infrastructures in Washington, DC (Tschantret, 2020). Therefore, to mitigate future extremist
acts of violence and terrorism, research involving domestic terrorists should be focused on the
ability to protect and secure critical infrastructures and focus on the “variation in terrorist attack
lethality” (Tschantret, 2020, p. 235). These factors are crucial in understanding the capabilities of
specific designated domestic terrorist groups, organizations, and lone-wolf actors.
Critical infrastructures are often not seen, in the present tense or in plain view of the
general public in parts of society, such as electric power grids and electrical lines and natural gas
pipelines, water filtration systems, dams, and community hospitals. Protecting these
infrastructures requires government, leaders, owners, and operators to conduct timely risk
assessments. The overall goal is to protect against cyber-criminals and provide physical
protection to protect these facilities. Therefore, estimates should include measuring the
probability of a potential terrorist attack, disruption, and damage to the Nation’s most critical
infrastructures.
Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources in Society
According to Rehak et al. (2019), to manage critical infrastructure and key resources
effectively, owners and operators must conduct PRAs and assess facilities and resources for
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resiliency to determine the reliability of service, resources, and commodities to minimize societal
impact. Rehak et al. suggested resilience and resiliency are critical factors that help reduce risk
and vulnerabilities and help absorb the impact of damage, disruption, and system failures caused
by accidents, disasters, and deliberate factors. To assess critical infrastructures, the Critical
Infrastructure Elements Resilience Assessment (CIERA) is a tool used to perform a statistical
assessment and analysis of the level of resiliency in elements of infrastructures to help determine
if infrastructures can recover from a disaster or disruption (Rehak et al., 2019). The process
involves a thorough evaluation of critical infrastructure sectors such as electrical grids,
communication networks, and natural gas transmission lines. In addition, Rehak et al. also
suggested the CIERA program offer owner and operators the ability to perform analysis and
assessment of essential functions. Resiliency ensures that infrastructures and resources have the
“ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event”
(Rehak et al., 2019, p. 4).
Dick et al. (2019) found that resilience and resiliency are integral to modern society in
one case study. Learning concepts promoting deep learning in the homeland security field can
involve applying machine intelligence and computer technology and system applications design
to develop learning patterns and produce data and image analysis on specific interest categories
and particular infrastructures. According to Dick et al., deep learning can contribute to 95%
accuracy and reduce problems in power-related infrastructures such as electrical grid systems
when elements of deep learning and machine vision are applied to protect critical infrastructures.
Deep learning is a concept that involves machine vision and computer system imagery to assess
factors related to risk and threat assessments and operational functions by evaluating learning
patterns to produce exemplar data to use as part of preventive maintenance (Dick et al., 2019). In
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society, critical infrastructures such as processing facilities and system networks, health safety
networks, and institutions essential to security and economic well-being, high-technology
innovations can detect anomalies before failures occur in processes (Dick et al., 2019). Scripture
teaches, “These were noble men than those in Thessalonica, in that they received the word with
all readiness of mind, and search the Scripture daily, to whether those things were so” (King
James Bible, 1769/2021 Acts 17:11).
According to Pirbhulal et al. (2021), protecting system networks and operational
functions requires an analysis of reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety/security
(RAMS). Furthermore, an investigative process ensures that critical infrastructure and resources
are protected against vulnerabilities. The goal is to prevent failures in modes in system
applications. Therefore, it is a view that cyber-security tools are needed to safeguard digitization
in digital components in system networks, which is essential in protecting critical infrastructure
systems and operational processes (Pirbhulal et al., 2021).
Dawson et al. (2021) suggested that managing critical infrastructure cybersecurity is a
significant challenge because of vulnerabilities and risks that can impact the 16 crucial
infrastructures from a national and global perspective, and they noted the purpose of the
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21 on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience is to
help mitigate cybersecurity attacks. The PPD 21 is designed to provide enhanced protection for
infrastructure sectors that include policy and mitigations to “strengthen and maintain secure,
functioning and resilient critical infrastructure,” according to Dawson et al. (2021, p. 69).
Challenges and problems facing critical infrastructures on the national and global level are
associated with cyber warfare, ransomware, and denial of service attacks driven by cybercriminals. These problems can have a large-scale and cascading impact on system networks and
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the operational functions of significant infrastructures because cyber-criminals design
ransomware to take control of system networks for ransom. Therefore, mitigation is an essential
part of addressing the problems caused by these cyber-criminals.
According to Luskova and Dvorak (2019), in managing risk, leaders and management
staff must understand critical infrastructures are considered an asset or system, and any type of
disruption, damage, or cyber-attack can have an adverse impact on the ability to perform as
intended and can have an impact on the performance of the economic and financial sectors, and
the ability provide for the needs of citizens and services relative to the quality of life (Luskova
and Dvorak, 2019, p. 7). In addition, because of new technological advancements in society,
leaders must prepare for unforeseen problems that require enhancing security protection
measures and an increased level of security to protect facilities, property, people, the
environment, system networks, and critical infrastructure. In homeland security and the private
sector, risk management is a core feature, and leaders must be prepared to evaluate exposure to
certain risk factors that can impact the energy sector, information and communication
technologies, roads and bridges, and the ability of first responders to respond effectively,
according to Luskova and Dvorak. In risk management, leaders follow predetermined guidelines
and management processes to mitigate current challenges and future problems that can occur.
Homeland Security in Society
In society today, homeland security aspects have evolved to focus more on domestic
terrorism, cyber-security, preventive measures, interdiction, enhancing counterintelligence and
counterterrorism measures, data-driven intelligence, and information sharing, vaccinations and
preventing the further spread of COVID-19, and other concepts essential in mitigating threats
and protecting critical infrastructures and key resources (Bellavita, 2019). The learning concepts
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on aspects of homeland security involve three factors: (a) foundational concepts on elements of
homeland security, (b) images that validate homeland security concepts, and (c) concepts that
subjectively include ideas that offer research questions and foundations and provide helpful
knowledge in the homeland security field (Bellavita, 2019). In addition, Bellavita noted that
empirical knowledge will help link physical and material sciences elements that include safety,
security, physical aspects of homeland security, biological factors related to the environment,
chemistry and chemical hazards, engineering, and information systems and technology.
Haase and Demiroz (2020) stated that communities are better prepared when they engage
in activities to reduce risks and increase resilience and resiliency to respond to dangers,
vulnerabilities, domestic threats, disasters, and disruptive events in homeland security. They
believe the best way to help communities understand the benefits of resiliency “in the
community is to enable the concept to be applied in research and public policy contexts” (Haase
& Demiroz, 2020, p. 1). Additionally, Haase and Demiroz mentioned that Homeland Security
Affairs and the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management are resources that
provide literature on resiliency in homeland security to communities and agencies to help
develop a hybrid model that conceptualizes elements of resilience and resiliency. It is also
essential for society and communities to understand how federal agencies define stability and
resiliency at different governmental levels, such as the White House, Department of State, and
DHS. Haase and Demiroz further noted that these efforts could impact the design,
implementation, programs, management, and evaluation of public programs and policies without
a clear understanding of the terms.
Danko (2019) explained that experiential is a common feature in homeland security and
emergency management (HSEM) in higher education and a methodological approach that
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represents a shift in homeland security elements. Addressing the challenges and problems seen in
society to protect citizens, government, and critical infrastructures from threats requires
supporting a national strategic strategy. After September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on U. S. soil,
in 2003, President Bush created the DHS as a national strategy to respond to terrorism, prevent
terrorism, border security, cyber-security, respond to hazards, and develop disaster resilience.
Since its inception, the mission of the DHS has changed due to risk, vulnerabilities and emerging
threats, and increased domestic terrorism. The DHS provides a framework to agencies to help
prevent future terrorist attacks and pending threats to safeguard America. Danko further noted
that today, higher education programs on homeland security emergency management are
structured to provide a transformational and evidence-based learning approach through
experience, best practices, and research. Future research should examine the research gaps and
students’ abilities to obtain robust analysis concerning risk and research design to bridge the gap
and provide ways to assess essential skills to achieve student success (Danko, 2019). Examining
risk and research gaps can include ensuring students are provided with an environment to
improve critical thinking skills, perform a critical analysis involving complex problems and
situations, and engage in collaborative problem-solving in an experiential learning environment
and practice to address today’s challenges and issues (Danko, 2019).
Risk Assessments in Society
According to Deka and Fei (2019), conducting a risk assessment on critical infrastructure
and individual users is essential in planning and developing homeland security strategies for
transportation systems in society, communities, neighborhoods, and ride-sourcing. Under the
guidance of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and the DHS, in 2018, the National
Household Travel Survey (NHTS) was used to develop a statistical dataset to help analyze
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characteristics of neighborhood transportation systems and ride-sourcing user data from
limousine and taxi trip frequencies to provide data on the proximity of transportation systems
and ridesharing sources to neighborhoods (Deka & Fei, 2019). In a research study, Deka and Fei
found that the frequency of citizens using ridesharing increased, and people living in proximity
to transit systems use ridesharing more frequently. Data and other information provided are
essential to homeland security in providing homeland infrastructure foundation-level data
(HIFLD) to the DHS for empirical statistical modeling to understand the impact ridesharing and
other transportation systems have on neighborhoods to assess travel needs (Deka & Fei, 2019).
In society, public transportation serves as a safety net for the less privileged and underserved
living in rural communities and metropolitan neighborhood areas.
Deka and Fei (2019) suggest that for future research, the DHS and the NHTS should
conduct a national study on the implications ridesharing has on transportation systems
nationwide through national surveys. It is vital to execute risk assessment in a society that lacks
protections for critical infrastructure and key resources. Data and statistics are collected to help
policymakers and local government planners to understand probabilities and the need to extend
electrical power grid systems and natural gas pipelines or build hospitals, bridges, roads, and
emergency services.
Recently, DHS agencies have been under enormous strain and dealing with risks
associated with the environment resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic which has been a
significant homeland security concern. Citizens and loved ones have been overcome, and many
have died from the COVID-19 pandemic. State and federal government agencies and the country
have been under enormous challenges and problems, including a time of political turmoil and a
change in presidential leadership in the United States. It is a critical time worldwide, and people
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have relied on their faith in God and prayer to help overcome challenges and problems. Scripture
teaches, “But without faith, it is impossible to please him; for he, that cometh to God must
believe that he is, and he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him” (King James Bible,
1769/2021, Hebrews 11:6).
Anthony and Hermans (2020) suggested that risk management and resiliency are
leadership processes concerned with improving critical functions and systems to support
neighborhoods, local areas, groups of people, and critical infrastructure in the homeland security
profession. Resiliency and resilience planning in homeland security agencies and organizations
allow leaders effectively to respond to and recover from man-made and natural disasters.
Resiliency is a process that involves developing the capacity to maintain continuity and bounce
back after disruptions, damage, and terrorist attacks to critical infrastructure and key resources.
According to Anthony and Hermans, resiliency in spiritual life is encompassed by “both
individual and communal perspectives and presupposes self-transcendence as an experience of
being drawn beyond by something outside of oneself, being and liberated from one’s fixation on
oneself” (p. 66). Furthermore, spiritual and religious discernment is considered a core feature of
spiritual life driven by assessing personal spiritual traits relying on spiritual capital and lived
spiritual experiences (Anthony & Hermans, 2020). Spiritual life creates resiliency and a higher
order of values and levels that followers support the religious organization’s vision and mission
(Anthony & Hermans, 2020). Scripture teaches, “Jesus said I am the way, the truth life; no man
cometh unto the Father, but by me” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, John 14:6).
Winterfeldt et al. (2020) explained that to assess risks involved with domestic terrorism, a
risk cost-benefit analysis is a methodological approach used in risk management to examine the
benefits, research cost, and total cost from the start-to-start finish. Risk-informed benefit-cost
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analysis in homeland security is essential. It allows analysts, policymakers, and researchers to
estimate future damage caused by domestic or international terrorist attacks and threats,
including damage associated with natural or manufactured disasters. Winterfeldt et al.
emphasized that the Economic Consequences Analysis Tool (E-CAT) provides policymakers and
analysts with the probability of the economic impact of specific threats listed in the Homeland
Security National Risk Characterization Register. The homeland security factors related to costbenefits analysis vary according to the agency and research project, the type of testing, and the
sensitive nature of a research project (Winderfeldt et al., 2020). Through this process, lessons are
learned for future applications, intelligence products, and tasks to provide a baseline risk metric
to make comparisons in research (Winterfeldt et al., 2020). A risk cost-benefits analysis is also
essential in analyzing potential damage and destruction caused by an extremist, domestic
terrorist, or natural disaster and provides and has a role in PRAs in assessing critical
infrastructure and elements of homeland security and managing risk.
According to Suo et al. (2019), in addressing problems related to critical infrastructures
in homeland security and the private sector, there are benefits in conducting risk assessment in
society, especially to meet the demand for public improvements, services, utilities, and
improvements in critical infrastructure. According to Suo et al., risk assessment provides a
profile of existing conditions, future risks, and potential sources of risk. A theoretical approach
to risk assessment can include a hybrid model. This model focuses on risk characteristics such as
a system-of-systems perspective, examining dual interdependency, and a scenario-driven course
to examine complexities and explore emergency response planning and can include a four-stage
approach resolution framework and risk matrix. These quantitative factors will be discussed and
highlighted in data and graphs at each dissertation stage.
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According to Kumar et al. (2021), to address gaps in research regarding risk assessments
and resilience in critical infrastructure, risk management processes must include a risk profile to
consider the impact of climate change to withstand events that can occur in the present and
future. Therefore, Kumar et al. explained that research mitigation must include extreme events
from a global perspective in a framework design to improve resiliency in critical infrastructures.
The dissertation research will provide data and methods to predict climate projections and the
probability of the impact on critical infrastructure using probability risk assessments. According
to Kumar et al., the PRA approach will allow researchers to examine limits and limitations
related to distribution and variables based on specific patterns and vulnerability to climate
change.
Yao et al. (2020) suggested an essential part of the process is understanding the
probability of an occurrence by conducting a PRA of any limitations, the target, or the targeted
area to mitigate concerns. It also includes exploring gaps in research associated with the
historical context and collecting data from models used to evaluate the likelihood of an attack or
event. Yao et al. noted that models such as the Elkabets and Shohet model and game theory
could be applied to explore gaps in research regarding the level of protection needed to protect
infrastructure or a problem-defense focus model designed to take into account consideration
security at different levels.
In today’s volatile environment and society, Baggott and Santos (2020) asserted that
examining protection measures for the Nation’s power grid system and natural gas pipeline
network requires investigating vulnerabilities. Therefore, it also includes robust risk analysis in a
framework that considers a multitude of problems that can occur to impact operational functions
and system networks that control infrastructures and involve other interdependent infrastructures
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that rely on resources to function. In addition, leaders, owners, and operators must take necessary
measures to prevent and mitigate vulnerabilities and probabilities associated with cyber-attacks,
hacking, and domestic and international terrorism by formulating strategies, according to
Baggott and Santos. To focus on many of these problems, data in the proposed research will
highlight “severity and likelihood classifications” (Baggott & Santos, 2020, p. 1754), and
evaluate six scenarios in different phases, and cover the spectrum of problems that can occur.
Domestic Terrorism in Society
According to Sacco (2021), domestic terrorism is significantly different from criminal
activity and centers on self-motivated individuals driven by a specific cause, ideology, or
political agenda. Domestic terrorists are divergent and draw beliefs from different philosophical
views and worldviews to justify violent extremism and domestic terrorism directed at the
government for political reasons (Sacco, 2021). In addition, Sacco explained that domestic
terrorists are ideologically motivated or driven by a specific cause, and acts of domestic
terrorism can be considered hate crimes and classified as domestic terrorism when an ideology or
an individual fuels acts of violence as a member of a domestic terrorist group. Acts of domestic
terrorism include intentionally selecting the “victim’s actual or perceived race, color, religion,
national origin, gender, gender identity disability, or sexual orientation” (Sacco, 2021, p. 2).
Homegrown extremists are often radicalized and motivated by foreign terrorist groups and
organizations that provide material support and support the groups’ ideologies. They may act
independently under the direction of the leader of the terrorist organization through propaganda
or communication through the internet (Sacco, 2021). There are also underlying drivers of
domestic terrorism driven by perceived or “perceptions of government or law enforcement
overreach, sociopolitical conditions, racism, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, misogyny, and
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reactions to legislative actions” (Sacco, 2021, pp. 2–3). The FBI considers violent domestic
extremism as an act of violence fueled by radical and violent extremists.
Kurz (2020) stated understanding elements of terrorism and the dynamics require
examining gaps in research on domestic terrorism and international terrorism and recognizing the
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) defines acts of terrorism as the unlawful use of physical
force and violence and acts of violence committed against citizens of a populated area and
violence that causes severe property damage, to intimidate or coerce a government, and parts of
the civilian population. Those who promote terrorism and acts of violence are committed to
supporting a political agenda, social objectives, religious and jihadist viewpoints, and
radicalization process (Kurz, 2020). A broad definition of domestic terrorism includes acts of
violence committed by White supremacists, misguided militias, lone-wolves, and other violent
extremists motivated by ideologies, political views, and acts of violence in furtherance of a
cause. According to Kurz, domestic terrorism has domestic origins in parts of society within the
U. S. territorial jurisdictions. Extremists support ideologies and become radicalized and engage
in planning and actions to conduct terrorist attacks within the United States. This type of
terrorism is currently the greatest threat to the United States and requires counterterrorism
measures to mitigate threats. According to Kurz, since September 11, 2001, at least “seventythree percent of deaths” (p. 119) have been associated with violent extremism and domestic
terrorism. Kurz also noted that most cases involving domestic terrorism fall under the U.S.
PATRIOT Act, and international terrorism involves acts of terrorism that occur outside “of the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcends national boundaries” (p. 119).
International terrorism falls under international and federal terrorism laws, and terrorists are
extradited to the United States for criminal prosecution. Scripture teaches, “Fear not for I am
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with you, be not dismayed for I am your God. I will strengthen you. I will help you. I will uphold
you with my righteous right hand” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, Isaiah 41:10).
Problem Statement
In examining homeland security and critical infrastructure problems related to domestic
terrorism and violent extremism, P. Davis (2019) noted on September 19, 2019, in the United
States, a man trained in bomb-making was indicted for conducting surveillance and targeting
potential targets for a terrorist organization. This suggests a significant problem related to
targeted violence and homegrown terrorists and why local law enforcement officials must remain
on guard for the evolving threat environment facing the United States and critical infrastructures
(P. Davis, 2019). In addition, after the domestic terrorist attack in El Paso, Texas, that violent
extremists perpetrated to support state and local law enforcement partners, the FBI in 2019
established the “F.B.I.’s” “domestic terrorism-hate crimes Fusion cell ” (P. Davis, 2019, p. 11).
The goal is to provide law enforcement partners with investigative and intelligence support to
mitigate the threat of domestic terrorism. P. Davis also noted another purpose is to ensure the
seamless sharing of information among local law enforcement agencies and investigative
resources concerning the threat environment. According to P. Davis, in a January 2019 press
conference, the FBI director stated the domestic-terrorism cases “investigated are motivated by
some version of what you might call white-supremacist violence” (p. 12), and it is not the
extremist ideology investigated; it is the violence investigated.
Molstad (2020) emphasized another problem in the United States is that there is no
uniform framework for specifically prosecuting domestic terrorism, but criminal codes are
applied to prosecute specific acts of terrorism. According to Molstad, political interest and
protectionism fuel attempts to curb laws involving right-wing terrorism to avoid conviction
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under terrorism laws and sections of the criminal code. Molstad suggested citizens in society feel
the judicial system should incorporate a form of law or a uniform domestic terrorism statute that
will allow for a criminal prosecution not based on a belief system, but on the perpetrators’
extremist violent actions and intent. For example, the problem here suggests that right-wing and
left-wing extremists believe their way of life is infringed upon and that their personal or national
way of life is threatened and resort to violent extremist behavior to support political and
ideological beliefs and commit acts of violence punishable by law, according to Molstad.
Scripture teaches, “For whosoever shall keep the law, and yet offend in one point he is guilty of
all” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, James 2:10).
Theoretical Perspectives
Homeland Security Theories
According to Comiskey (2018), homeland security is a discipline. It lacks a specific
theory or framework, but learning can involve multiple concepts and ideas taught by
professionals from various fields related to homeland security. Comiskey explained that
institutions and homeland security elements have evolved from numerous disciplines evaluated,
validated, developed, and generate other theories and methodologies as the field matures over
time. Homeland security is also a discipline in which multiple realities in society became known
and can include a different body of knowledge-based, theoretical perspectives, or overarching
framework based on the subject matter or homeland security concern (Comiskey, 2018).
Bothamley’s Dictionary of Theories in 2002 referred to homeland security as a general activity
and principles that are evidence-based and supported by scientific evidence which explains
observed facts and phenomena (Comiskey, 2018). Theoretical perspectives can also include
typologies and evidence-based and systematic viewpoints in homeland security. According to
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Comiskey, theories in research can involve “descriptive theory and explanatory theory,
normative theory, and predictive theory” (p. 31), and the inductive process is referred to as a
grounded theory. Other theories include “grand theory, macro-theory meso-theory, and micro
theory” (Comiskey, 2018, p. 31). Homeland security is considered a metadiscipline because of
the cumulative knowledge, methods used in inquiries, and problem-solving to solve complex and
critical problems (Comiskey. 2018).
Stewart and Oliver (2021) noted elements of homeland security engage in policing
programs, crime-fighting initiatives, counterterrorism programs, and community-oriented
policing services (COPS) programs at the local government level. These programs receive
funding allocations through the DHS. At the local level of government, funding initiatives and
financial incentives support strategic planning, operational goals, tactical necessity, and change
to adapt at the local level (Stewart & Oliver, 2021). The DHS comprises 22 departments and
federal agencies responsible for responding to natural or manufactured disasters and terrorist
incidents; the agencies involved represent various disciplines and thus approach different
challenges and problems from different theoretical perspectives, as noted by Stewart and Oliver.
Scripture teaches, “Thus said the Lord the maker thereof, the Lord that formed it, to establish it,
the Lord is His name” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, Jeremiah 33:2)
Risk Assessments Theoretical Perspectives
From a theoretical perspective, risk assessments in homeland security structured for
critical infrastructure are considered concepts, ideas, and processes designed to identify and
analyze hazards, vulnerabilities, and threats that can adversely impact system networks,
operational functions, and business processes. The data collected allow leaders, policymakers,
owners, and operators to make informed decisions and mitigate risks. The theoretical perspective
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in the dissertation will consist of PRA theories involving electrical power grid systems and
natural gas pipelines.
Critical Infrastructures Theories
According to Ren et al. (2020), in a quantitative approach to critical infrastructures,
grounded theory is a model used to examine conditions and losses in homeland security and
inferences in the relocation of victims’ “self-identity, social connections, and meaning systems”
(p. 1) during disasters. This approach includes a model designed to assess mental health and
provide services and support relocation policy in a postdisaster environment and developed to
evaluate conditions that lead to psychological disorders (e.g., posttraumatic stress disorder
[PTSD]) and problems due to relocating citizens and victims in heavily damaged areas caused by
earthquakes or significant disasters (Ren et al., 2020). The benefit of this model is in assessing
victims, the relocation process, psychological and social vulnerabilities, and cultural factors
related to disease, mental health, domestic terrorism, and other problems. According to Ren et
al., future researchers should consider this model and examine the benefit of mental health
services during disasters, support systems, and cultural significance.
Meijer et al. (2021) noted that viewing critical infrastructures such as drinking water
facilities, electrical grids, and natural gas transmission lines is essential to the well-being of life
and citizens living in communities and cities. In these distribution systems, risk assessments and
maintenance strategies are crucial to the efficiency of operations and vital functions. They
suggest graph theory used to assess and identify the most critical elements such as water supply
and demand and to, categorize sewage discharge systems elements, and measure the distance
between manufactured overflow systems and structures to provide a graphic presentation of
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networks involving water and sewage distribution systems, electrical networks, and grid systems
(Meijer et al., 2021).
Grady et al. (2021) noted that Maslow’s theory of human motivation could be used to
approach the hierarchical arrangement of critical infrastructure based on societal and basic
human needs. This theory addresses needs and social vulnerabilities related to supply availability
and demand. This theoretical approach can help guide system networks, and physical critical
infrastructure systems failures and political governance theories are applied when evaluating
functions related to public welfare and addressing the basic needs of consumers. According to
Grady et al., the government’s role in providing for underserved communities and communities
“developed under welfare capitalism to coordinate public and private efforts for finance and
delivery of social welfare” (p. 10) in critical infrastructure management.
Domestic Terrorism Theories
According to Varaine (2019), in viewing conflicting views on economic deprivation and
terrorism, one hypothesis suggests economic deprivation has no relation to terrorism. Still,
Varaine argued that economic deprivation and terrorism are related to the extent to which
collective deprivation is a factor in determining the role ideology plays in terrorist movements,
such as the ability of far-right terrorists to mobilize because of collective deprivation far-left
terrorist mobilization is motivated by collaborative improvements. Varaine further noted that
system-justification and backlash theories are consistent with how far-left and far-right terrorism
mobilizes, and the decline or increase in economic activity serves as potential drivers. Finally,
Varaine mentioned that some conservative political systems support right-wing ideologies, and
conservative extremists express political attitudes. Collective action and extremism are at the
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heart of conservatism when motivation levels and similar views are described on the far left
(Varaine, 2019).
According to A. P. Davis and Zhang (2019), civil society has had exposure to domestic
terrorism. Between 1970 to 2010, there have been 167 domestic terrorist attacks across the
country, and terrorist organizations engage in high-risk activities and movements that present a
threat to other countries. Thus, social movement theory can help clarify an element of terrorism
and explain terrorism rooted in an organizational paradigm (A. P. Davis & Zhang, 2019).
Furthermore, social movement theory can also help explain the radicalization process, how
domestic terrorist organizations become a radical social movement, and how organizations
become spaces for radicalization and challenge political structures, as noted by A. P. Davis and
Zhang.
According to Qvortrup (2020), the Lijphart model of domestic terrorism suggests that
domestic terrorism is motivated by a grievance that leads to opportunities for meaningful
participation. In this model, when there are more opportunities for political influence, domestic
terror and fatal acts of terrorism are lower; terrorist groups will not have the ability to perpetrate
domestic terror. Additionally, Qvortrup explained domestic terrorism can be associated with
factors related to ethnicity and ethnic tensions, linguistic and religious culture, and minority
discrimination. Qvortrup provided an opposing view on the “logic of scientific discovery” (p.
908) by Popper. In choosing a specific theory on domestic terrorism or any other subject,
Qvortrup suggested a hypothesis or thesis should not be introduced if the theory cannot “explain
the things the former theory could explain, as well as the things it could not explain” (p. 908).
According to Haddow et al. (2021) in the United States, domestic terrorist groups and
organizations that include the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), militias, and Oath Keepers (identified as
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white supremacist organizations) engage in lynchings, intimidation, burning crosses, voter
intimidation, and action designed to impact and influence the political process. Haddow et al.
(2021) suggest anarchists have been around since 1886, engaging in demonstrations, mail
bombings, and rallies, and are “responsible for two of the ten deadliest attacks on American soil”
(Haddow et al., 2021, p. 410). In addition, unions have been noted to engage in terrorism to
influence the political process. Other terrorist groups and organizations identified are groups or
organizations with violent and destructive natures and engage in violent activity and behavior.
For example, according to Qvortrup, domestic terrorist organizations are identified as the
“K.K.K., the Black Panthers, Weather Underground, Army of God, Earth Liberation Front,
Animal Liberation Front, Aryan Nations, the Boricua Popular Army, the Jewish Defense League,
and the Symbionese Liberation Army” (p. 410). Haddow et al. further suggested one of the
single most devasting acts of domestic terrorism in the United States was the 1995 bombing of
the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.
State of Problem
According to Haddow et al. (2021), the United States has experienced an increase in acts
of domestic terrorism and acts of violence that involve violent extremism and radicalization,
including behaviors such as violent shootings, bombings, violent physical attacks, gang beatings,
arson, lynching, vandalism, and property destruction. Haddow et al. explained that over the past
five years, communities have experienced domestic threats and taken measures to prevent,
prepare, and respond to acts of domestic terrorism. The term “terrorism” encompasses extremist
activities involving specific ideologies, tactics, and weapons, including bombings, improvised
devices, mass shootings, chemical and biological agents, and physical assaults (Haddow et al.,
2021). Further, Haddow et al. stated the Natural and Technological Hazards and Risk
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Assessment also identifies weapons of mass destruction as chemical, biological, or radiological
weapons. In the United States, domestic terrorism encompasses activities and actions that are
dangerous to human life, violate U.S criminal law or laws of a state, and involve measures
designed to intimidate the government and influence a government policy and the political
process. Haddow et al. recounted that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols conducted a
domestic terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and
considered it to be the most devasting domestic terrorist attack in U.S. history. According to
Haddow et al., the perpetrators “claimed the U.S. government had overstepped its bounds
regarding gun control and in its handling of the Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas standoffs”
(p. 416).
Purpose of Study
This dissertation research study is aimed to shed light on the importance of PRAs in
critical infrastructures, homeland security, and social elements. The goal is to provide data,
statistics, and guidance to help secure critical infrastructure and key resources involving electric
grid power systems, natural gas pipeline distribution, and natural gas transmission in
communities. The study will address the problems that can devastate society, human life,
government, economic and financial sectors, emergency services, and other resources to explore
the benefits of PRAs in society from a theoretical perspective. Kumar et al. (2021) stated that a
novel framework for conducting a PRA on critical infrastructure should include assessing the
impact of climates changes, especially in areas where an event can impact communities (e.g.,
fires, hurricanes, tornados, and flood-prone areas) and population changes that impact local
emergency services and resources. For example, risk assessments are essential in building
resiliency in infrastructures in areas where there is extreme precipitation and drought because
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PRAs provide planners and policymakers with the ability to ensure new development will be
based on data, statistics collected, and on principles of flexibility, diversity, consideration given
to industrial ecology, and develop an understanding of short-term and long-term impacts of
climate risk (Kumar et al., 2021).
Forman (2020) noted that in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States,
extensive natural gas infrastructure and natural gas transmission lines exist, and dangers
associated with the subterranean and underground circulation of natural gas express the need to
provide adequate security. In 1985 in the United Kingdom, there was an explosion which “killed
eight people, demolished six apartments, and shattered all nearby windows within a quarter of a
mile radius [and involved the] 7600-km-long National Transmission System” (NTS; Forman,
2020, p. 146), which is part of the natural gas national grid system. Forman noted the NTS
consists of a transmission system responsible for transporting a large volume of natural gas
throughout the country at high pressure to producers, international interconnectors, and delivery
to specific regions and lower gas pressure to consumers. Natural gas movement and transmission
have geopolitical implications and adequate security is required to protect the NTS (Forman,
2020). In addition, public safety has an increased role in securing energy supplies in society.
Forman further suggested that management and security professionals should recognize the
importance of securing natural gas movement, identifying risks and points of vulnerability, and
providing intervention to help ensure the environment and communities because of the nature of
subterranean and underground natural gas infrastructure. The proposed dissertation will briefly
examine four trajectories related to the management, transmission, distribution, and movement of
natural gas at the subterranean level and measures to protect and secure these critical
infrastructures from acts of domestic terrorism and other risk and vulnerabilities.
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Importance of Study
Natural gas and propane are essential resources in metropolitan and rural areas. Natural
gas distribution and transmission are critical infrastructures that provide the help needed in
electricity generation to meet basic human needs in communities to prepare meals and to provide
heat and hot water. The proposed study is important because it will examine how to prevent and
protect these critical infrastructures from risk, vulnerabilities, and domestic acts of terrorism. The
dissertation’s research involving critical infrastructure, homeland security, domestic terrorism,
extremism, and transformational leadership will provide research theories to address each
quantitative research study element. Another goal is to contribute to future research in mitigating
risk and vulnerabilities associated with critical infrastructure and key resources applicable to
other infrastructures. The dissertation will provide a quantitative research study on managing
natural gas critical infrastructure and transmission and securing these vital infrastructures.
Scripture teaches that “It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, but the honor of kings to search
out a matter” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, Proverbs 25:2).
According to Beyza et al. (2019), a theoretical approach to managing critical
infrastructure and vital resources includes graph theory and network theory. These theories are
an approach designed to evaluate processes that have been cascading system failures. The
process will require networking and conducting statistical analysis using “statistical indexes
applied from elements of graph theory” (p. 1). During the procedure, management undergoes a
network series process to determine the cascading failures and conduct simulations and a
“statistical analysis by testing natural gas test networks” (Beyza et al., 2019, p. 1). These are
theoretical approaches designed to help management minimize downtime, analyze stand-alone
systems, and evaluate power systems that control the flow of natural gas. The quantitative
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dissertation research study will explore the drivers for change and research gaps, contribute to
future research, and examine the role of PRAs in government and management structures in
protecting critical infrastructures and key resources in society. In the spiritual domain of inflow
of spirit, Scripture teaches, “It is the Spirit that gives life and the flesh profits nothing; the words
I have spoken to you are spirit and life” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, John 6:63).
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
This chapter encompasses the literature review that addresses PRAs in critical
infrastructure and homeland security. The chapter includes defining the role of this type of risk
assessment in homeland security, examining factors relevant to protecting electric power grid
systems’ and natural gas pipelines’ critical infrastructures from domestic terrorism, an increase
in violent extremism, and developing a framework based on probabilities in counterterrorism
processes. Leaders must be prepared to safeguard and secure critical infrastructures such as
natural gas pipelines and electric power grid systems, and other vital resources from domestic
terrorists, violent extremists, lone wolf actors, and natural and manufactured disasters in the
homeland security profession. The dissertation will consist of a quantitative research study on
PRAs in homeland security and valid research on these three manageable issues related to
domestic terrorism, violent extremism, and protecting critical infrastructures such as natural gas
pipelines and electric grid power systems.
According to Chatterjee et al. (2021), a PRA is a methodological and systematic
approach designed to evaluate complex risk. It assesses the probabilities of other risks and
vulnerabilities by seeking answers to questions such as what can potentially go wrong,
examining the likelihood of an event, occurrence, or phenomenon, and what probable measures
can be taken to mitigate concerns. In PRAs, this type of risk assessment process is formulated to
help evaluate, identify, and measure current and future trends through metrics designed to be
used by agencies and organizations in homeland security in specific models, solutions, and
scenarios, and to track specific trends, extreme weather events, domestic terrorism activity, and
cyberattacks (Chatterjee et al., 2021). Furthermore, Chatterjee et al. explained that elements of
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government, the private sector, and society in general, PRA provides leaders with guidance and
tools to evaluate certain factors and risks by providing reliable knowledge on uncertainties that
require special consideration and considering probability spaces.
Grimmett (2021) described that a scenario-driven model could include known and
unknown factors in socio-security systems. According to Grimmett, these systems can involve
multiple stakeholders and multiple factors that may present additional challenges if consideration
is not given to macro-scale disruptions in security, demographics, politics, and the environment
in a multicriteria analysis. In scenario-driven models, risk management can include a framework
that considers probability versus consequence can be highlighted on a graph or use metrics to
illustrate factors relevant to the risk assessment associated with low, moderate, significant, and
high risk (Grimmett, 2021). Probability is a factor that can be applied in many areas such as
emergency response, energy applications, assessing consequences, assessing behavior, fitness,
terrorism, and violent extremism. In Chapter Three, different methodological approaches will be
discussed in detail.
According to Durrett (2019), probability can also be viewed as a measure or
measurement theory that identifies probability as space-related factors. It relates to factors
associated with a set of outcomes, consequences, events, and functions highlighted as a threepart process and illustrated in a field and mathematical process. Outcomes in probability theory
can be conceived as an experiment, event, trial, test, or scenario, with each having a different
outcome. In equations, the probability is generally highlighted and represented as “P or as P(A)
as the probability of a function P(A) = 0.5, and probability introduced where events intersect is
represented by P(A ∩ B) or P(A ∩ B) = 0.5 and probability illustrated as an event union is
represented by P(A ∪ B) or P(A ∪ B) = 0.5” (Durrett, 2019, p. 1).
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According to Holzmann and Smith (2021), in homeland security and the military, when
addressing challenges and problems in the organization, leaders must select the shortest path to
interdiction that may involve a zero-sum game and selecting a strategy directed toward problems
in a specific area of concern. The interdiction strategy may include formalities designed to take
into consideration metrics that include a set of arcs and costs. Holzmann & Smith suggested that
leaders must select the appropriate path which maximizes benefits in the followers’ cost.
However, followers must also select the minimum cost and path to achieve goals and objectives.
In this case, when leaders and followers select an appropriate strategy, probability is a factor that
is part of a “policy of randomized interdiction actions” (Holzmann & Smith, 2021, p. 82) when
selecting a specific course action to address challenges and problems. Holzmann & Smith further
suggested that PRAs can provide leaders and followers in homeland security and the military
with specific options based on assessing the shortest path in interdiction strategies to approach
specific problems and solve linear problems.
Modern PRAs have been around since the 1980s and are used in the nuclear industry to
assess risk (Standley et al., 2020). It is a risk assessment process that is used to assess detection
processes and complex warning systems in elements of risk reduction. Standley et al. (2020)
explained that probabilities are used in risk assessments and decision-making in military wars
and are a significant part of the leadership in assessing risk. According to Standley et al., the
“likelihood ratio test (LRT), based on Bayes’ theorem” (p. 137), is a process used to assess the
probability of an observed outcome. However, there must be a basis for probability before the
LRT is applied. The probability of severity must be equal to the consequences of computing risk.
The proposed research will highlight data on how probability functions in various scenarios and
from a cloud perspective in assessing risk. Research suggests there is still a strong need to
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understand the research gaps in homeland security and wars in how probabilities are used to
focus on specific problems in decision making, and detection, and how it is used to compute and
minimize risk and risk reduction by “fusing detection information and war statistics” (Standley et
al., 2020, p. 1387).
According to Abreu et al. (2019), in measuring probability in homeland security related
to incidents involving violent extremists and mass shootings, the new stochastic model can be
used to maximize survival probabilities by identifying the potential characteristics of people that
may be involved in these situations. In addition, it includes understanding patterns in the
behavior of the perpetrators or shooters’ effectiveness. Abreu et al. noted it is essential to
understand probabilities related to the impact human parameters have on mass shooting attacks
and an individual ability to overcome a shooting incident to save lives while putting themselves
at a greater risk. Abreu et al. further suggested that a good starting point is based on applying
stochastic simulations to understand key human parameters to increase survival probability,
which can involve exploring probable measures to improve self-protection and explore ways to
increase interactions and simulate processes by creating scenarios. In the homeland security and
criminal justice system exploring probability in various scenarios can involve examining
outcomes from the bottom up rather than through prescribed measures and modeling tools. The
goal is to create more accuracy, increase simulation times, and explore probabilities in real time
(Abreu et al., 2019).
According to Suo et al. (2021), PRAs for critical infrastructure are conceived as
quantitative measurements for assessing the probability of an occurrence associated with a
specific risk profile that emerges and identifying weaknesses in informal processes. The risk
associated with critical infrastructure and key resources is often more challenging and
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problematic because there is interdependency and a multiplicity of risks among some
infrastructures. Because of the dynamic stochasticity of some critical infrastructure, and when a
PRA is more challenging, it will require more procedures. Suo et al. suggested that a stochastic
model can require three stages to provide a more accurate depiction of risk to qualify for the
assessment. First, the PRA requires the use of factual, objective records and must be submitted to
the subjective judgment of experts to qualify as part of the assessment. Suo et al. noted that this
type of model can apply to decision-makers in many cases and is required in public policy to
provide an adequate and thorough risk profile. Furthermore, risk can be modeled to highlight the
level of risk (low, moderate, or high), determine the frequency of risk, and help to determine the
frequency in which risks are more prevalent or highlighted during specific periods of risk.
To conduct a risk assessment on critical infrastructure, two elements must be included in
a scenario that can involve the use of “multiple risk factors and multiple interdependent critical
infrastructures” to determine the multiplicity (Suo et al., 2021, p. 107730) p. 1). First,
respectively assessing each infrastructure, a determination must be made on a specific level or
period of risk. Risk factors related to multiplicity involve factors related to operational
functions, hydrometeorological hazards, domestic terrorism, down power lines, and pipeline
failures. Factors related to critical infrastructure interdependency are associated with spatial
proximity, material exchange, and how some infrastructures are interwoven and utilize the same
communication and system networks, according to Suo et al. (2021). Dynamic stochasticity risk
factors refer to how infrastructures can be impacted by different risk events that, on the other
hand, can then impact operational functions. When critical infrastructures are susceptible to more
risk, there can be variations and uncertainty. Suo et al. further explained that the end goal of a
PRA related to critical infrastructures is risks that must be quantified by probability and loss.
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When a PRA is required to measure weaknesses, it is based on several factors relevant to
whether weaknesses have been determined by the risk periods of alert and based on a higher
frequency of risk factors, mitigation, and preventive measures. These are factors that will be
discussed in detail in Chapter Three as part of the methodological processes.
Karbowski et al. (2019) noted in homeland security and national security, the risk
associated with cybersecurity is a significant concern for leaders and the private sector. To
mitigate these concerns, the Markov chain model can be used to assess the probability of
distribution to assess risk related to the future state of operational performance of system
networks. This is a process that involves the concept of detection and preventative measures
designed to provide data and information on probabilities and unforeseen events that have not
occurred, but can predict and evaluate future consequences related to an event capable of
disrupting system networks. Karbowski et al. suggested it is a process that shares similarities
with the Bayesian network model by compiling data on smaller directed acyclic graphs (DAG).
PRA related to this model will also be referenced in Chapter Three.
Critical infrastructure and key resources are provided with guidance and special
protection in homeland security. According to Newbill (2019), a Google search of the phrase
“critical infrastructure” yields “189 million results in little more than a half-second, and global
critical infrastructure results would illustrate 151 million, and how critical infrastructure is
defined will provide 71.5 million results” (p. 761). Newbill asserts that the number of critical
infrastructures has increased because industries, sectors of critical infrastructures, and new
advancements in technology have expanded due to new communications systems and operational
functions and the need to provide resources for basic human needs as well as to support
economic development and government needs. Furthermore, Newbill noted that some boundaries
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related to critical infrastructure constitute a need for additional measures in physical protection
and cybersecurity on a global and international level. The type of protection given to
infrastructures relies on the threat landscape, risk, vulnerabilities, and limitations identified to
determine the significance of national and global infrastructures. In homeland security, a
significant focus is on cybersecurity and placed on nation-state actors capable of hacking into
facilities, networks, and systems that control critical infrastructures (Newbill, 2019).
According to Herring (2020), in conducting a quantitative literature review on homeland
security, the theoretical probability can involve equations, analyzing phenomena and
mathematical statistics, data, angulation, and assessing an occurrence, incident, or event. To
explore how effective a homeland security framework (HSF) is in emphasizing an organizational
approach and design to guide risk assessment and “enhanced operational integration and
collaboration across America's (HSE) (Herring, 2020, p. ii). Herring further noted that PRAs
could provide quantitative data to examine current themes and trends in homeland security and
collect data from agencies within departments of homeland security, data on organizational
behavior, and the type of research instruments designed to “collect and analyze descriptive data
to answer the research questions” (p. 9). This dissertation literature review has significant
sections on homeland security and the three manageable issues identified as mitigating domestic
terrorism, extremism, and counterterrorism efforts. According to Herring, a significant emphasis
is on protecting and securing a natural gas pipeline's critical infrastructure and other essential
resources in a local area that can be impacted by acts of terrorism and domestic terrorists.
According to Knight and Gekker (2020), in homeland security, critical internal
infrastructures function to provide government support with technological advancements
responsible for surveillance and data analysis software. Knight and Gekker suggested the goal is
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to support how the United States manages processes involved in immigration and elements of
national security (p. 231). In homeland security, a theoretical framework in a government
infrastructure can include “Benjamin Bratton’s concept of the interfacial regime, used to
interface with the ‘Investigative Case Management (ICM), a system designated to provide
support for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE.).” (Knight & Gekker, p. 231). A
technological process is used to conduct data analysis to help track immigration processes;
oversee, manage, and enforce immigration policies; help to avoid governmental abuses, and
support U.S. homeland security and national security systems.
In homeland security, Wilcox (2020) noted that leadership must mitigate domestic
terrorism, prepare for threats posed by actors engaged in information warfare and data breaches,
and enhance counterterrorism measures necessary to meet today’s challenges. Wilcox suggested
that in mitigating these challenges, under the National Security Council (NSC) Information
Warfare Directorate (IWD), leaders must take necessary measures and provide analysts, leaders,
and policymakers with practical recommendations to implement policies on mitigating domestic
terrorism and extremism threats and protecting critical infrastructure (p. 111). Wilcox further
noted that effective leadership is essential in establishing robust domestic and foreign policy and
representing foreign interests. In homeland security and national security research, information
and communication technologies must be more adequately prepared for information warfare in
the near future. Homeland security research in the future must also focus on the U. S.
adversaries’ ability to convert from “conventional warfare (CW) to non-conventional warfare
(NCW)” (Wilcox, 2020, p.108).
Strang (2018) stated that effective leadership is essential to the success of homeland
security. Leaders must engage in strategic planning to plan for unexpected risks, vulnerabilities,
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and threats to infrastructures and organizations’ performance. Succession planning is an essential
part of the selection process and selecting leaders to fill critical positions in the not-for-profit
(NFP) organization. Strang stated that NFPs must approach threats based on threat assessments,
best practices, and risk management activities to mitigate threats. NFP organizations that
participate in elements of homeland security must also conduct security checks on staff and
volunteers to determine if potential employees are on the DHS national terrorism blacklists and
no-fly-watch list, according to Strang.
According to Brod (2018), effective leadership involves communicating the vision
change initiatives designed to impact the organization, organizational structure, and subordinates
in the homeland security agency. In a quantitative research study, future research should focus on
“leadership skills on readiness for change” to provide a comprehensive approach to leading
organizational change (Brod, 2018, p. 108). In one research study, Brod further noted the goal
was to help create new knowledge to contribute to future research and create research design
toward a “willingness to accept and promote change within the organization” (p. 108). In
homeland security, agency leaders must recognize the following:
•

Protecting critical infrastructures and key resources such as natural gas pipelines,
electric power grid systems, and water treatment facilities is essential.

•

Community policing and law enforcement are essential in homeland security and
critical in counterterrorism in collecting data on potential domestic threats.

•

Law enforcement provides a system to collect critical data applied in counterterrorism
efforts.

•

According to some theories, two means of “transforming input into output” are
accomplished by (Brod, 2018, p. 37):
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•

A determination is made on “who transforms the information through the political
process” (Brod, 2018, p . 37).

•

Cultural norms are “transformed into outputs” to improve outcomes (Brod, 2018,
p. 37).

Wibeck et al. (2019) suggested that societal change is often a driver for change in
leadership, and societal transformation may include exploring the environment, sustainability,
and processes to address global challenges. Societal change may require leaders to examine
nonlinear systemic processes related to “climate changes, rapid urbanization, increasing energy
demands, and pressing need for poverty reduction” (Wibeck et al., 2019, p. 2). Further
transformative changes in homeland security research may examine the impact of individual
factors, formal settings, and goals and create pathways towards change based on “geographical,
socioeconomic, political, and cultural” dynamics (Wibeck et al., 2019, p. 2). Furthermore,
Wibeck et al. noted some researchers seek to examine the relationship between transformation,
sustainability, and what drives societal change, defining critical conditions for change and
identifying change agents. Wibeck et al. also suggested a theoretical approach in future research
to understand how social change occurs is to examine social systems, the period for change, the
scope of transformation, and identify the drivers and agency.
Steckler and Waddock (2018) suggested that in elements of homeland security,
transformative changes may include developing a framework that recognizes three factors or
retreats associated with “reflective, relational, and inspirational” aspects of leadership (p. 171).
These factors are essential in providing sustainability for change agents and transforming
leaders. When there is a cultivation of transformative retreat leaders, Steckler and Waddock
further suggested they will develop perseverance, resilience, and focus on personal well-being.
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Humanity becomes a priority in transformative change, and leaders create the ability to “achieve
success in their transformational endeavors” (Steckler & Waddock, 2018, p. 171). Inspirational
practices are essential in dealing with day-to-day challenges, societal change, and threats relevant
to homeland security in a leadership role (Steckler & Waddock, 2018). Passionate worship
allows leaders to create and develop a place and space for enlightenment, spiritual development,
and reflection. Scripture teaches, “The Lord provides blessings to all, according to the riches of
his glory, as a way to strengthen man by his Spirit in the inner man, and Christ dwells in the
hearts of men through prayer and faith; that ye, being rooted and grounded in love” (King James
Bible, 1769/2021 Ephesians 3:16-17).
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security was created, after September 11, 2001, in
response to acts of terrorism and terrorist attacks committed on U.S. soil. The DHS consists of
11 agencies or components. It is a federal agency with a mission to protect the United States
from domestic and international terrorist threats. Federal agencies such as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S.
Secret Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have a broad range of
responsibilities, including interdiction, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, aviation security,
border security, emergency response, and protecting critical infrastructures and key resources.
An essential mission of homeland security is enhanced security and the prevention of acts of
terrorism. Domestic terrorism includes violent extremists, anarchists, lone-wolf terrorists, and
acts of terrorism committed on U.S. soil, where the FBI is the lead agency that responds to and
investigates terrorist-related incidents. Citizens around the country saw violent domestic
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extremism in the U.S. capital on January 6, 2021, which shook the country, government, and the
political landscape.
According to Hunter et al. (2020), in some democracies, internet connectivity plays a role
in domestic terrorism, violent extremism, and lone-wolf terrorist activities. The internet is seen
as a channel for potential terrorists to communicate and spread propaganda. Hunter et al. noted
that in some democracies, the internet is the channel to share extremist views, ideologies, and
radicalization. The internet and social media serve as a platform for radicalizing and recruiting
individuals into domestic and international terrorist groups and organizations. Further, Hunter et
al. suggested it is not easy to measure radicalization in many democracies because different
regimes or authoritarian governments support political processes and institutions in other
countries. In the United States, domestic terrorism may be examined and studied from three
different perspectives:
1. Determine the impact propaganda has on the radicalization process and terrorist
recruitment.
2. Conduct theoretical studies on how social media and the internet may be associated
with 'domestic terrorism in democracies,'
3. Conduct research studies on democracies likely to have “greater incidents of domestic
terrorism” based on demographics and internet reach (Hunter et al., 2020, p. 202).
Hunter et al. suggested another essential factor in determining how internet usage supports
domestic terrorism is propaganda used to “spread extremism ideologies, recruit new members,
and carry out attacks” (p. 202). To determine these factors, future research should focus on how
different internet platforms may support domestic terrorism and violent extremist ideologies.
Future research should also examine social media outlets' role in influencing the radicalization
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process, recruiting new members, and spreading violent extremist propaganda, polarization, and
self-radicalization processes. Hunter et al. further stated that future research should examine the
psychological impact the internet may have in influencing conflict and terrorism.
According to Brogan et al. (2020), how domestic terrorism and counterterrorism are
perceived in the United States has changed due to the results of the 2016 presidential election
and leading up to the 2020 presidential election. Some believe “electoral campaigns have
demonstrated that politicians are actively trying to politicize terrorism” (Brogan et al., 2020, p.
1). There have been new challenges in counterterrorism in the United States because of the rise
of violent extremism, left and right extremist movements, and how some may view the Blue
Lives and Black Lives Matter (BLM) movements. When domestic terrorism becomes politicized,
violent extremism increases and many nonviolent movements around the country become
infiltrated by violent extremists and pro-government groups. These groups have also received
support from specific political parties on both sides of the political spectrum. When violent
extremism and particular groups are polarized, it creates a recipe for civil unrest. Brogan et al.
noted the “danger of politicizing terrorism” (p. 1) blocks finding common ground in parts of
society; once this occurs, people become radicalized and entrenched in extremist movements.
These acts of violence are often against the U.S. government, political process, government
policies, and law enforcement. Domestic terrorism events and violent extremism impact
homeland security and counterterrorism elements and how people view the political process and
the government’s ability to protect against domestic terrorist groups and acts of terrorism.
Domestic terrorism is often supported; by selected ideologies, tactics, causes, and violent
extremist organizations that operate under the guise of white supremacy and militias.
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“Ideological motivations of terrorists” and extremist groups’ motivations are directed toward
dismantling governments and influencing voters (Brogan et al., 2020, p. 1).
Brogan et al. (2020) suggested developing an understanding of domestic terrorism in
homeland security and the essential dynamics in the profession and counterterrorism in
protecting critical infrastructures such as natural gas pipelines, communication technology, and
first responder personnel. In addition, these domestic terrorist groups’ activities create “internal
and external security challenges” and threats in the U.S. and raise counterterrorism concerns
(Brogan et al., 2020, p. 2). Finally, Brogan et al. explained that citizens in the country have
conflicting views on the government’s ability to prevent future terrorist attacks. Therefore, future
research on these subjects should focus on specific areas of concern:
•

How political partisanship can have an impact on counterterrorism policies and in
shaping perception.

•

The negative impact that politics or political campaigns can have on domestic
terrorism, counterterrorism, and threats to critical infrastructures; and

•

Race and national origin can have an impact on responding to terrorist threats.

Homeland security and counterterrorism rely heavily on information input from collecting data
and information obtained from various intelligence sources. Brogan et al. explained that this
might include “problem locations, gang activity, affiliation to terrorist organizations, weapons
used, arrests, and prison releases” (p. 33) concerning extremists and anarchists.
The information input process is vitally important to mitigate potential threats and
develop counterterrorism strategies to respond to threats. From a homeland security perspective,
law enforcement has a critical role in collecting data and information on individuals deemed as
actionable intelligence or probable domestic threats to reduce domestic threats and extremism in
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the United States. According to Brogan et al. (2020), in the United States, between 1987–2010,
law enforcement was credited with mitigating 73% or 83 potential domestic terrorist plots and
thwarting 89 domestic terror plots; furthermore, “66 were foiled through human intelligence
(HUMINT) from members of the public, covert police operations, or police informants” (p. 5).
However, in the United States, many law enforcement agencies have a problem engaging in
proactive counterterrorism activities to collect data and information on domestic terrorist and
extremist groups engaging in counterterrorism activities and developing counterterrorism
strategies and tactics.
Under the DHS (2021), the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) serves as a
warning system when there is a heightened domestic terrorism “threat environment across the
country” (p. 1). The NTAS provides a bulletin on new developments and threat trends. The
current threat environment involves ideologically motivated, violent extremists. According to the
DHS (2021), these extremists object “to the exercise of governmental authority and the
presidential transition” (p. 1). The current threat assessment suggests extremist terrorists in the
United States pose a credible threat. The current threat environment consists of the following:
1. Targeting individuals who oppose views related to the “First Amendment-protected,
non-violent protest activity,” and anger-fueled over COVID-19 restrictions, 2020
election results, and police use of force.
2. Violent protest over “racial and ethnic tension” and views on immigration.
3. Foreign terrorists inspire homegrown violent extremists (HVEs).
4. Violent extremist threats are directed toward critical infrastructures, electrical grids,
and telecommunications infrastructures.
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5. Threats are meant to intimidate or coerce based on religious views, race, ethnicity,
identity, or political beliefs.
The DHS (2021) has emphasized strengthening security measures and prioritizing physical
security measures to protect people and critical infrastructure.
The DHS noted that in 2020 and 2021, a primary goal of homeland security and the
NTAS is preparedness and preparation to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and the Omicron
surge and prevent domestic terrorist incidents. A formal process designed to conduct a Homeland
Security Threat Assessment to inform the public of current and pending threats. The DHS
encourages citizens, partners, and stakeholders “to report suspicious activity and threats of
violence” (DHS, 2021c, p. 1). to include reporting online threats to local FBI offices, fusion
centers, and local law enforcement agencies. The DHS encourages supporting communities and
“if you see something, say something” to help prevent acts of domestic terrorism.
Figure 1
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According to Guhr et al. (2019), homeland security, national security, and securing
critical infrastructure and key resources are at the forefront of homeland security in the security
profession. Today, many challenges and problems are often associated with mitigating threats
related to domestic terrorism, extremism, and improving counterterrorism efforts. Domestic
terrorism is often supported by selected ideologies, tactics, causes, and violence. Guhr et al.
suggested that effective leadership is essential in information security because leadership and
management directly impact information security behavior and other areas of homeland security.
Leaders can often influence subordinates and improve “extra-role and in-role behavior levels
[and] full-range leadership theory” provides theoretical and empirical sound guidance on
leadership approaches (Guhr et al., 2019, p. 340). A goal is to help employees rise above selfinterest to change and motivate employees to perform better and achieve their goals and mission.
Goswami et al. (2018) suggest many problems are related to the drivers of domestic
terrorism and changes in leadership. As a result, homeland security and law enforcement
agencies have experienced many challenges and difficulties. First, leaders must create “corporate
social responsibility” and a positive image (Goswami et al., 2018, p. 645). Second, leaders must
develop transformative measures to help improve society, create better opportunities for
employees, and communicate more effectively with communities in “adhering to legal
regulations” and the letter of the law (Goswami et al., 2018, p. 645). Third, a leader must
examine organizational and citizenship behavior factors to address unethical behavior problems
and the need to build strong collaborations and foster cooperation, friendships, trust, acceptance,
and fellowship. Finally, Scripture teaches, “But if we walk in the light, as he is in the light, we
have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ, his Son, will cleanse us from all
of our sins” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, 1 John 1:7).
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Fiebig and Christopher (2018) suggest that women play a unique role as leaders in
homeland security and the community, and an example is a role women play in the “intersection
of Catholic women works” as sisters and church leadership (p. 505). Women have served in
unique roles in the religious community and have represented servant leadership styles. Fiebig
and Christopher noted that the skills many women possess are an asset to an organization and
organizational structure. In the religious community, women identified as leaders have
outstanding leadership qualities that center around five trends:
1. These leaders show a willingness to possess “significant leadership responsibilities,”
2. In many cases, women are more caring and “compassionate towards others,”
3. Women in servant leadership roles possess skills necessary to help guide an
“individual towards personal growth,”
4. Women often serve as great role models,
5. Women in transformational-servant leadership roles possess the ability to “create
solutions to social justice issues and security problems” (Fiebig & Christopher, 2018,
pp. 505, 509, 512).
The proposed research will also focus on women’s role in transformational-servant leadership
roles in homeland security and the impact of spirituality and religion on management styles.
Fiebig and Christopher suggested another goal is “to examine future women's religious
management styles by explicitly highlighting the use of servant leadership” as a model for
spiritual support (p. 512). The dissertation will also address the research questions related to
Christian perspectives on many challenges and problems in homeland security. For example,
Scripture teaches, “It shall not seem hard unto thee when thou send him away free from thee; for
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he hath been worth a double hired servant to thee, in serving thee six years: and the Lord thy God
shall bless thee in all thou do” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, Deuteronomy 15:18).
Three Manageable Issues
Domestic Terrorism
Many of the challenges and problems in homeland security related to domestic terrorism
and violent extremism require local law enforcement authorities and counterterrorism
professionals to respond to threats. Domestic terrorist groups such as violent extremists,
anarchists, White supremacists, and lone wolves have been designated domestic terrorist groups
and organizations in the United States and local municipalities. Piazza (2020) explained that
domestic terrorism is propagated in many parts of society by political rhetoric and can include
hate speech and “rhetoric that targets, vilifies, excludes or is fashioned to intimidate racial,
ethnic, religious or sexual minorities, women, political opponents, migrants, disabled persons or
members of other groups by political figures fuel domestic terrorism” (p. 431). Piazza further
noted that the use of hate speech and rhetoric associated with the political climate appeals to
some domestic terrorists, and acts of violence are not limited to past mass shooting incidents, nor
are they limited to America. Discriminatory rhetoric linked to political activity or the political
environment can increase the potential for domestic terrorist attacks.
Domestic terrorists often share extremist viewpoints but have different ideologies and are
a threat to the U.S. government, and these groups also pose a threat to local communities, law
enforcement, electric grid power systems, and natural gas pipeline infrastructures. Many local
police organizations face multifaceted challenges, community problems, increased public
scrutiny, and domestic threats. In 2020, the increased police shootings, civil unrest, and
demonstrations attracted many domestic terrorist groups. These problems led to extremists
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infiltrating many peaceful protests and raising the homeland security threat level on domestic
terrorism. These groups have also become a threat to local critical infrastructures and
government buildings. Another homeland security threat in the United States and other countries
is the COVID-19 pandemic, stretching homeland security and law enforcement resources to the
limit and creating a virtual environment. In September 2020, several demonstrations and
problems in law enforcement and homeland security events increased the COVID-19 threat
environment in the United States and the need for transforming organizations and changes in
how many businesses do business and function.
According to Laguardia (2020), in the current domestic terrorism environment, many in
the criminal justice system and public and legal practitioners feel the need for a “domestic
terrorism statute,” one designed to eliminate disparities between domestic and international
terrorism (p. 1061). Laguardia suggested prosecutions for international terrorism charges involve
material support, terrorist acts prohibited by law, and designations associated with international
terrorism. In law enforcement, there are hurdles in prosecuting domestic terrorists. Laguardia
further suggests the disparity in terrorism cases involving international terrorism and domestic
terrorism is that domestic terrorism prosecutions are rare. In criminal prosecutions involving
international terrorism, “terrorists receive longer sentences and may be subject to more
aggressive investigations with less oversight” (Laguardia, 2020, pp. 1064–1065). In addition,
domestic terrorism associated with violent White supremacists is classified as a hate crime in
most cases. Laguardia further noted prosecuting domestic terrorism will require a federal statute
to charge designated domestic terrorist groups and organizations as domestic terrorists to address
the gap in the federal statutory framework.
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Laguardia (2020) pointed out that there are disparities among law enforcement in how
international terrorism cases are prosecuted in federal courts compared to domestic terrorism
cases. Due to the rise in right-winged extremist violence and domestic terrorism, there is a call
for the federal government to create a domestic terrorism statute. With the increase in domestic
terrorist activity, domestic terrorist statutes should swiftly eliminate barriers to prosecuting these
cases. The problem with prosecuting domestic terrorism cases in the United States is that there
are general statutes for acts of terrorism, and these cases can be highly problematic. Depending
on the act, laws used to prosecute domestic terrorists do not apply to prosecuting international
terrorists. Laguardia further suggests more statutes should lessen disparities and mitigate how
right-winged extremist terrorists and other domestic terrorist cases in the United States are
prosecuted and pass stricter laws.
Laguardia (2020) noted the example of a 2018 FBI case that involved members of the
Rise Above Movement (RAM), a White supremacist, neo-Nazi gang engaged in violent behavior
in Charlotte, South Carolina, and charged members in a “criminal indictment for actual violent
conduct” (p. 1061). However, in this case, members of the terrorist organization will not face
terrorism charges. The information further suggests a White supremacist named James Alex
Fields, Jr. was also responsible for Heather Heyer’s death during the protest, and domestic
terrorists are rarely charged (Laguardia, 2020). International terrorist charges under the terrorist
statutes receive longer sentences, and investigations are more extensive. Federal laws concerning
terrorists and terrorism do not cover domestic terrorism according to how international terrorists
are treated under U.S. laws.
According to Berryman (2020), social media providers should be held accountable for
facilitating acts involving domestic terrorism and the “availability of a federal cause of action”
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(p. 1329). Still, it might dissuade domestic terrorists and violent extremist groups from engaging
in such activities. An obstacle may include proving a proximate cause of action and establishing
the connection between domestic terrorists and social media. In addition, this also includes
establishing a social media outlet cause of action directly linked to domestic terrorism or the
actions of domestic terrorists. Moreover, victims of acts of domestic terrorism face obstacles.
Even though the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA) includes “civil remedies for international
terrorism” (p. 1329), when acts of domestic terrorism or international terrorism occur, victims
have little chance of recovering any damages.
Krueger et al. (2020) explained that in the current domestic terrorism threat environment
in the United States, some feel domestic surveillance is a balance between liberty and security. In
some cases, domestic counterterrorism policies and surveillance are too intrusive, even though
these policies are designed to improve safety and security. Krueger et al. suggested the increase
in counterterrorism efforts has led to a rise in domestic terrorism and framed it as a trade-off
between “core political values or whether they depend on the messages from political leaders”
(p. 104). In one study conducted in Europe concerning balancing privacy and security, Krueger
et al. noted that enhancing domestic security does not reduce security efforts. Future research
should assess whether the security-liberty trade-off impacts individuals’ personal beliefs or
shapes views in specific contexts if individuals are willing to conform to changes in security
policies. Krueger et al. further noted political affiliations in counterterrorism cases feel these
policies align with more “political predispositions and existing knowledge” (p. 105).
According to Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019), terrorism is defined as the premeditated use
or threat of violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants, and the goal is
“to obtain a political objective through the intimidation of an audience beyond that of the
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immediate victims” (p. 331). In viewing domestic terrorism from a political perspective,
Gaibulloev and Sandler noted domestic terrorism often occurs in other countries with
relationships with the United States or key Western countries with more transnational and
domestic terrorist attacks. In some cases, U.S. allies or affinity-lined relationships some countries
have with the United States make some countries more susceptible to domestic terrorist attacks.
In some countries, because of the diplomatic relations between the United States and three
countries, they further noted that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have contributed to
domestic terrorism.
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019) described domestic terrorism as a phenomenon that
involves homegrown terrorism and acts of violence perpetrated by violent extremists. In many
cases, the victims and perpetrators are often citizens living in the country. Some are often
locally-based and share propaganda and misinformation with other domestic terrorist
organizations. In most cases, domestic terrorists are politically motivated and engage in violent
acts against citizens, the government, and law enforcement. Gaibulloev and Sandler further
stated that there are far more domestic terrorist attacks than transnational terrorist attacks, and
struggles leading to domestic terrorist attacks are considered “domestic terrorist incidents” (p.
332).
In a review of an article in The Washington Post, McAleenan and Plofchan (2020) noted
that the DHS issued the “first annual release on Homeland Threat Assessment” (p. 1) in 2020.
The report categorizes domestic terrorists as “ideologically motivated lone offenders and small
groups of violent domestic extremists” as the leading threat in America (p. 1). These
organizations pose the greatest threat to the way of life, the business community, and civil
liberties. During the November 2020 election, McAleenan & Plofchan suggested domestic
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terrorist groups were responsible for heightened social and political tensions and used the
infringement of civil liberties as an excuse for violent extremist actions during the initial
response to the COVID-19 pandemic response.
McAleenan & Plofchan further suggests in perpetuating violent extremist activity, other
lone-wolf actors and organized domestic terrorist groups use the internet to spread propaganda
and misinformation and accelerate the velocity of radicalization and violent actions. Today, the
challenges posed by domestic terrorist groups and lone-wolf actors require an all-hands-on-deck
approach to mitigate violent extremism. McAleenan & Plofchan noted federal agencies such as
the FBI engage in activities to investigate domestic terrorism and investigate any foreign
influence. In addition, the U.S. Secret Service analyzes domestic terrorism and guidance to
prevent mass attacks. Finally, the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security Agency provide
support to nonprofit agencies and communities to help deter the radicalization process and help
prevent the spread of violent extremism that leads to violence.
According to Zulli et al. (2021), public relations are at the forefront of research involving
foreign terrorist threats and activity crises. However, in this case, little attention is given to
domestic terrorism and violent extremism, leading to an increase in domestic terrorism in the
United States. Zulli et al. suggest that 40 years of media coverage on domestic terrorism
indicates four theoretical factors related to crisis management and issues involving domestic
terrorism associated with the news media coverage related to “sourcing, contextualization,
ideological labeling, and definitional uncertainty” (p. 1). Information suggests the four factors in
how domestic terrorism is viewed today are related to:
1. Over the years, views on domestic terrorism have been contextualized and shifted.
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2. Domestic terrorism groups and organizations’ ideological labels apply to right-wing
domestic terrorists rather than left-wing terrorism.
3. The definition of domestic terrorism has changed over time.
4. Future research should focus on gaps in research concerning “public relations and
crisis management” (Zulli et al., 2021, p. 357 ).
Zulli et al. provided the example that occurred in October 2020, involving a domestic terrorist
threat against the governor of Michigan, when “three right-wing extremists were arrested in a
failed attempt to kidnap the governor” (p. 2). If there is no actual definition on how to handle or
prosecute domestic terrorist cases, “debates underscore the constitutive yet contested nature of
terror crises,” and how domestic terrorism cases are defined is reliant on a clearer picture,
“construction and management of terrorist crises” and who is defining the crisis (Zulli et al.,
2021, p. 358). The Bible provides a clear picture of false prophets stating, “Beloved. believe not
every spirit but try the spirit whether they are of God because many false prophets are gone out
into the world” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, 1 John 4:1).
According to Chalk (2020), the relationship that countries such as the UK, France,
Canada, and Australia have in addressing domestic terrorism is based on mitigating terrorist
threats, the role law enforcement has in preventing domestic terrorism, and the mechanisms
applied to review and control domestic terrorists and organizations. In the UK, the apparatus
used to mitigate domestic and international terrorism involves several agencies that collect data
and covert information to conduct a unified effort to address domestic and national threats. Chalk
wrote to mitigate issues that are immediate and long-term threats related to domestic, the Joint
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) manages terrorism threats, homeland security, and national
security established in 2003. The primary goal is to synthesize data and information collected to
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analyze and assess threats identified by law enforcement agencies and HUMINT. The HUMINT
efforts may involve community residents and law enforcement in collaborative efforts to target
individuals, groups, and domestic terrorist organizations and their infrastructure, plans, and
capabilities. Chalk (2020) noted around 2018, the French president created a “20-member
National Centre for Counter-Terrorism” (p. 10) designated to monitor counterterrorism efforts
and determine necessary strategies to mitigate risk, vulnerabilities, and threats. In Canada,
counterterrorism efforts are the responsibility of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS), an agency tasked with data and intelligence collection from principal resources such as
“human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT), and open-source intelligence
(OSINT)” that may include video surveillance, intercepting communications, and coverundercover operations (Chalk, 2020, p. 12). The CSIS is tasked with providing time-sensitive
reports based on “threat assessments, and a strategic analysis on threat risk assessment” (Chalk,
2020, p. 13).
In 2019, the Canadian government passed Bill-59, legislation designed to provide a
“higher degree of granularity for defining the powers and operational latitude granted to CSIS
under the 2015 Act” (Chalk, 2020, p. 13). Bill-59 represents the importance of intelligence
sharing between the community, law enforcement, and governmental departments. Chalk (2020)
stipulated that the CSIS agencies cannot engage in actions involving torture and risk associated
with endangering life and can impede travel and intercept communications. In addition, specific
information can be held concerning retaining data sets, governing personal information, and
tightening how terrorism is defined. A significant function of the National Security and
Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is to “create a super-watch dog” to coordinate
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counterterrorism actions and activities of CSIS, the CSE, and the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (RCMP), according to Chalk (p. 14).
According to the FBI, the “sovereign citizens” movement is considered to be a domestic
threat in the United States, not a terrorist organization, but a “movement of loosely affiliated,
similarly minded, individuals”(Sarteschi, 2020, p. 6). These groups are considered a threat in the
United States because of behavior inconsistent with the rule of law and conduct, which threatens
nonsovereign and law-abiding citizens. These individuals are considered dangerous and believe
America is an illegitimate government with no absolute legal authority. The DHS (2021) has
designated the “sovereign citizens as extremists” (p. 8) which can include individuals, groups, or
organizations that commit acts of violence directed toward government officials and institutions
and consist of government facilities. In this case, the term extremist is not used to define or
identify sovereign individuals or groups. However, the term applies because they can engage in
violent extremist acts of violence. Sarteschi further explained that sovereign citizens could be
found on websites showing individuals interacting with government and public officials, arguing
against various laws, and trying to “argue their way out of law violations” (p. 8). The
psychological behavior of sovereign citizens is seen in the difference in belief systems, core
beliefs, tactics, and how individuals display a sense of self-identity.
Rich (2020) explained that extremism has been around in the United States since the 19th
century and is poorly framed in many people’s minds in some parts of society. In later years
there has been an increase in far-right extremist and domestic terrorism in crime dramas,
westerns, and romantic melodramas. These factors are terrains for external terrorists outside the
realm of Hollywood. For example, according to Rich, during the1990s, American cinema began
depicting the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), skinhead extremists, neo-Nazi groups, and patriot militias.
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Domestic threats have contributed to these groups to an increase in extremism. In later years,
research studies have linked some far-right ideologies and the motives of jihadist terrorist groups
and organizations to the radicalization process by instilling radical beliefs and jihadist ideologies
in the minds of new members designed to target governments.
According to Rich (2021), in some parts of society, radical White supremacy movements
express concerns about a range of issues and demonstrations that lead to perpetrated violence, a
range of hate crimes, and violent extremist attacks. In addition, far-right domestic terrorism is
often seen exerting support that “reinforced established patterns of racial and ethnic domination,
often involving local law enforcement bodies” (Rich, 2021, p. 163). Between 1920 and 1979, the
new left terrorism emerged and became more prominent and viewed from a strategic standpoint
directed toward breaking opponents’ will and instilling fear and attainment to achieve a broader
political objective to achieve power. According to Rich, far-left terrorism can elevate its terrorist
tactics and strategies and support underground groups and movements that do not have links to
political affiliation and support at the center of politics.
According to Tamborini et al. (2020), when there is news coverage of domestic terrorist
events, this often increases “moral institution salience” (p. 511) and impacts the level of respect
for government authority and law enforcement. An example is the media coverage and exposure
to news concerning the terrorist attack in Paris, France, in 2015 and based on a sample of data
collected from U.S. participants involving the domestic terrorist attack in the 2017 Las Vegas,
Nevada music festival shooting. Tamborini et al. suggest even though the motive was unclear,
the news coverage concerning the attack in Paris may have influenced the Las Vegas attack and
had an overall impact on the audience's perception regarding the level of safety, cohesion, and
“increased the salience of binding moral intuitions” (p. 551). Tamborini et al. suggested domestic
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terrorism and extremist violence increasingly expose victims, perpetrators, and other domestic
terrorist actors to violent events and mass shootings that have a reminiscence of domestic and
international terrorism. These events also inspire actors and perpetrators, increase the “salience
of moral instincts,” and motivate other domestic terrorist actors (Tamborini et al., 2020, p. 512).
Tamborini et al. (2020) further explored moral instincts from a psychological and moral
foundational and theoretical (MFT) perspective; defining the term as “bits of mental structure”
that develop over time when an individual has been exposed to different events that “operate
preconsciously to govern moral judgments” (p. 512), and thoughts that shape experiences. Based
on exemplification theory and models of intuitive morality and exemplars (MIME), Tamborini et
al. suggest continuous exposure to media coverage of domestic terrorism and violent extremism
can have a long- and short-term impact. It can stimulate mental functions associated with moral
intuitions and impact attitudes, decisions making, and the behaviors of domestic terrorists and
extremists and have an impact on the minds of members of an audience, according to Tamborini
et al. Research has shown five MFT intuitions that have an impact on individualized and binding
moral institutions in the level of authority, loyalty, and participation in domestic terrorist groups
and organizations, according to Tamborini et al. (p. 513).
Mahoney (2020) discussed nonstate extremist groups and organizations that issue bluffs
and threats as a means to intimidate, coerce, and issue threats against civilian populations and
governments to help strengthen the groups’ credibility. Bluffing is considered a common tactic
used to achieve specific goals and help advance the groups’ strategic goals through methods
designed to outbid rivals, interrupt the peace process, intimidate civilian populations, and
promote violence and violent activity threats. Exploring motives behind bluffing suggests it is a
tactic that provides incentives to nonstate extremist groups and provides strategic rationales that
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can include empty threats to pursue new objectives. Mahoney explained that assessing extremist
terrorist bluffs will help determine if a group has the motivation and can help identify distinct
campaigns and determine if bluffs contribute to advancing these specific objectives. In some
cases, bluffs are used to threaten future violence against civilians and advance specific interests
or objectives without violence or violent activities. When extremist groups use bluffs to terrorize
civilians and governments, it is often to estimate the cost of damage, project its power, and the
potential cost of future incidents. Mahoney further stated that when bluffs are used against
citizens and government agencies, extremist groups and organizations attempt to raise
awareness, publicize grievances, and coerce the government into compliance with their threats.
Future research can focus on examining patterns in the behaviors of extremist groups and
domestic terrorist groups to determine if specific bluffing patterns have been used to expand in
geographical locations and regions. This focus may help understand the rationale behind the
motives of extremist groups and organizations as well as understand the rationale behind the
groups’ target selection and enable researchers to test hypotheses related to empty threats,
according to Mahoney.
Violent Extremism and Anarchists
A comparative study involving domestic terrorists identified as violent extremists
suggests these groups are motivated by political and ideological goals and objectives. The radical
group leaders are often male, older, and likely to be part of the ethnic majority (Jasko & LaFree,
2020). In the relationship between leader and follower, leaders are more committed to the
organization’s ideologies, goals, and objectives. Followers are more committed to committing
and engaging in extremist acts of political violence to support the group’s ideology, goals, and
objectives. In recent years, extremist and radical groups have increased, and followers are
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expected to support the groups’ or organizations’ shared goals that may vary according to
membership in the group and members' level of motivation, personal preferences, and
knowledge (Jasko & LaFree, 2020).
In the United States, Jasko and LaFree’s (2020) research suggests in domestic terrorist
groups, a “third of the members classified as leaders and two‐thirds are considered as followers”
(p. 141), and there are differences in age, gender, minority status, and socioeconomic position.
Members are committed to the mainstream goals and objectives of the organization and willing
to commit political acts of violence. However, in multivariate models used to compare leaders’
and followers’ motivation for committing political violence, Jasko and LaFree noted a lack of
research in these areas. Thus, research gaps exist, but research has shown differences in leaderfollower characteristics, specialized knowledge, and incentives in the organizational structure.
Still, followers must demonstrate a commitment to the group’s and organization's ideology,
cause, and potential psychological rewards for committing political acts of violence.
According to J. Bell (2019), the United States has a long history of race relations and farright extremism. In the United States, White supremacy has been at the forefront of violent racerelated activity. Around the country, they are responsible for many expressions of racism and
racist violence. J. Bell pointed out that since the election of the first Black president, it created a
postracial environment. Since the 2016 election, the country has seen an increase in the “number
of documented race-based hate crimes” (J. Bell, 2019, p. 305) and crimes motivated by bias
targeting different races. Since the 2016 election, there has also been an increase in violent
extremism and “tenets of White supremacy” (J.Bell, 2019, p. 305). J. Bell noted that hate crimes
and extremism blanket most of the country, with no sufficient remedy to stop hate crimes even
though most hate crimes are prosecuted on the state level and not the federal level. Currently,
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five states do not have state laws or legislation concerning hate crimes, including Arkansas,
Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming (J.Bell, 2019, p. 305). Depending on the nature
of a hate crime, some hate crimes are prosecuted on the federal level.
J. Bell (2019) suggested that in some cases, under the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990,
law enforcement agencies are required to report hate crimes if the crime fits a specific pattern. A
report by the Associated Press indicated that between 2009 and 2014, half of law enforcement
agencies in jurisdictions in Indiana failed to report incidents involving hate crimes to the FBI (J.
Bell, 2019, p. 313). In 2016, according to J. Bell, the FBI suggests some law enforcement
agencies in Indiana claimed there were no hate crimes committed in their jurisdiction. J. Bell
further explained that in states that do not have hate crime laws, a cross burning is considered a
“simple trespass case” (p. 314), and these weaknesses in some institutions contribute to an
environment that supports hate crimes and creates barriers that make it hard to address the
dangers posed by violent extremists.
According to Saito (2019), in a 2017 report, the FBI Counterintelligence Division
suggests groups identified as Black identity extremist (BIE) groups were motivated by the unfair
treatment of African Americans and actions designed to perpetrate violent acts against law
enforcement and communities. Saito pointed out that the BIEs threat is no comparison to White
supremacists, and members of BIE groups attempt to identify with the BLM group to perpetuate
dangerous, violent extremist actions often seen in acts of violence during peaceful
demonstrations with other extremist groups. The 2017 FBI report indicated that BIE groups have
been responsible for an “increase in premeditated, lethal retaliatory violence against law
enforcement” (Saito, 2019, p. 4). In a volatile environment, BIE groups are responsible for
perpetrating violence against law enforcement and use police brutality as a reason for
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“justification for such violence in the future” as a retaliatory measure (Saito, 2019, p. 4).
However, Saito noted that left-winged extremism often involves private acts of violence
perpetrated by anarchists and Black nationalists. Evidence does not suggest these extremists are a
threat to law enforcement, and right-wing extremism poses a more significant threat because of
the evidence of racism and the level of violence. Saito further explained that self-styled liberals
and progressives claim nationalism fosters radicalization elements and radicalizes hatred, which
risks public safety.
According to Ganesh and Bright (2020), anarchists and extremists have exploited the
internet and social media platforms with propaganda, impacting how some civil societies,
governments, and the private sector function and raising concerns for counterterrorism experts.
Ganesh and Bright explained that the internet and social media are vehicles used to spread hate
narratives, promote propaganda activities to solicit terrorist financing, and radicalize members.
Mitigating violent extremism requires a counterterrorism strategy designed to counter violent
extremism; therefore, countermeasures should include a strategic communication plan targeting
violent extremism and preventing extremists from exploiting social media platforms. Ganesh and
Bright stressed that future research on mitigating domestic terrorism and extremism must take a
multistakeholder approach to challenge the violent extremists’ ability to influence the internet
and social media and use these resources as a platform to spread violent extremism. Many open
democratic societies should examine how to prevent the “exploitation of social media platforms
and is an essential regulatory question for civil society, government, and the private sector”
(Ganesh & Bright, 2020, p. 7). Future research should be conducted to examine social media
outlets when bluffs made by domestic terrorist groups as threats made through social media, this
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will help analysts determine empirically if bluffs are empty threats and test any hypothesis using
data-based tools to evaluate these problems.
Counterterrorism
Weeks (2019) stated that in counterterrorism, radicalization and political violence are a
concern, and it is a social problem in society that requires measures to mitigate extremism and
threats. He recognized radicalization theories coalesce around factors such as identity,
grievances, or foreign policy elements and support for ideologies, and radicalization is a process
like a conveyer belt theory that involves a series of progressive steps (Weeks, 2019). As an
individual becomes more radicalized, the process leads closer to violent behavior. To combat the
radicalization process will require assessing the “mainstream political thought in a given period”
(Weeks, 2019, p. 741).
According to McIlhatton et al. (2020), in a quantitative research study on
counterterrorism that involved a methodological framework including structured interviews
conducted in local and international jurisdictions in the United Kingdom, United States, and
Australia to conduct risk assessments on critical infrastructures and core features of development
projects, the goal was to protect against acts of terrorism (p. 753). The research study focused on
two inquiries associated with understanding the importance of counterterrorism in the real estate
development process and assessing the counterterrorism barriers in providing protective security
in large venues where crowds gather for specific events or functions. McIlhatton et al. suggested
in the research literature on elements of counterterrorism, the focus is placed generally on
measures needed to mitigate threats through policies and strategies aimed at mitigating the threat,
removal of the threat environment, and individuals, groups, and organizations that are a threat to
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homeland security and national security. However, there is a limited body of work on anticounterterrorism measures.
These measures are designed to provide a defensive posture to protect and prevent acts of
terrorism, especially in environments where there is an increase in crowds, an attractive
backdrop to terrorists. However, in counterterrorism, some barriers inhibit counterterrorism
measures and protective strategies in some future development projects. Therefore, McIlhatton et
al. (2020) suggested in counterterrorism to reduce elements of terrorism, counterterrorism and
antiterrorism are measures designed to take into consideration three approaches
1. Counterterrorism measures can include mitigation to remove the threat environment,
individuals, groups, and organizations.
2. Counterterrorism measures can include deploying “hard-line and soft-line measures”
in response efforts.
3. Anti-terrorism measures can include measures commonly used in the United
Kingdom’s design to provide protective security (McIlhatton et al., 2020, pp. 753–
754).
McIlhatton et al. noted that in counterterrorism, there is little research literature and a reduced
knowledge base on these anti-terrorism measures that can include taking action to mitigate
terrorism and how to, protect crowded places, and protecting cities from the threats, risks, harm,
and acts of terrorism. A significant attractor to terrorists in modern society is events that
accommodate large crowds, such as concerts and sporting events. These venues require
counterterrorism measures designed as proactive security for events requiring planning,
defensive, and crowd control measures. McIlhatton et al. suggested future counterterrorism
research should explore gaps in research associated with an integrated security management
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system, and special consideration should be given to real estate developments that accommodate
large crowds and ensure personnel is well-trained, educated, vetted, and policies and procedures
around other security-related issues that are not always present. McIlhatton et al. feel defensive
measures are not limited to methods in physical and proactive security measures.
According to Tung (2019), mitigating domestic terrorism and violent extremism in the
United States requires counterterrorism strategies and information operations designed to meet
three strategic goals and objectives:
1. Intercept domestic terrorist groups and extremist communications to determine the
adversary's plans.
2. Obtain information through surveillance, wiretaps, and warrants on domestic terrorist
groups and extremists to determine intentions, locations, objectives, and goals.
3. Once critical information has been obtained, implement necessary measures,
disrupting a planned attack, disrupting those potential attacks, and capturing domestic
terrorists (Tung, 2019, p. 560).
In counterterrorism, detection is an essential part of mitigating threats. Passive detection
measures can provide background sounds such as television and radio transmissions to determine
the potential location (Tung, 2019). In the United States, fusion centers are another
counterterrorism tool in counterterrorism operations used to collect data, information, and
surveillance from other federal and local law enforcement agencies on domestic terrorists and
violent extremists.
According to Nguyen (2019), law enforcement has a critical role in counterterrorism
efforts in preventing domestic terrorism across the country. Domestic terrorism has become an
immediate homeland security and national security concern. Measures taken to combat domestic
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terrorism are also a concern for citizens due to a fear of a potential erosion of civil liberties and
other constitutional rights. As a result, some law enforcement agencies have adopted measures
and programs like “countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives,” according to Nguyen (p.
322). These programs are a driver of programs directed toward mobilizing communities and
developing a strategic community strategy to mitigate homegrown terrorism and other forms of
domestic terrorism such as street gangs, lone-wolves, White supremacists, and militia groups.
The DHS supports change drivers through federal government grant programs to local law
enforcement and designated community groups.
Schuurman et al. (2019) suggested that the lone-wolf concept has a different typology
from a violent extremist in the counterterrorism profession. Empirical research suggests that
online and offline activities are critical to how these terrorists adapt to radical terrorist behavior
and are motivated to commit violent acts of terrorism. Regarding the pre-attack actions of the
lone-wolf type, these individuals “are not stealthy and highly capable” of committing acts of
terrorism (Schuurman et al., 2019, p. 771). In research findings, the lone-wolf concept should be
redefined to prevent closing off the ability for detection and interdiction in counterterrorism. On
the other hand, lone actor extremists in the United States are currently on the rise, and the
perception of lone-wolf terrorists has been misconceived and questionable. This calls into
question the ability to detect, prevent, and respond to these types of threats.
In some cases, these types of terrorists are motivated by interpersonal, political, and
ideological viewpoints, have ties to other operational features, and are connected to more
extensive networks. Schuurman et al. (2019) suggested how lone-wolf extremists are defined and
should be overhauled but should be considered single operatives with a mission to conduct or
carry out a specific threat. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies must engage in early
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detection methods to prevent attacks and deploy countermeasures in counterterrorism.
Schuurman et al. further suggest it is essential for counterterrorism professionals and law
enforcement to understand that among lone-wolf extremists, loneness, social isolation, and poor
social skills are traits of these individuals. Some of these individuals are psychologically
triggered by personal motivation and a commitment to support causes led by potential coconspirators (Shuurman et al., 2019).
According to Boukalas (2019), in the United Kingdom, counterterrorism policies are
directed toward mitigating counter-extremism. Boukalas noted that counter-extremism programs
are designed to avert the potential of government failure and divides in society along political
lines or create a culture that mobilizes security in all parts of society. In the United Kingdom,
counter-extremism is prominent in institutions, and strategic planning helps to secure many
aspects of society from extremist activity (Boukalas, 2019). The prevention strategy serves as an
intervention in the community, state, and intercommunity relations designed to improve
counterterrorism efforts through collaborations and cooperation from diverse and multicultural
communities (Boukalas, 2019). Counter-extremism involves the whole society, and the state is
responsible for deciphering key element and their implications. Therefore, preventive programs
help the state counter the threat of extremism. The prevention paradox is an antiliberal position
to secure and perpetuate liberalism to take a different approach to extremism without violating
civil liberties and other freedoms, according to Boukalas.
To mitigate threats related to terrorism, Milton and Price (2020) noted that leadership
decapitation is a method used to remove the leadership of terrorist groups and organizations.
Research suggests what complicates matters in this approach is the longevity in external
relationships and conditions that can impact elements of leadership. Milton and Price suggested
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some literature on terrorist networks, and leadership decapitation supports the notion that some
terrorist organizations, networks, and operational functions can be impacted if there is leadership
decapitation. Many terrorist groups and organizations are susceptible and vulnerable to
leadership decapitation. When these counterterrorism tactics and measures are used to address
leadership in terrorist groups and organizations, the literature suggests the following:
1. Leadership decapitation can impact the organization’s performance, longevity, and
ability to function and plan activities.
2. Based on research literature, there is an argument suggesting “highly networked
terrorist groups and organizations tend to be more resilient to decapitation,” and other
members can assume the leadership role (Milton & Price, 2020, p. 310).
Milton and Price delineated that leadership decapitation and terrorist networks are two different
research topics. In many cases, terrorist groups and organizations attempt to avoid actions that
create vulnerabilities and are vulnerable to a state’s counterterrorism apparatus, measures, and
tactics.
Future research should examine gaps in research associated with leadership in domestic
and international terrorist groups and organizations impacted by leadership decapitation and the
ability of these organizations to plan, function, and operationalize. Future research should also
explore how “small-scale connections can lead to leadership and management” changes in these
organizations (Milton & Price, 2020, p. 320). To root out threats to the homeland and national
security requires a framework that examines different perspectives.
Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
According to Sauter (2020), in 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act
established the Department of Energy (DOE), which serves as a cabinet-level agency tasked with
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oversight and monitoring America’s agencies that provide nuclear power and energy programs
(p. 6). These measures also include guidance and recommendations on securing and protecting
nuclear and energy infrastructure sectors from cyber threats and malicious cyber-attacks. Sauter
explained that the DOE is designated as the “lead sector-specific agency for cyber-security” (p.
6) and collaborates with partners and stakeholders to ensure the nuclear and energy sector
infrastructures are protected from cyber threats that can impact systems networks and operational
functions. Under the DOE, the agency established the cybersecurity capability maturity model
(C2M2) in a multiyear program designed to help secure facilities, evaluate processes, identify
and prioritize vulnerabilities, and help improve cybersecurity measures for nuclear facilities, oil,
electrical power grid systems, natural gas facilities, and pipelines (Sauter, 2020, p. 6).
In 1990, experts warned that the U.S. energy sector was susceptible to cyber-attacks, and
a small number of cyber-attackers could cause significant disruptions to the nation’s electrical
grid system. According to Sauter (2020), in 2017, U.S. energy companies were compromised and
targeted by “Russian advanced persistent threat actors” (p. 5) that obtained control over an
electrical grid system causing massive blackouts, and in 2018, another cyber-attack led to
multiple pipeline failures in natural gas pipeline communication systems.
Additionally, Sauter (2020) described a cyber-attack that targeted a natural gas
compression facility and impacted natural gas distribution for several days. Experts feel a more
targeted cyber-attack could potentially impact natural gas transmission, distribution, and
interconnectivity and force an operational shutdown geographically. As a result, cyber-threats in
the U.S. energy sector are among the greatest threats to critical infrastructure that can cause
massive disruptions in major cities and rural and metropolitan areas. According to the Pipeline
Cybersecurity Initiative Fact Sheet, Sauter further noted that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
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Security Agency (CISA) provides stakeholders, owners, and operators with guidance based on
three assessment types that also examine probabilities (p. 520). The assessments include the
following:
1. Tier-I assessment involves a multiday assessment for conducting an evaluation.
2. Tier-II assessments involve the ability to conduct a single-day assessment for
evaluation.
3. Owners and operators use Tier-III assessment to conduct assessments independently
(p. 520).
Under the U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-19-426, a critical infrastructure
pipeline is required to complete security documentation related to essential infrastructure
operational functions and the environment (Sauter, 2020).
According to Wei et al. (2020), to manage critical infrastructure, there must be a support
system that assists in providing guidance and recommendations “for urban infrastructure interasset management” of critical infrastructure (p. 2). These vital infrastructures can include rural
and urban street works, including roads, bridges, pavement maintenance, water distribution
systems, natural gas distribution, and natural gas transmission pipelines. Therefore, leaders must
be familiar with these challenges and infrastructure management systems and manage critical
infrastructures in multiple leadership roles (Wei et al., 2020). For example, the first challenge is
working interdependently on numerous groups when critical infrastructures involve underground
utilities. The deterioration in concrete and pavement can impact roads and streets and cause
significant damage to assets such as underground electrical and communication cables, water
distribution systems, and natural resources gas pipes. The second challenge is “urban
infrastructure management” systems that require leaders to compile data from several sources
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and can include data from engineers, such as “underground utility maps, road construction
details, and road closure regulations” (Wei et al., 2020, p. 2) and is located where specific
utilities are buried underground, which in many cases will require data from a utility locator.
The third challenge can include mitigation to schedule timely or routine maintenance that
is proactive and allows leaders to “predict the potential consequences of actions and observations
in infrastructure management to apply appropriate countermeasures” (Wei et al., 2020, p. 2).
Mitigation includes necessary measures to identify hazards, risks, vulnerabilities, and threats that
can impact society if there are failures, distribution problems, and domestic terrorist incidents.
The goal is to determine if there are any environmental concerns, such as risk and vulnerabilities
and the potential for contamination, traffic delays, and disruption, and identify behavioral
concerns that can impact operational functions. Many critical infrastructures require technology,
system networks, and communication technology to perform well to maintain the continuity
needed for operational processes to deliver resources. Wei et al. (2020) also explained that
critical infrastructures require “intelligent web-based decision support systems” (p. 2) for
infrastructure management system-of-systems to support different operational functions. These
systems are used to manage underground conditions or “Assessing the Underworld DSS, referred
to as ATU-DSS,” which deals with roads, pavement, underground utilities, and surface
conditions that impact underground utilities (Wei et al., 2020, p. 2). These systems use a set of
building blocks that trigger in the event of abnormalities and anomalies in data inconsistent with
current and historical data and based on a “rule-based and real-time data” approach developed by
domain experts, according to Wei et al. (p. 2). In addition, Wei et al. recommended that future
research on critical infrastructure explore measuring uncertainty by applying quantitative metrics
and “qualitative linguistic expressions,” a method based on human reasoning to assess and
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determine “a qualitative confidence levels-based uncertainty management scheme” used by
domain experts to compare linguistic qualifiers based on “fuzzy sets theory” (p. 6).
According to Luskova and Dvorak (2019), critical infrastructures and key resources are
considered an asset or system that provides needed resources where any disruption or destruction
can have an enormous impact on how the economy performs as well as the social fabric of many
communities. Luskova and Dvorak noted these resources are vital to the quality of life for people
living in a community that relies on specific resources to protect “life, health, security, property,
and the environment” (p. 7). These resources include the local food chain, water treatment
facilities, hospitals, banks, social services, police and fire, electrical grids, and natural gas
pipelines. In addition, Luskova and Dvorak explained that protecting critical infrastructures
requires conducting a risk assessment to determine vulnerabilities. A risk assessment is a
functional plan of action designed to provide a framework and application in a risk management
plan and security plan to protect critical infrastructure and key resources, including security
measures for detection to prevent disruptions and the destruction of elements of critical
infrastructures. Critical infrastructures and key resources include both public and private entities.
As Luskova and Dvorak noted, ensuring the protection of these infrastructures requires
cooperation from the public and owners/operators of infrastructures in a proactive approach to
secure critical infrastructure.
According to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) and the
American Petroleum Institute (API), the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and
Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2020 received high praise from the INGAA and API
(“INGAA, API Laud Congressional Passage of PIPES Act,” 2020, p. 53). The new legislation is
part of the 2020 omnibus spending bill, and the goal of the bill was to provide guidance and
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enhance safety for workers and strengthen and enhance safety protocols under the Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA; “INGAA, API Laud,” 2020, p. 53). In
addition, the PIPES Act aims to enhance measures for public safety and protect the environment
and includes the following requirements:
1. PHMSA must provide safety measures designed to detect leaks and new regulations
for repairing and class location and enhancing public safety measures.
2. PHMSA will provide additional funding for pipeline safety at the federal and state
levels.
3. PHMSA requires operators to modernize and upgrade facilities and safety regulations
for LNG export facilities.
4. PHMSA requires operators to enhance safety measures and public safety in local
distribution systems.
5. The new grant system under PHMSA will provide “emergency responders, public
safety, advocates and community groups” (“INGAA, API Laud,” 2020, p. 53).
The PIPES Act also includes additional measures to ensure “improvements in environmental
performance” (“INGAA, API Laud,” 2020, p. 53) and ensure processes contribute to reducing
emissions.
In the United States and countries such as the United Kingdom, there are “sprawling
networks of natural gas infrastructure” (Forman, 2020, p. 143) as well as landscapes that are
constantly changing and require security measures designed to protect and mitigate dangers
associated with the flow of underground natural gas. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
National Transmission System (NTS) consists of natural gas transmission pipes that are “7,600km-long and 280,000 km of buried distribution pipes” (Forman, 2020, p. 143), which is part of
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the National Grid System (NGS). According to Forman (2020), the NTS monitors the
distribution and transmission of high volumes and high-pressure natural gas from producers and
international connections and involves networks that distribute natural gas on a regional scale. In
subterranean infrastructures involving natural gas in the United Kingdom, there are dynamic
fields of risk broken down for two reasons: (a) ensuring natural gas pipelines are a distance from
actors that can cause disruptions and gas to escape; and (b) making circulatory infrastructures
remain unknown to actors, minimizing the risk of interference or domestic terrorist incidents.
In natural gas production, transmission and distribution are the primary functions in the
high-pressure transportation of natural gas (Quinn, 2020). Transmitting and transporting natural
gas through a maze of pipe systems requires forecasting an adequate amount of pressure.
Therefore, forecasting rooms must have “natural gas pipeline pressure alarms” (Quinn, 2020, p.
i) and sensors that allow operators to maintain gas line pressure. In natural gas production, safety
is another primary concern, and many pipeline failures occur due to natural gas pipeline
infrastructures that become old over time and are not adequately maintained. According to Quinn
(2020), the PHMSA is currently responsible for enforcing federal regulations and industry
standards, including ensuring operators use the latest safety technology to protect critical
pipeline infrastructures and production and support public safety. Natural gas transmission and
distribution also have negative environmental impacts and safety concerns. However, natural gas
transmission is considered the “cleanest burning fossil fuel and energy-efficient and most costeffective way to deliver, distribute, and transmit natural gas over long distances” (Quinn, 2020,
p. 27). Therefore, in the production and transmission of natural gas, sensors and digital
technology play a critical role in maintaining, controlling, and protecting pipeline infrastructure
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in ensuring more competent and smarter production and can contribute to a higher volume of
natural gas with fewer errors and care to the environment and public safety (Quinn, 2020).
According to DiChristopher (2020), high-level concerns were expressed about the risk
associated with state-sponsored hackers in natural gas production and distribution. Cybercriminals continuously attempt to penetrate operational functions in industrial control systems in
facilities that house electrical grid system controls for utilities, refineries, oil, and natural gas
pipelines (DiChristopher, 2020, p. 1). Companies that fail to follow the DHS cybersecurity and
infrastructure security protocols run the risk of failure in the organization's information
technology (IT) segment. As DiChristopher explained, in the production, distribution, and
transmission of natural gas, a cyber-attack has been a long-standing concern for some facilities
with inadequate IT security for natural gas compression. An alert issued by the DHS in February
2020 revealed an unnamed natural gas facility was targeted and susceptible to hackers gaining
access to the IT systems (DiChristopher, 2020, p. 1). Information system technologies infected
with ransomware could penetrate operational technology and systems networks, which can
impact control and operational functions. The cybersecurity contractor Dragos issued a statement
that suggests the cyber-attack “did not attempt to intentionally alter, modify, and degrade the
integrity of industrial control systems at the gas compression plant” (DiChristopher, 2020, p. 1).
A significant factor related to the cyber-incident was partly due to a failure to install security
barriers between IT and operational technology (OT) systems, according to DiChristopher. The
DHS alert highlights the importance of information sharing among critical infrastructure in the
energy sectors to mitigate cybersecurity threats and physical threats to critical infrastructures and
key resources facilities in real-time and monitored IT systems 24 hours a day by experienced IT
technicians.
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According to Uberti and Stupp (2021), the recent Colonial Pipeline hack in May 2021
illustrates the need for a regulatory body to enforce cybersecurity standards for oil and gas
producers. In this case, the hacking attack on one of the nation’s most significant oil, fuel, and
gas producers had a catastrophic impact, causing substantial shortages in fuel supply and a
considerable increase in fuel cost. The magnitude of the Colonial Pipeline shut-down extended to
“5,500-miles of pipelines and stretches across the Gulf Coast to New Jersey” (Uberti & Stupp,
2021, p. 2). In addition, Uberti & Stupp noted in a 2019 report issued by the GAO cited that
hackers could target the pipeline information technologies. The pipeline security had
vulnerabilities that extended to staff shortages, and the company lacked cybersecurity expertise.
Therefore, businesses in the energy sector must take cybersecurity more seriously and obtain the
necessary resources to mitigate hacking, cyber-criminals, and ransomware.
According to Good (2020), suggest in the past, oil and gas pipeline companies were
warned that cyber-attacks could have a significant impact on mainstream businesses and natural
gas compression facilities and could negatively impact the credit rating of companies. When
electrical power grid systems or oil and natural gas production IT are affected by ransomware,
credit ratings are impacted, and utilities are at risk. Good suggests owners and operators of these
infrastructures are responsible for preventing cyber-attacks and must mitigate “front-office
operations such as email and internet activity from cyber and physical threats that can impact
“operation technology systems, and industrial control systems” (p. 1) from cyber threats,
hackers, and other cyber-risks. The DHS suggests in the event of an intrusion, employees must
be trained in emergency response, address cyber-risk and threats, and have decision-making
skills to mitigate cyber-threats.
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On May 27, 2021, the DHS issued the first cybersecurity guidelines, requirements, and
regulations for operators and owners of critical oil and electrical power grid systems and natural
gas pipelines. The new security directive falls under the purview of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). The goal is to ensure essential infrastructure has the capabilities and
capacity to mitigate hackers and cyber-criminals and prevent cyber-threats from threatening the
stability of critical infrastructures that provide necessary resources such as electricity, oil, and
natural gas to pipeline sectors. The new requirements are due to the ransomware attack on one of
the nation’s largest petroleum pipelines and producers and growing concerns that hackers or
state-sponsored terrorists can hack into another oil and natural gas or electric power grid system
critical infrastructure.
The DHS collaborates with partners to help create resiliency in technology and controls
in information technology and operational functions to help prevent cyber-attacks. For example,
the cyber-breach and attack on the Colonial Pipeline operational controls demonstrate the need
for more resilient and robust cybersecurity. The federal government is working closely to
monitor private partners to ensure adequate cybersecurity. Under new DHS requirements,
owners and operators are required to report cyber-incidents to the “DHS Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the designated cybersecurity coordinator within 24
hours and seven days a week” (p. 1). DHS initiatives also require owners and operators to assess
gaps in cybersecurity and mitigate any problem identified during risk assessments which must
also be “reported to TSA and CISA within 30 days” (p. 1). The new requirements also highlight
the TSA’s role in strengthening cybersecurity to ensure that electric power grid systems and oil
and natural gas pipelines are secure and resilient, and measures to mitigate ransomware, cybercriminal, physical, and cyber-threats, according to DHS.
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Schlette et al. (2021) explained that in cybersecurity, the primary purpose of cyber threat
intelligence (CTI) is to contribute to data and information gathered on cyber threats and
significant problems that can have an impact on other oil and natural gas pipelines (p. 21). CTI
provides a platform that offers a means to share, detect, and protect against any potential cyberthreats that have been identified through CTI analysis and assessment tools designed to provide a
“quality transparent assessment security” analysis of information technology (Schlette et al.,
2021, p. 21) and operational technology systems on attacks and incidents that have occurred
during operational functions. Empirical studies have shown leaders should collaborate with
domain experts to understand the threat landscape and the benefits of sharing data and
information to avoid operating under “inaccurate and incomplete data, or outdated threat
intelligence” and risk assessments (Schlette et al., 2021, p. 21). The objective is to help prevent
technical errors and inform other leaders, owners, and operators. CTI artifacts can assist analysts
in understanding the nature of cyber threats and provide intelligence on threats that were
identified and not known and require immediate attention to mitigate threats.
Christian (2020) noted in January 2020, Congress passed a new infrastructure framework
design to provide support investments for electrical grid modernization systems and clean energy
and address the most significant critical infrastructures and critical resources in the country.
Funding allocation will include the following, according to Christian:
1. $1.5 billion in funding to replace aging natural gas infrastructures in some
communities.
2. $2.25 billion in energy and solar grants and funding for low-income and underserved
communities to replace outdated gas pipes.
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3. $1.5 billion in financing for electric vehicles and charging stations to help reduce
emissions (p. 1).
4. Funding for energy efficiency retrofits for homes and schools and supports
weatherization programs in low-income communities.
Christian further explained that the overall framework is to help improve resiliency in critical
infrastructure and key resources and protect communities in floodplain areas, such as funding
energy efficiency programs, conservation programs, and intelligent technologies. In addition, the
goal is to invest in underserved communities in need of critical resources to meet basic human
needs, roads, and bridges, and support public safety. Today, members of Congress on both sides
of the aisle are currently having debates on funding initiatives and the status of current critical
infrastructures.
According to Hurdle-Lightfoot (2020), in natural gas production, distribution risk
management is a significant function, and owners and operators of natural gas facilities and
pipelines must maintain specific criteria and a current risk assessment plan. In natural gas
pipeline production, industry owners and operators must develop an adequate risk assessment
plan that focuses on safety. Companies should have the latest technology to monitor leaks and
provide real-time condition reports on safety precautions necessary to maintain industry and
policy standards systemwide. In the United States, hundreds of miles of natural gas pipelines
exist. Therefore, leaders in homeland security and industry-wide must understand the benefits of
effective risk assessment planning and update plans to address today’s challenges, problems, and
changes in environmental conditions that can impact subterranean natural gas transmission lines
and underground natural gas distribution pipelines to consumers. A similar risk assessment plan
is expected for the electric power grid system, which must maintain continuity plans and have
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redundancy in its operational functions to provide service during power outages, downlines, and
problems related to data breaches and operational functions.
Hurdle-Lightfoot (2020) noted an adequate risk assessment plans would help reduce
profit losses, help maintain industry standards and maintain adequate safety plans and
mitigations. In America, natural gas pipelines are one of the primary energy resources and are
second to electrical power grid systems around the country. Natural gas pipeline upgrades and
new community development increase consumption and the cost of gas to consumers and
commercial customers. The natural gas industry safety initiative must include response plans,
risk assessments, and assessing risks and vulnerabilities from production to distribution,
operations, and servicing pipelines in fieldwork. A lack of these processes can have an impact on
the industry nationwide and consumers. In the natural gas industry, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) Act of 1970 requires the industry to provide employees and
organizational structures with safe working conditions and training on “how to maintain safety,
risk assumptions, pre-job briefings, OSHA requirements, and emergency response protocols”
(Hurdle-Lightfoot, 2020, p. 2).
In a quantitative research study on the nature of risk perception, the research should focus
on the social reality, risk planning, and decisions made on housing projects and urban
development where electric power grid systems and natural gas transmission pipelines are often
related to land use and hazardous conditions. According to Hayes et al. (2021), in planning
hazardous infrastructures, a view of land use requires assessing different degrees of risk, input
from multiple stakeholders, and pipeline sector engineers’ assistance. The type of land use is an
essential aspect of natural gas pipelines, and in urban development, careful consideration should
be given to “high-pressure gas pipelines infrastructure” because third-party activity and
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excavations can have a devasting impact on communities in the near vicinity, cause dangerous
fires and have an impact on public safety (Hayes et al., 2021, p. 183). Hayes et al. noted
countries such as Australia, a “comparative analysis can be useful to highlight specific risk” (p.
183) and help determine the level of risk associated with new housing projects near a natural gas
pipeline. Hayes et al. further noted there is evidence of broader risk in communities with
hazardous infrastructures such as natural gas pipelines and electric power grid systems. Some
political and institutional structures fail to understand fewer conflicts between people and
community stakeholders, such as utilities in communities better serve public safety. Planning
requires understanding elements of hazard creep, and new development projects in a community
can impact existing hazardous pipeline facilities.
Advanced technology plays an essential role in public safety in critical infrastructures in
communities, oil production, natural gas pipelines, and electrical power grid systems. Public
safety relies on pipeline facilities and utilities to function efficiently in risk management and
housing near schools and hospitals. Public safety in land use planning plays an essential part in
the process and ensures the public domain remains safe. Risk governance is an integral part of
planning to ensure all measures are taken to protect the public and the environment, including
other critical infrastructures such as bridges, dams, roadways, and waterways. In some cases,
where there is “hazard, creep associated with new residential development” (Hayes et al., 2021,
p. 185), people living in the community development can be impacted by an existing highpressure natural gas pipeline. A worst-case scenario is when a new development is in proximity
to a high-pressure natural gas pipeline line. A lack of consultation with engineering experts can
place communities at risk. Hazard creep can expose communities to hazards and consequences
associated with a pipeline failure; if this occurs, relevant legislation will require modification to
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the pipeline system to protect the public domain and to reduce risk “as low as is reasonably
practicable” (ALARP; Hayes et al., 2021, p. 184). According to Hayes et al., efforts will be
required in collaborations between “planners, developers, regulators, and pipeline engineers” to
review public risk factors (p. 184). In future land use cases and when natural gas pipelines are a
development for the state, there must be a statutory policy for easements specific to be spelled
out on a land title and physically marked on the property as a warning or to prevent incursions.
Hayes et al. further noted in one case study within a multi-case study, in “Victoria and South
Australia, to make a comparison between governance frameworks and risk perceptions” (p. 187),
an evaluation was needed to determine the overall benefits of land use, including elements of
planning and pipeline legislation that govern specific pipelines and key stakeholders (Hayes et
al., 2021, p. 187).
In many parts of the country, oil and natural gas pipelines are susceptible to lightning
strikes, and there are at least “2 million miles of oil and natural gas pipelines in North America”
(Bickham, 2021, p. 32). Bickham (2021) also explained that lightning strikes in the environment
are not the concern; the concern is the impact lightning storms can have on pipelines and controls
systems, the lining of underground pipelines, and damage to coatings and cathodic protection
(CP) systems used to monitor the conditions of underground pipes. Lighting strikes are different
geographically, such as in the state of Texas, where systems are used to evaluate and monitor
pipelines remotely. However, technicians must still perform inspections to assess the health of
underground pipes and determine how systems are performing. When lightning strikes, it is hard
to determine when a failure will occur, the extent of the corrosion, and how much downtime is
required after a system failure. CP is a method used to assess and evaluate “different parts of a
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pipeline and pipe flanges” that have been directly hit by a lightning strike (Bickham, 2021, p.
32).
Brenna et al. (2020) explained that measures include efforts designed to cover different
parts of the pipeline to protect oil and natural gas pipelines. One method used is CP, which refers
to preventive measures designed to protect underground carbon steel pipelines from corrosion. It
is a process “achieved by using a cathodic polarization below the protection potential, namely
0.85 V vs. CSE [CSE, copper-copper sulfate reference electrode] for carbon steel in aerated soil”
(Brenna et al., 2020, p. 1). The purpose of the process is to prevent corrosion that contributes to
corrosive effect throughout the thickness of the pipeline where alternating current (AC) and
voltage can contribute to severe corrosion at “industrial frequencies between 50 or 60 Hz and
when there are frequencies at 150 Hz, or higher the process decreases” (Brenna et al., 2020, p.
5). Therefore, factoring in AC density in preventing pipeline corrosion is significant in
preventing and reducing erosion, causing a coating defect in the pipeline system.
Taquechel and Saitgalina (2018) stated to protect natural gas critical infrastructures,
“risk-based performance metrics, and performance evaluation frameworks” (p. 2) are an integral
part of the process. The homeland security and counterterrorism mission framework provide
performance metrics as a critical tool to deter or prevent acts of terrorism and support antiterrorism efforts. In elements of government performance metrics, Taquechel and Saitgalina note
it is essential for government, especially in cases where measures are applied in government to
help improve emergency outcomes and “public management and program outcomes” (p. 2). In
homeland security, performance measurements and risk management help deter terrorism and
acts of terrorism and reduce the potential consequences. In this case, the purpose of PRAs is to
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assess the likelihood and consequences of a pending terrorist attack involving critical
infrastructures.
According to McCreight (2019), in managing critical infrastructures, vulnerabilities also
extend to when an infrastructure experiences unforeseen incidents such as an electrical grid
collapse, impacted by severe storm weather and wind conditions, “terrorism, technological
accidents, cyber-attacks or geomagnetic storms” (p. 1). In the United States, from the perspective
of homeland security, emergency management, and national security, there are three critical
infrastructures, including “nuclear power plants, chemical manufacturing, and natural gas
pipelines,” that have strategic significance (p. 1). As McCreight explained, if any of these energy
systems and sectors experience significant disruptions or potential terrorist attacks at the
operational level, this can have a cascading and devasting effect. Managing critical
infrastructures requires leaders to ensure systems perform at an optimal level, and leaders must
“mitigate loss, disruptions, discontinuity, and nullification of ordinary everyday services”
(McCreight, 2019, p. 2).
According to Tata and DeCotis (2019), there are risks and vulnerabilities in delivery
systems related to oil and natural gas pipeline production and electric power grid transmission. In
the United States, a key driver of natural gas production is demand, and “inter- and intra-state
pipeline projects” are constructed as infrastructure upgrade projects to meet the demands of
existing customers and new communities (Tata & DeCotis, 2019, p. 1). In the production of
natural gas, there are risk categories and high-level mitigation procedures. According to Tata and
DeCotis, even though there are eight risk categories and vulnerabilities, the significant problems
and risks are associated with the following:
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1. Safety: Problems due to system failures and pipeline incidents causing injuries to
workers, the public, and property damage.
2. Reliability: Problems related to “failures and damage to infrastructure and upstream
supply constraints” (p. 8).
3. Execution: Problems related to weather problems, forced events, and problems due to
strikes and protests.
4. Technical: Problems occur when pipelines require rerouting, "complexities in
design,” and a lack of skilled workers (p. 8).
5. Financial: Problems are often related to cost overruns and materials, and sometimes
upgrade projects lead to high restoration and upgrade costs.
Tata and DeCotis further noted between 2008 to 2018, there was a “total of 1,530 incidents
across an average of more than 1.5 million miles of onshore transmission and distribution
pipelines” (p. 4). Many of the incidents were material-related, pipe corrosion, equipment failure,
and some underground pipe welds failed. Tata and DeCotis explained that condition monitoring
is necessary to assess and monitor risk and pipes leaking, and mitigating risk requires monitoring
pipe pressure and “reductions in operating pressures and scheduled repairs and replacements” (p.
4). There is a significant concern for natural gas producers in the aging pipeline infrastructure in
many parts of the country. Among pipelines in service today, there are “1.6 million miles of the
natural gas pipeline where approximately 48 percent were installed between 1940 and 1979, and
65 percent are natural gas transmission lines, and 35 percent are natural gas distribution” lines
(Tata & DeCotis, 2019, p. 4). Another problem is that in some instances aging natural gas
pipelines did not have installation or construction dates or data and information on when pipes
were installed underground.
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Under the DHS (2021b), the 2012 NIPP framework was designed to ensure the protection
of critical infrastructures and key resources by providing guidance and recommendations on
securing these CIKRs (DHS, 2021b, p. 1). In the United States, infrastructures are essential to
national security, “public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life” (DHS, 2021b, p.
1). Under the NIPP, critical infrastructures and key resource sectors include roads and bridges,
chemical facilities, nuclear plants, water treatment facilities, communications, technologies,
electrical power grids, and natural gas transmission lines. Under the DHS Presidential Directive
7, special consideration is given to physical security, cybersecurity, and human capital to protect
the CIKR. The CIKR considerations require “effective implementation of protective programs
and resiliency strategies” (Tata & DeCotis, 2019, p. 1). The NIPP requires a risk management
framework that targets six areas:
1. CIKRs are required to set specific goals and objectives to manage risk.
2. CIKRs must identify assets, systems, and networks to protect.
3. CIKR must develop a risk management plan, conduct risk assessment, and assess the
“consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats” (DHS, 2021b, p. 1).
4. CIKR must prioritize specific processes to protect and secure infrastructures.
5. CIKR must have formal processes to implement intervention and preventive
programs.
6. CIKR preventive and security programs must be practical and measurable.
The overall process involves establishing an effective strategy for assessing risk and risk
management to produce a “comprehensive, systematic, and rational assessment of national or
sector risk” (Tata & DeCotis, 2019, p. 2).
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Tezak (2019) noted in viewing natural gas pipelines and natural gas transmission lines
issues involving these critical infrastructures are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC; p. 209). For each pipeline construction project, operators must obtain a
permit and certification. Even though the FERC is the regulating agency, additional measures are
often related to land use, and particular limitations must be mitigated before construction projects
can proceed. Tezak further suggested in some cases, local and state governments and non-FERC
agencies may appeal decisions made under the FERC to ensure all state requirements are
completed by all agencies involved in the process.
According to Bencie and Araboghli (2019), under the DHS, 16 critical infrastructure
sectors have been identified as economic sectors, energy grid sectors, healthcare sectors,
transportation sectors, communication networks, and natural gas transmission pipelines, and any
disruption to these systems will devastate the “American way of life” (p. 40). In each sector, the
DHS encourages owners and operators of CIKRs to create continuity and resiliency programs
and what-if scenarios with state and federal governments' and local governments’ assistance. The
process allows stakeholders to prepare for seen and unforeseen incidents and apply
countermeasures to mitigate risk. Bencie & Araboghli suggested targeting domestic terrorists,
violent extremists, and other threats; a target analysis and an assessment tool may be used to
assess risk in qualitative and quantitative procedures. Six factors—criticality, accessibility,
recoverability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (CARVER)—are used to assess threats:
1. Criticality: Targets “points of failure” can have the most significant liability and
negative impact on operational functions.
2. Accessibility: Represents the level of ease in which an adversary will have access to
the target.
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3. Recoverability: Represents continuity in the ability to resume normal functions after a
successful attack.
4. Vulnerability: Represents the risk factors and points of access available to the
adversary to exploit facilities and information technology.
5. Effect: Represents the consequences, scope, and magnitude of disruptions and
damage to facilities perpetrated by the adversary.
6. Recognizability: Represents the “degree to which an asset can be recognized as a
desirable” target by an adversary for attack (Bencie & Araboghli, 2019, p. 2).
The CARVER assessment tool has been around since WWII as an offensive targeting tool to
help bomber pilots target the adversary’s munition sites. (Bencie & Araboghli, p. 2).
The dissertation will target how leaders in homeland security today devise processes to
monitor, protect, and secure electric power grid systems, natural gas pipelines, and natural gas
transmission lines identified as critical infrastructures and key resources. In addition, the
dissertation will include measures to assess vulnerabilities, conduct risk assessments, and address
domestic terrorism. The dissertation will be supported by the geographical information system
(GIS) mapping data to highlight the importance of identifying other critical infrastructures in the
local area associated with underground natural gas distribution and transmission pipelines.
As Anderson (2020) stated, in the United States, there are approximate “2.56 million
miles (4.12 million km)” of natural gas pipelines, and these pipelines are responsible for carrying
“natural gas to more than seventy-five million customers,” including residents, businesses, and
corporate organizations (p. 1873). In 2019, natural gas pipelines supported $150 billion in annual
expenditures and production to support customers, utilizing gas resources for “heat, electricity,
plastics, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, fabrics, and organic chemicals” (Anderson, 2020, p. 1873).
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In addition, Anderson noted that there are benefits to natural gas pipeline construction for
communities.
There is risk associated with different phases of the pipeline construction and risk to
communities and organizations due to leaks, threats to life, and property damage. Anderson
(2020) further noted that in some communities that host natural gas pipelines, there is a reduction
in property values associated with risks leak of leaks, corroded pipes, and explosions. Therefore,
leaders need to understand there is an explicit and implicit cost in natural gas operations.
Anderson stated expenses related to “public and private property damages and emergency
response” are explicit expenses, and costs associated with personal injuries, loss of life, and
deaths are implicit costs (p. 1873). Anderson further stated the PHMSA, a division of the U.S.
Department of Transportation, is responsible for tracking incidents, and between 2000 to 2019,
there were a total of 12,316 natural gas pipeline incidents, including “309 deaths, 1232 injuries,
and $10.96 billion in property damage,” reported by the PHMSA (p. 1873).
Lemos-Cano and McCalley (2019) suggest natural gas pipelines and electrical grids have
future implications. The role of leaders will often require optimizing systems to meet the
demands of customers and new pipeline construction. Natural gas has been an essential resource
in years past, and these critical infrastructures are an integral part of the global energy landscape.
Lemos-Cano and McCalley suggested preparation for future expansion; a deterministic model
will require determining the type of construction, the location and capacity, and the amount of
time needed in business investments, including the operational cost and security, and assessing
the reliability criteria. Depending on demand and expenditures, natural gas transmission
pipelines can be modeled based on the cost of improvements, “combustion turbine units, and the
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combined cycle plants used to generate electricity” and “representations according to the
assumptions considered” (Lemos-Cano & McCalley, 2019, p. 2).
Eyberg (2019) noted that leaders and management structures associated with electric
power grid systems, natural gas distribution, and oil producers are concerned about cybercriminals because these hackers can target system networks that control production, distribution,
and transmission. A report issued by the API and Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating
Council indicated that securing these critical infrastructures in a “defense-in-depth” posture is a
significant concern for upstream facilities, transmission, and locations that extend to wellheads,
pipelines, transmission facilities, and securing construction sites (Eyberg, 2019, p. 37). To secure
these operational facilities and platforms require:
1. Conducting assessments on the “less in-secure core technology” and systems(Eyberg,
2019, p. 39).
2. Upgrading “cyber-tools and techniques” (Eyberg, 2019, p. 39).
3. Creating more secure operational facilities and upgrading internet platforms and
software.
4. Making natural gas pipeline investments and improvements in physical security and
surveillance monitoring, biometrics, and facility security.
5. Natural gas companies invest in uni-kernels technology to create “more secure
systems” (Eyberg, 2019, p. 39).
6. Uni-kernels is a software and systems upgrade that includes initiatives to assess and
monitor operational and system functions.
Eyberg further suggests that securing systems and software upgrades will require expert
engineers, reliable system and technology service providers, and secure internet platforms to
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provide real-time operational and situational analysis and include investments in uni-kernel
applications.
According to Obadi and Korček (2019), the future of natural gas production and
transmission will be reliant on the natural gas market, the energy environment around the world,
and the strong demand for natural gas in parts of Asia. Support for energy security and demand
will require investments in new natural gas pipeline infrastructures and reducing operational
costs to control consumer costs. Obadi and Korček stated that U.S. natural gas production and
infrastructures had met all analysts’ expectations, which has led to lower natural gas prices in the
past and an increase in the demand and cost in 2020 due to natural gas pipeline upgrades.
According to Kuczyński et al. (2019), in the leadership role, natural gas distribution and
transmission are critical in promoting natural gas pipeline operations efficiency. Continuity is an
essential factor, and some distribution points have vortex turboexpanders which depending on
the transmission pipeline, can provide “high efficiency in the range of 70 to 90%” (Kuczyński et
al., 2019, p. 2). Natural gas regulation stations (GRSs) can positively impact efficiency and gas
facility expansion to determine selection criteria for a cost-effective application of turboexpanders at selected GRSs (Kuczyński et al., 2019, p. 1). Improving natural gas distribution and
transmission increases efficiency, and the GRSs can help determine if gas flow is too high or too
low, and automatic control systems help to determine if there are problems and regulate gas
flow. To improve continuity, key performance indicators (KPIs) can be incorporated into
pressure reduction stations and assist in “natural gas recovery at the GRS,” according to
Kuczyński et al. (p. 4). Regulatory laws and statutes will require providers to ensure continuity
and resiliency in natural gas transmission depending on the location of the natural gas
distribution and transmission process.
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According to Josephine et al. (2020), community resiliency is essential in the leadership
role in electric power grid transmission and natural gas production, distribution, and
transmission. Josephine et al. suggested that local, state, and federal governments must have
public policies that support community plans for resiliency and continuity to protect against
natural hazards and disasters. In addition, many leaders, homeland security elements, and law
enforcement enhance community resilience by adopting measures, strategies, and procedures to
address manufactured and natural disasters and domestic terrorist threats. Planning also includes
the involvement of community residents, stakeholders, and the faith community. Planning
resiliency programs have two key areas of concern:
1. Stakeholders involved in the process understand community resilience affects
strengthening communities and community resources.
2. Elements of the process require mitigation, risk assessments, strategic planning,
preparedness, and stakeholders’ involvement is an essential part of the process.
Building community resilience is an integral part of society’s protection against natural disasters
and threats posed by extremist and domestic terrorists in many parts of society. It is also vital in
safeguarding soft targets such as natural gas pipelines and electric power grid transmission lines
and facilities from domestic terrorists and acts of terrorism. Scripture teaches, in many elements
of life as seen today, “Do not be conformed to this world but be transformed by the renewal of
your mind, that by testing you may discern what the will of God is, what is good, and acceptable
and perfect (King James Bible, 1769/2021, Romans 12:2).
Cantelmi et al. (2021) explained that in management structures in homeland security,
resiliency is an essential factor that recognizes the ability of critical infrastructures (CI) to
recover from threats and vulnerabilities, disruptive and destructive events, as well as reduce the
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level of shock systems can absorb during operational functions. In homeland security, processes
to ensure risk assessments and management measures are based on resiliency in the level of
“robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity” (Cantelmi et al., 2021, p. 342). These
measures are incorporated into the technical capabilities, communication and system networks,
transmission, distribution, and organizational and social aspects of the organization. Cantelmi et
al. suggested PRAs and risk analysis can provide data from interviews, questionaries,
observations, and methods used in resilience research from detailed best practices and lessons
learned from current and previous research studies. Cantelmi et al. discussed a systematic review
based on preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) in
quantitative research can help to determine the principal level of dimensions relative to critical
infrastructure associated with “techno-centric, organizational, community, and urban resiliency”
(Cantelmi et al., 2021, p. 344).
Around the world, critical infrastructures and key resources have great significance, and
infrastructures, in some cases, are identified according to public use in society (Derks et al.,
2020). For instance, forest preserve areas and parks are considered infrastructures in Bonn,
Germany. During the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown in 2020, the government
“restricted citizen freedom of movement and assembly” (Derks et al., 2020, p. 102253). The
COVID-19 pandemic provided forest management the opportunity to assess and engage with
visitors and measure the reactions of citizens that flocked to forest recreation areas. Although, in
one qualitative research study, Derks et al. noted that “the influx of visitors posed challenges for
forest managers and was contrary to urban forest policy,” pandemic response efforts and research
findings suggest the pandemic increased visitors (p. 102253). Derks et al. indicated before the
COVID-19 pandemic, there was an average of about “290 people per day” that visited forest
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infrastructure, and qualitative research study findings indicated, “the vast majority of visitors
were over 40 years old, and 80 percent of visitors were born before 1980” (p. 102253). However,
during the pandemic between March 2020 and April 2020, the number of visitors visiting forest
preserve infrastructure increased to “690 visitors per day,” according to Derk et al. (p. 102253).
They recommended future research studies help determine visitor preferences and why visitors
are motivated to visit forest preserve infrastructure even if there is a pandemic or other
emergencies.
Awuzie and Monyane (2020) explained that some delivery systems identified as critical
infrastructures must have sustainability in parts of society because negative influences can
significantly impact these systems. According to Awuzie and Monyane, the ability to function
correctly and mitigate these concerns requires a governance framework design to help guide
project managers to develop effective “sustainable project management practices” (p. 961).
Today, advancements in technology require upgrading infrastructure to mitigate threats,
vulnerabilities, risks, and the level of pressure placed on natural ecosystems and infrastructure
upgrades in electrical grids and natural gas pipelines infrastructures must be in line with the
“pace of technological transformations” in modern society (p. 961). Awuzie and Monyane
further noted infrastructure client organizations (ICOs) have an essential role in devising ways to
increase the amount of investment in critical infrastructures, assets, and processes that are
essential in promoting “comprehensive adherence to the sustainable development goals” (SDGs;
Awuzie & Monyane, 2020, p. 961). Research data are collected on quantitative data, and
qualitative multicase studies conducted for qualitative content analysis (QCA) are used to
evaluate data obtained from sampled and structured interviews to help determine the level of
infrastructure sustainability, according to Awuzie and Monyane (p. 961).

112
According to Kruglanski et al. (2020), during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, no
indicators suggest the pandemic impacted terrorist activities. There was no decline around the
world in international and domestic terrorism. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic impacted
many people and societies, institutions were still being exploited by jihadists, left-wing
extremists, and far right-wing extremists who spread propaganda and conspiracy theories. In
viewing aspects of extremism, domestic terrorism, and international actors in America during the
COVID-19 pandemic, there were the following incidents:
1. Domestic terrorist-related incidents involving “fifty vehicles ramming attacks since
late May that targeted protesters” (Kruglanski et al. (2020, p. 121).
2. Domestic terrorist groups such as the Boogaloo Boys far-right extremist group
intensified domestic terrorist attacks, instigated propaganda attacks against the
pandemic lockdown, and promoted anti-lock-down and police brutality protests and
demonstrations in many U.S. cities.
3. Anti-Asian hate crimes increased early in the pandemic.
4. Far-right extremist groups and organizations such as Qanon, Oath Keepers, Proud
Boys, Boogaloo Boys, and others were “responsible for 90% of domestic terrorist
attacks in the U.S., in 2020, compared to 66% in 2019’ (Kruglanski et al., 2020, p.
121).
5. Far-left extremist groups such as Antifa were responsible for violent and destructive
demonstrations supporting some liberal viewpoints and protested during BLM rallies
and police brutality demonstrations.
Kruglanski et al. also noted that there were anti-lock-down protests and increased cyber-attacks
designed to target hospitals and medical facilities in other countries, such as Germany.
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Moreover, in many parts of society, international and domestic terrorists sought to use the
pandemic to grow stronger and exploit gaps in security and as a means to “forward their
ideologies as a substitute for fear, frustration, and panic,” according to the authors (Kruglanski et
al., 2020, p. 122). For some domestic terrorist groups and organizations during the COVID-19
pandemic, it has been opportune to bolster messaging and spread propaganda to support
extremist political viewpoints, recruit new members, incite violent extremist acts, and further the
agenda of the organization.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
According to Maertens et al. (2022), the Bayes theorem was first introduced in
probability theory and statistics by mathematician Thomas Bayes around the 17th century. This
theoretical perspective explains aspects of probability and how it relates to an event or
phenomenon based on calculating the frequency of an event and the available knowledge of
conditions before the event occurs. Bayes developed a mathematical process for inductively
assessing probability and established probability interference to calculate probability and
validity. Maertens et al. explained that in safety sciences, examining probabilities allows
researchers to explore uncertainties, risk assessment factors, and worst-case scenarios and
develop better ways to conduct risk assessments. Maertens et al. suggested that the Bayesian
approach and PRA methods help leaders improve on making decisions in risk management
processes and transition from traditional processes to new methods based on evidence-based
processes and integrating data in engineering exercises. From the theoretical perspective,
randomness plays a significant role in computing predictions based on data and prior knowledge
of an event or phenomenon. Maertens et al. discussed the term “probability” represents the
ability to rely on partial knowledge, and uncertainties in risk analysis can provide:
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1. Scenario uncertainties are directed toward omissions that can be incorrect or
incomplete specifications of the risk scenario.
2. Model uncertainties represent expressing limitations in the mathematical models or
calculating techniques.
3. Input or parameter uncertainties are representations of uncertainties related to
measurement errors that must be taken into consideration systematically based on
bias in data and randomness.
Determining probability in risk assessments is also reliant on the methodology used to
measure outcomes and potential consequences associated with an event, phenomenon, behavioral
characteristics, and certain factors related to critical infrastructures in homeland security.
Jiang and Liao (2021) suggested variables related to probabilities that require addressing
the research gap. To bridge the research gaps, “linguistic variables and multi-granularity
linguistic term set,” researchers must use a “double-quantified linguistic variable to qualify two
forms of language representations” (Jiang & Liao, 2021, p. 207). The first involves linguistic
variables must consist of probability information, and the multi-granularity linguistic term set
must have correct probable information to identify the differences in shortages in a “multigranularity linguistic term set” (Jiang & Liao, 2021, p. 207). An example is that a natural
language can be ill-defined as expressing probabilities in a humanistic system and serving as a
means of communication for people. However, too few probability mechanisms, such as
computers, can directly handle human language because computers are “governed by the laws of
mechanics, physics, chemistry, and electromagnetism” (Jiang & Liao, 2021, p. 207). Therefore,
there must be a representation of variables to consider linguistic variables. The values must
involve words, phrases, and sentences in artificial and natural language form or consist of
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numbers in a specific range. When there are linguistic representations and variables, probability
can be used to make various comparisons associated with an evaluation, event, or phenomenon
based on certain known factors.
In the field of homeland security, according to Nagin (2013), the deterrence effect is a
factor that can potentially help prevent recidivism in the criminal justice system. The probability
of apprehension is a factor related to domestic terrorists, violent extremists, and cyber-criminals
when there is a certainty of apprehension and a lengthy prison sentence. Probability has a role in
homeland security and the criminal justice system when it can contribute to the deterrent effect.
In viewing probability and deterrence, four research gaps should be taken into consideration:
1. The first is related to the mechanisms available to law enforcement to change the
perception of the probability of apprehension.
2. The second involves the link between the deterrence effect and the threat of severe
punishment and the “criminogenic effect of the experience of punishment” (Nagin,
2013, p. 199).
3. The third is the probability of the concept of a sanction regime, and legal authority is
measured to contribute to the deterrent effect.
4. How does sanction risk relate to probabilities in the criminal justice system?
Nagin suggests based on the probability of apprehension, if the four research gaps are not
addressed and if a link is not established between risk perceptions and imperative sanctions,
there is no way to adjust perceptions if the punishment is not severe, however, cruel, and if
“changes are not made in punishment and sanctions the deterrent effect will not be achieved”
(Nagin, 2013, p. 199). Nagin further suggested in a framework in the criminal justice system and
homeland security, if probability measures are correct, the consequences will provide certainty of
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apprehension when there are more legal consequences, lengthy sentences, and severe
punishment, and the deterrent effect can be achieved.
Summary
The conceptual and theoretical framework in the dissertation will be structured around
PRA in management structures in homeland security and protecting critical infrastructures.
According to Ekström et al. (2021), a conceptual framework or concept involving a PRA should
include a method for risk analysis in a scenario or simulation design to provide building blocks
to optimize the design criteria. The risk analysis and criteria will allow decision-makers and
stakeholders to make informed decisions based on evidence-based data and provide a
comparative analysis and optional models in building specific designs and patterns that highlight
values and a consequence model to help avoid consequences associated with not complying with
energy requirements. A conceptual framework or concept can include two design models
directed toward the “probability of failure and the probability of different design options” and
should reference cost-effectiveness and is financially viable (Ekström et al., 2021, p. 111434).
Probabilistic risk analysis should consist of an iterative process that involves steps to be
performed, an analysis, and data input. Each facet of the iteration process should contribute to
more complexity, add to the building blocks, and provide substantive data to help inform
decision-makers, according to Ekström et al. In homeland security elements and critical
infrastructure, a conceptual framework can include six steps that suggest the following:
1. Design plans should first define and identify stakeholders (government entities,
contractors, developers, agencies, and community stakeholders) in building a critical
infrastructure framework for new developments, technology, and upgrades.
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2. The second step can include factors identification which references identifying
influences, identifying uncertainties, and identifying factors that impact, quantify and
evaluate design patterns.
3. The third involves the framework that can identify uncertainties and what qualifies as
uncertainty and provide a probability distribution that references uncertain perimeters
based on data.
4. In the building design input data, sampling and random sampling should be part of
the process.
5. There should be simulations that highlight “multiple simulations and calculations,
depending on the chosen models, there can be two datasets per design option, and
highlights stochastic parameters” (Ekström et al., 2021, p. 111434).
6. The sixth step involves a framework for critical infrastructures that should provide
energy performance (EP) data to help determine EP feasibility, uncertainty, and EP
variations, according to Ekström et al.
Ekström et al. explained that the conceptual model should allow stakeholders and decisionmakers to evaluate and validate the PRA and examine all probabilities. For example, a case study
can be used to validate probabilities, phenomena, values, or factors related to construction or
distribution, building processes, energy performance, or how a specific infrastructure functions
in real time.
According to Jaimes et al. (2020), a PRA framework can be used to compare and
evaluate the economic outcome of “wind turbine towers subjected to cyclone‐induced wind
loads” is applied (p. 528). The conceptual framework should consider all probabilities,
uncertainties, and the consequences of cyclone-force winds and specific hazards. Significant
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factors in the assessment include identifying wind speed, wind direction, risk perimeters,
vulnerabilities, and the economic cost to the organization and consumers. Another key indicator
is the geographic locations in which wind turbine towers are located are in making comparisons
between electric power grid systems and power distributed from nuclear power plants. One of
the goals of the PRA is to assess the “probability of negative consequences” (Jaimes et al., 2020,
p. 529).
Saada (2021) noted a probability theory could be used in conjunction with the Bayes
theorem, a statistical process that examines the probability of a different set of causes and help to
project the outcome when data is computed to measure the consequences and outcomes. The
probabilistic graphical model (PGMs) is a process that seeks to “provide complex multivariate
systems as joint probability distributions” because it is used to make comparisons between
“multidimensional space based on natural and intuitive variables” (Saada, 2021, p. ii). On the
other hand, dynamic Bayesian networks and Bayesian inference techniques are processes used to
compare reasoning over certainty in probabilities when projecting “domains of human activity
recognition and detection,” which can potentially be essential in counterterrorism in tracking
patterns in human activity and behavior and computer interactions and activity on video
surveillance systems (Saada, 2021, p. ii). According to Montag et al. (2021), the dynamic
Bayesian network theory was created in the 1990s by Dr. Paul Dagum at Stanford University,
and today the theory is applied in research to study “digital biomarkers of brain function” in
mental health to identify continuous markers (p. 897).
Christian Perspective and Homeland Security
According to Xiong et al. (2020), a Christian perspective on homeland security can
provide leaders with spiritual guidance for addressing challenges and problems associated with
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the COVID-19 pandemic and domestic terrorism from a practical and spiritual perspective.
Xiong et al. explained that spiritual practitioners consider the COVID-19 pandemic from a
theological lens and rely on faith and spiritual resources to overcome these challenges. In
addition, people of faith and spiritual care providers practice self-care to help overcome
challenges until they can receive COVID-19 vaccinations. Today, while the challenges and
problems related to the COVID-19 pandemic have been overwhelming, vaccinations are now
available, and people are encouraged to get vaccinated.
Xiong et al. (2020) further noted many people feel the “pandemic and emergency
preparation capacity, and rapid response” is essential and a priority (p. 16). For many people,
spiritual light has shone through the darkness brought on by the pandemic, and there will be
lessons learned “not only as nations to nations but also as humans to all sentient beings and the
living conditions surrounding us” (Xiong et al., 2020, p. 18). In many ways, the COVID-19
pandemic has changed the way people live. In years to come, in research to address gaps related
to the COVID-19 pandemic, lessons will be learned from the tragedy and lessons shared by
many nations. In society today, many “Christians are feeling the heaviness of the pain and
suffering being experienced by humanity” (Xiong et al., 2020, p. 23). Many people are
discovering the “body of Christ” and questioning how they can remain a community of faith if
people are forced to stay in isolation (Xiong et al., 2020, p. 26). Future research will show how
Jesus Christ died for the sins of many, and “today we know that Jesus too has been there, alone
in the tomb; his family and friends separated from him as well” (Xiong et al., 2020, p. 27).
Scripture teaches, “For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jews or
Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit” (King
James Bible, 1769/2021, 1 Corinthians 12:13).
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Kessler (2020) noted that effective leadership transforms the world, and servant leaders
serve others. Therefore, Christian leaders should fight against ugliness in the world and strive to
“make the world more beautiful” (Kessler, 2020, p. 1). Kessler noted the link between
“aesthetics and transformation of the world” in Christianity (p. 1) and recognizing God as the
head of the church. Transformational-servant leadership recognizes:
1. In representing the Body of Christ, leaders must go beyond the church.
2. Leaders must strive “for truth and the goodness” in representing Christ Jesus
(p. 1)
3. Leaders must understand that “the spirit is the real leader of the church” (p. 1).
4. In the workplace and community, servant and spiritual leaders “partake in the
work of the Spirit” (p. 1).
5. Spiritual transformation is caring for others and “beautifying the church and
beyond” (p. 1).
Kessler further noted that in the church, transformative leaders are the link between leadership
and beauty in rediscovering the “beauty in the church leadership office” (p. 1). Christian
spirituality is about leading the church and church organizations to serve the community and help
others. Transformation takes place when people find their way to God through beauty and Spirit.
Because what gives people the most “pure authentic feeling” is transforming and witnessing
God’s presence (Kessler, 2020, p. 2). The Bible teaches, “All Scripture is breathed out by God
and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and training in righteousness, that the man
of God may be competent, equipped for every good work” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, 2
Timothy 3:16-17).
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Overview
Chapter Three includes a presentation of the research methodology, consisting of data
collection methods, instruments, case studies, scenarios, and research participants. In addition,
the chapter outlines the research questions and hypotheses of various outcomes and scenarios
relevant to probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) related to homeland security and critical
infrastructures involving electric power grids and natural gas pipelines and mitigating external
and internal elements of domestic terrorism in America. The PRA process involves examining
conditional probabilities related to the outcome of an incident or stated cause.
Design
According to Hayes (2022), in the case of “independent probabilities of A and B, an
equation will be equal to P(A) and P(B)” (p. 1). The overall purpose of the Bayes theorem and
rule is to provide a mathematical computation to assess conditional probability when it involves
the probability of an event (A) occurring versus an event (B) that already has occurred based on
predetermined conditions. This process can also include variables and observations associated
with an event or occurrence.
The research design will consist of several theoretical perspectives related to PRA and
Bayes’s theory, developed by and named after Thomas Bayes (c. 1701–1761). The theorem was
developed to understand probabilities related to an event and based on prior knowledge of the
conditions of the event. In some instances, the theory is applied to statistical inferences in data
and statistical analysis and probability interpretations to measure an event or occurrence and how
an incident may occur. In homeland security (HLS), critical infrastructure and key resources are
essential to basic human needs, economic sectors, technology, operational functions, and system
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networks. The design is essential because critical infrastructures (CIs) must receive adequate
protections to protect against natural and man-made disasters, cyber-threats, external and internal
domestic terrorism in America.
According to Suo et al. (2021), because CIs provide equally significant social public
services, ignoring probabilities, risks, and vulnerabilities can lead to extensive damage and a loss
of essential resources and services. CIs also provide resources such as natural gas, electricity,
and water and support communication and transportation systems needed to support the quality
of life in many communities. In infrastructures, the quantitative PRA model provides
measurements of risk occurrence and can be instrumental in assessing other risks, providing a
risk profile, and assessing and identifying weaknesses in CIs. The CI framework can include
three factors related to risk factor multiplicity, CI interdependency, and dynamic stochasticity
and characteristic that renders “CIs’ risk more susceptible to variability and uncertainty,” and
risk conditions qualified by probability and loss (Suo et al., 2021, p. 1.). In addition, quantitative
measurement requires determining the level of risk-alert periods and determining if the risk is
high frequency. Suo et al. (2021) noted that in creating a PRA scenario for CIs, a
multidimensional analysis includes the scenario elements, evolution, and effect. A scenariodriven dynamic stochastic model (SDDSM) comprises a 3-step solution and provides a rating of
the risk based on the dynamic stochastic probability of the risk and independent CIs and the
classification of risk identified in the scenario. The design features of the model and the
multidimensional PRA analysis should include three elements:
1. Elements of the scenario can include multiple risk factors and multiple interdependent
CIs and include variables, components, and classifications, and qualifying factors
associated with risk can include the following:
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a. Hydrometeorological hazards and terrorist-related incidents,
b. Pipeline failures and power outages, and
c. It includes classifying sources of risk factors such as natural and man-made
disasters and internal risk factors.
2. The scenario evolutions represent the mechanisms in the dynamic stochastic model
and are related to the following:
a. How risk factors change “dynamically and appear or disappear stochastically”
(Suo et al., 2021, p. 2),
b. Whether or not risk factors worsen or the type of targeted measures are used to
reduce the effect or control the situation and the frequency of the occurrence.
c. The evolution of mechanisms is reliant on the status of multiple conditions related
to operations and system functions, “normal operations, disruptions with or
without restoration, failures, recoveries, and the establishment of a new normal”
(Suo et al., 2021, p. 2), and the level of resiliency and redundancy
3. The scenario effect in the PRA scenario process represents summing up risk and
showing how there are interactions between individual and single risk. The scenario
effect processes include the following:
a. The CI aggregation risk factors must demonstrate multiplicity and
interdependency, and
b. The CI aggregation should demonstrate how risk is classified, representing two
types of risk series and parallel.
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According to Suo et al., a research design that highlights aggregated CI risk factors that are often
referenced in other existing research studies related to CI probability risk factors should include
the following:
•

Natural risks: Risk factors related to “earthquakes, hydrometeorological hazards,
hurricanes, flood plain areas, and climate change” (p. 2).

•

Man-made risks: Risk factors associated with “construction damage, acts of terrorism,
intentional malevolent acts, cyberattack, external disruptions, human error, and data
breaches (p. 3); and

•

Internal factors: Risk factors due to flaws considered as defects in the design, pipeline
valve failures, system blockage failures, aging infrastructure, and failures in the
electrical power grid systems.

CI Interdependency Classifications
•

Geographical problems, physical security, cyber security, and “logical
interdependencies,

•

Input, mutual, shared, exclusive, or collocated interdependencies, and spatial and
functional interdependencies,

•

Budgetary and market interdependencies, and stochastic interdependencies” (Suo et
al., 2021, p. 2).

CIs have become more prevalent in many parts of society and require quantitative measurements
of specific risk and risk occurrence probability, identifying vulnerabilities and weaknesses,
supporting the risk profile, and planning preventive strategies to mitigate probabilities and risk.
In Figure 1, the framework illustrates a PRA scenario for CIs based on a 3-stage resolution (Suo
et al., 2021, p. 5).
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Figure 2
PRA Scenario for CIs
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Suo et al. (2021) further noted that some CIs classifications are based on risk factor
multiplicity and may include hybrid models designed to function as the PRA model representing
electrical power grid systems. The cumulative effect and creating risk curves are based on
probabilities representing system failures, and quantitative measures justify probability and loss.
The illustration in figure 1 highlights procedures for framework and procedures on quantitative
measurements. The PRA framework for three-stage CI scenarios is represented by:
1. The first stage is information acquisition, in which information and data are gathered
from “objective factual CI interdependency information and records based on the
subjective expert judgment” (Suo et al., 2021, p. 4).
2. The second stage involves assessing and processing the frequency of information
provided on risk, and “CI interdependency information is processed dynamically and
stochastically, corresponding to dynamic stochasticity” (Suo et al., 2021, p. 4).
3. The third stage is risk aggregation, considered a “hierarchical risk aggregation”
process designed to identify risk factors and CI risk aggregations (Suo et al., 2021, p.
4).
A dynamic stochastic model is used as a scenario to support a PRA for interdependent critical
infrastructures and provide a basis for disseminating critical information.
According to Chalgham (2020), in creating a PRA design and model for addressing
pipeline failures, a system-level prognosis, and health monitoring (PHM) methodology to
mitigate pipeline health and failures. Furthermore, providing a comprehensive approach to
natural gas pipelines require strategies designed to provide measures in pipeline maintenance of
various components and systems and provide strategies to address pipeline degradation and
mitigate the cost of maintenance programs and operational and economic cost factors. Additional
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PSA measures can include optimizing safety protocols and environmental factors and upgrading
sensors in locations in the pipeline to maximize protection. The PHM is a methodological design
that can effectively optimize operational performance and provide practical strategies for
mitigations. Chalgham explained that enhancements and mitigations in a PHM model help
protect the integrity of pipeline systems and reduce pipeline degradation and failures related to
interdependencies and system components. The PHM is designed to
•

Optimize system health and “reliability in real-time and over-time” (Chalgham,
(2020, p. 14).

•

Optimize how system components function, perform and manage structures, and
schedule pipeline maintenance.

•

The PHM process will help optimize the placement of health sensors through the
pipeline for preventive detection measures, perform diagnosis on valves, and provide
predictive measures to assess failure causes of gas pipelines.

Chalgham further noted that the PHM design and methodological approach is essential for
management structures to support the integrity of the pipeline system and is a proactive
approach to mitigate challenges and problems and avoid system-level failures through
mitigations. Therefore, in a PHM framework and model, system-level performance is
essential and represented by three functions:
•

Provide mitigations for pipeline corrosion,

•

Provide a model and methodological approach to pipeline degradation, and

•

Provide a process model that mitigates challenges and problems associated with
compressors and valves.
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In addition, to address degradation in natural gas pipelines, a system-level functional model may
include the “Fault tree or a Bayesian network” (Chalgham, 2020, p. 20) that assesses the
functional degradation and add to reductions in the performance of compressors.
Research Questions
Research Question 1: Analysis
RQ1: What is a theoretical approach to a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in
homeland security?
According to Chatterjee et al. (2021), in viewing PRAs from a theoretical perspective,
PRA is commonly used in the HLS field to assess and evaluate failures in systems and networks.
In homeland security, PRA is a process that can be integrated into risk management and concepts
of resilience when there are incidents and occurrences involving uncertainty and risk. Chatterjee
et al. noted that from a theoretical perspective, PRAs provide a “direct way of modeling
stochastic resilience measures” (p. 369) and include different variables or resilience metrics to
apply the Bayesian statistical process to assess uncertainty, level of threat, and vulnerability. In
HLS, scenarios are created to assess and model risk, vulnerabilities, and uncertainty; and use
simulation tools to help model specific conditions and occurrences and assess the impact of the
event type and the severity associated with a system and operational failure and outcome. In
addition, PRA theoretical perspectives provide an approach to risk analysis on resiliency and
methods that can “integrate vulnerability and resilience dimensions into the risk assessment
processes” (Chatterjee et al., 2021, p. 369). According to Chatterjee et al., in PRAs, a scenario
and simulation-based approach to risk assessments can quantify data and integrate uncertainties
in Bayesian networks and Monte Carlo simulations in processes designed to produce resilience
metrics and probability distributions.
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Research Question 2: Analysis
RQ2: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) applied in risk management?
According to Thöns and Stewart (2020), PRAs can be a significant part of risk reduction
strategies in homeland security to help prevent terrorist attacks and acts of terrorism by modeling
activities related to improvised explosive devices involving “large governmental building
structures” (p. 1). To help determine cost-efficiency, assess the significance of an event or
occurrence, and take measures toward safety and protecting life. In addition, the “Bayesian preposterior decision analysis” informs decision-makers on prior information (Thöns & Stewart,
2020, p. 1) and new knowledge to make more informed decisions in risk management.
Research Question 3: Analysis
RQ3: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) used to compare risk in critical
infrastructures?
According to Nouri Qarahasanlou et al. (2021), a comparison of PRAs is reliant on the
number of risk factors and the level of “CI reliability (uptime) and recoverability (downtime)
performance” (p. 2). The processes require using “probabilistic performance measurement tools”
(p. 2). In comparing CIs, recoverability, is a term representing a system’s ability to perform
under various conditions and based on time intervals, disruptive events, and external resources.
Furthermore, in comparing CIs, the restoration process is viewed as a joint probability when
factors are based on the “event, correct prognosis, diagnosis, and mitigation and recovery” as
follows: “Re = R + (1 - R) P-diagnosis / P-prognosis and P-Recovery” (Nouri Qarahasanlou et al.
(2021, p. 4).
Nouri Qarahasanlou et al. (2021) further noted that comparisons are determined based on
performance metrics and the following equation: “p-diagnosis represents the probability of
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correctness, p-prognosis probability is the measure of correct prognosis, and the probability of
correct recovery is represented by p-recovery” (p. 4).
According to Nouri Qarahasanlou et al. (2021), a comparison can be made in CIs if the
framework and methodological approach is designed to provide a risk factor-based reliability
importance measure (RF-RIM). A process that evaluates probabilities and risk to measure the
level of resilience and “sum of reliability and recoverability” (Nouri Qarahasanlou et al., 2021, p.
1). In some instances, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC) may be selected to determine the best fit by comparing values based on
“comparing the maximum likelihood value to select the appropriate model” (Nouri Qarahasanlou
et al., 2021, p. 9).
Hypotheses
The null hypotheses for this study are relevant to the research questions listed below:
RQ1: What is a theoretical approach to a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in
homeland security?
H01: Bayesian standards are applicable to PRAs, corroborating data, and a 2-step
approach to testing probabilities.
According to Bowater and Guzmán-Pantoja (2019), to test a null hypothesis in an
imaginary scenario in HLS, an event is represented by the extra-sensory perception in predicting
an outcome or occurrence that involves “20 independent Bernoulli trials in succession” (p.
1422), A process directed toward outcomes associated with failure or success in CI elements.
Each trial represents a “probability of 0.5 and y is greater than 10” (Bowater & Guzmán-Pantoja,
2019, p. 1422). To test this null hypothesis, if the “probability of a correct prediction p is equal to
0.5,” chances are an individual does not have an extra-sensory perception to predict an outcome
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(Bowater & Guzmán-Pantoja, 2019, p. 1422). On the other hand, in viewing an alternative
hypothesis, if the probability p is more significant than 0.5, an individual may have an extrasensory perception to support a prediction in the right direction unless the individual was
disingenuous or making a false prediction. It is also assumed that the “tested statistic is ˆp = y/20
is the maximum likelihood estimator of p, the p value for this problem,” it is the assumption p
value is one-sided (Bowater & Guzmán-Pantoja, 2019, p. 1422). Represented by this equation. In
using a 2-step Bayesian approach to measure probabilities, observation of the data can impact the
level of belief when parameter θ lies in the interval [θ0 − ε, θ0 + ε] but does not represent “the
one-sided P-value method,” as well as to the Q-value. According to Bowater and GuzmánPantoja, in applying the Bayesian 2-step approach, data can be corroborated with the hypothesis
if “θ lies in the interval [θ0 − ε, θ0 + ε]” (Bowater & Guzmán-Pantoja, 2019, p. 1435). The
Bayesian standards of probabilities is a “logical way to incorporate the presence of nuisance
parameters” or events into two steps based on the conditions of perimeters and based on
“calculations of posterior probabilities and densities in the first and second steps” (Bowater &
Guzmán-Pantoja, 2019, p. 1435). Posterior probabilities represent statistical probabilities when
true calculations represent a hypothesis based on relevant observations.
RQ2: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) applied in risk management?
H02: The Bayesian decision theory in PRAs provides a methodology for assessing
risk and making critical decisions.
According to Oates and Sullivan (2019), a PRA can be applied in risk management from
a deterministic perspective. The standard methodology concerns a decision rule and probability
measure based on average-case analysis (ACA; Oates & Sullivan, 2019, p.1339). Based on the
Bayesian decision theoretical perspective, an average error is determined in decision-making as
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expected to represent loss or risk. The ACA represents mathematical computations equivalent to
Bayesian decision theory and is “limited to experiments that produce a deterministic dataset” (p.
1339). In viewing a null hypothesis using the Bayesian rule in PRA, the theoretical perspective
offers a methodology for statistical testing and uncertainty quantification to finding answers to
complex problems and systems “at the point of applied mathematics, statistics, computational
science, and application domains” relevant to risk management and other factors such as groups,
methods, and task (Oates & Sullivan, 2019, p. 1340).
RQ3: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) used to compare risk in critical
infrastructures?
H03: The Bayesian testing (NHBT) framework is essential in comparing risk and
identifying specific perimeters in the null hypothesis.
According to Tendeiro and Kiers (2019), PRA is applicable in comparing perimeters
associated with two or more populations or groups. The goal is to draw data from related
populations to answer questions concerning how to determine how one can believe that M0 or
M1 holds” more population perimeters. To examine probabilities, consideration given to
customary ratios of probabilities and the odds ratios has been exhaustive. Tendeiro and Kiers
noted that to quantify “prior odds ratio to the posterior odds ratios,” the data and statistic
illustrated. The posterior probability of a model will express the prior probability to produce “the
likelihood of data under the new model” (p. 774). The null hypothesis testing, or null hypothesis
Bayesian testing (NHBT) framework, uses “Bayes factors to compare a point null model” by
identifying a perimeter of interest with neutral value and probability density functions (Tendeiro
and Kiers, 2019, p. 775). The process can be used to compare and observe data from two
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competing models, and the newly observed data and statistics are updated in the NHBT
framework.
Case Study: PRA Bayesian Networks and Dynamic Stochasticity Models
In one case study concerning the dynamic stochastic model in measuring and assessing
the risk associated with the PRA, Suo et al. (2021) used the dynamic stochastic probability to
assess risk factors during a specific period. In this approach, a test determines how the model
effectively identifies and tracks risk-alert periods and risk factors related to CIs and determines
the model’s impact on preventive measures. Other significant factors related to CI safety are
determining the risk periods associated with classifying risk and providing recommendations for
future support for CI plans and risk preventive measures. According to Suo et al., the information
further suggests this model is most appropriate and instrumental in providing a “scenario-driven
dynamic stochastic model” (p. 12). Therefore, it is suitable for decision-makers to use a PRA
model to assess CI risk and determine the preventive measures needed to protect against CI risk
and mitigate any concerns. Furthermore, research should examine the future implications of this
model by introducing “mature theoretical tools and integration of intelligent technologies” to
assess future PRA models for critical infrastructure (Suo et al., 2021, p. 12).
According to Kammouh et al. (2020), in applying the PRA probabilistic framework and
design to Bayesian and dynamic Bayesian networks (BNs) and scenario-driven dynamic
stochastic models, these processes can help evaluate resilience indicators and assess the
resilience in engineering systems (p. 1). The BN can help determine the relationship between CIs
and the indicators and handle various terms related to dependencies and variables associated with
CIs in probabilistic risk factors in PRA terms. In the dynamic BN network, this model is
designed to provide a more accurate picture by recording time and variables to establish the
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current level of resiliency in dynamic engineering systems (DES). To measure the level of
resilience in these systems, a mathematical process is applied based on certain factors to
determine the level of resiliency and establish the evolutions in system processes and
performance. According to Kammouh et al., probabilistic methods are more appropriate in
modeling engineering systems, especially in the instance when data are not available, and
measurements will require the “use of a fuzzy analysis and Bayesian Networks (BNs)” (p. 2).
Fuzzy theories consist of methods used when uncertainty and vagueness are uncertain, and
specific factors are unclear.
Furthermore, this theory is heavily reliant on subjectivity when data are limited, or there
is a lack of data, and preference is given to opinions somewhat instead of data. Nevertheless, this
approach can calculate BN resilience between CIs interdependencies and require a probabilistic
methodology that calculates resilience metrics and value. In addition, it can require developing a
“universal resilience metric for infrastructure systems” (Kammouth et al., 2020, p. 2). A goal of
the scenario-driven dynamic stochastic model is to determine factors related to the risk-alert
period and high-frequency and high-risk CIs, according to Kammouh et al. (2020).
According to Kong and Simonovic (2019), there can be temporal and spatial relationships
in infrastructure systems. Analyzing hazards requires assessing multiple hazards that impact CIs
and the probability of damage and destruction. In cases where interdependencies represent
multiple CIs, the hazard period and time variance are significant factors requiring examining
occurrence probabilities. The two main types of temporal relationships are associated with how
multiple hazards coincide with more than one hazard and require understanding the sequence of
multiple hazards and triggers. Spatial relationships are related to the impact of multiple hazards
on CIs when geographic interactions evolve. Kong and Simonovic noted that spatial
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relationships have recently become the focus of research studies. However, this approach relies
on CI exposure to multiple hazards in limited areas of concern. In spatial relationships, factors
related to the following:
•

The impact of multiple hazards,

•

The possibility of multiple hazards in a geographical area, and

•

The susceptibility of CIs to joint impacts and secondary hazards.

In temporal and spatial relationships in CIs, there may be a “combination of conditional and joint
damage probabilities caused by individual hazards,” and probability damage to CIs may exceed a
specific threshold (Kong & Simonovic, 2019, p. 1855).
According to Kumar et al. (2020), electric power systems (EPS) are an essential part of
generation transmission distribution (GTD) networks. Therefore, they must undergo a reliability
evaluation in planning and operations to help determine the level of reliability, especially in
cases where there are interdependencies in power systems that support other networks. When
there is uncertainty and power systems are unreliable, decision-makers encounter fuzzy figures.
Uncertainties can be modeled using probability density functions (PDFs) and analyzed using the
Monte-Carlo simulation (MCS) method to evaluate the reliability indicators and include point
estimate methods. At least 14 work considerations apply to creating a CI training scenario to
assess reliability in electrical power systems and reliability evaluations.
According to Kubo et al. (2022), in conducting a deterministic risk assessment for CI
such as nuclear power plants, a PRA is used to assess and evaluate safety conditions and conduct
a regulatory inspection. However, Kubo et al. noted a difficulty involved in the method related to
how temporal information is handled to evaluate and monitor conditions and is “essential for
modeling operators’ recovery actions and level 2/3 PRA inputs” (p. 357). For example, when this
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process is involved in some nuclear facilities, “temporal information incorporated to provide
time-dependent epistemic and aleatory uncertainties into a thermal-hydraulic (T-H) analysis”
(Kubo et al., 2022, p. 357). In addition, in some institutions, a dynamic PRA can involve a
“RAVEN code which is an acronym for “reactor analysis and virtual control environment”
assessment (Kubo et al., 2022, p. 357), and can involve Latin hypercube sampling methods
(LHS) and adaptive methods for sampling conditions.
In further viewing the role of probabilistic safety assessments (PSA), it is a systematic
methodology applied in the nuclear industry to evaluate risk and provide insights into safety
designs and operational functions in the nuclear power plant (NPP) industry (Zhou et al., 2021,
p. 2). In measuring risk numerically, scenarios can be assessed according to consequences and
frequencies on three levels. The three PSA levels that represent the following:
1. Risk and incidents associated with the nuclear reactor core,
2. Accidents or incidents related to the release of radioactivity within a facility can
impact the environment and humans, and
3. The release of radioactivity or radioactive waste can result in “harm to human health
and environmental damages, respectively” (Zhou et al., 2021, p. 1).
Zhou et al. noted that some conventional PSA studies generally involve single-unit PRAs
(SUPRAs; p. 1), meaning studies involving scenarios on a single reactor unit as long as other
units are not in a critical state and are not dependent on other reactor units. However, since the
Fukushima Daiichi accident in March 2011, in conducting scenarios in nuclear facilities
involving interunit dependencies, there has to be a proper characterization of risk and site-level
dependencies to provide an accurate picture of the risk profile (Zhou et al., 2021, p. 1). In
conducting a PSA data analysis, according to a statement by the Power Reactor Information
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System (PRIS) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2020 (Zhou et al., 2021, p.
2). Figure 2 represents a statistical illustration and characterization of NPPs worldwide that
highlights 442 nuclear reactors in current operation (Zhou et al., 2021, p. 2):
•

Worldwide, “73.2% of these nuclear power plant sites have two or more nuclear
reactor units” (Zhou et al., 2021, p. 2).

•

Multiunit sites are responsible for “88.9% of the operating reactors” (Zhou et al.,
2021, p. 2).

•

Worldwide, 23.0% to 43.7% of sites account for two-unit sites and have two to four
reactor units.

Figure 3
World Statistics of Nuclear Power Plant Sites as of April 2020

Note. From “Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment: A Comprehensive Survey, by T. Zhou,
M. Modarres, and E. L. Droguett, 2021, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 213, Art. 107782, p. 10
(https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2021.107782).
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In conducting a PRA risk assessment, there are differential factors related to a “multiunit
PRA (MUPRA) and single-unit PRAs (SUPRAs)” in nuclear power facility environments (Zhou
et al., 2021, p. 10).
•

Multiunit PRAs are factors related to reactor dependencies at the exact location.

•

Site-level PRAs these factors include all radiological dependencies at the same site
and include “reactor units, spent fuel pools, and other radioactive waste storage
facilities” (Zhou et al., 2021, p. 3).

•

Regional-level PRAs involve radiological sources located across all dependencies.

Zhou et al. (2021) further noted that PRAs conducted in these facilities also involve the
challenges and problems in all domains relative to risk assessment and risk metrics involving
multiunit sites.
Case Study: PRA and CI Risk
PRAs are essential in protecting CIs and understanding specific risks in homeland
security. It also includes addressing risks related to social infrastructures deemed as critical and
having interrelated interdependencies and network boundaries. For example, in one case study
utilizing a PRA framework, Ongkowijoyo and Doloi found the domino effect can identify
significant risks, threats, and vulnerabilities in “risk identification and risk assessment in
electricity infrastructures” (p. 8) to mitigate challenges and problems.
Design and Methodology
Ongkowijoyo and Doloi (2017) suggested assessing probabilities using scientific
methods that include “the failure mode effect and criticality analysis (FMECA), social network
analysis (SNA), and fuzzy-set theory” (p. 5). These methods aim to analyze critical risks
identified as the most critical “based on decision factors and risk impact propagation”
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(Ongkowijoyo & Doloi, 2017, p. 5). Risk propagation refers to vulnerabilities and risks capable
of causing disruptions in system networks and operational functions, fuzzy-set theories are
mathematical computations used to examine uncertain sets, and stakeholder participation has
membership functions. For example, a fuzzy-based critical risk analysis (FCRA) is conducted to
illustrate the interrelated relationship between “stakeholder identification and hazard events
identification” in PRA risk assessments (Ongkowijoyo & Doloi, 2017, p. 10).
Participants and Setting
In Ongkowijoyo and Doloi’s (2017) research study, “stakeholders are referred to as
persons, groups, or organizations” that participated in the study (p. 10). Participants and
participation aim to mitigate risks and develop a comprehensive strategy for infrastructure
designed to minimize and reduce the level of risk that can disrupt CIs and identify extreme
hazardous events. A preliminary risk assessment is developed in the plan, designed in a longterm strategy to identify hazards, events, and risks, and includes stakeholder participation. In
addition, the stakeholder participants work toward “embracing divergent perceptions” and
conducting a “risk impact statement and propagation mechanism analysis” (Ongkowijoyo &
Doloi, 2017, p. 9). The overall goal was to assess critical risks associated with urban
infrastructure system risks by developing, integrating, and mitigating risk assessment
methodologies.
Location and Purpose
The infrastructure risk assessment is performed organization-wide in an internal process.
It does not involve identifying risks and vulnerabilities outside of the organizations or mitigating
any external interdependent or interconnected organizations. The risk assessment includes a
single system and does not include assessing risk outside of the organization or impacts to
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external organizations. Ongkowijoyo & Doloi (2017) research study aims to validate models
based on a hypothetical case and apply empirical research that can contribute to future research.
The practical and social implications are to provide an effective strategy in the decision-making
process that will contribute to a seamless operation in society and increase CI and community
resilience.
Findings
According to Ongkowijoyo and Doloi, research findings suggest that “fuzzy-based social
network analysis (FSNA) methods” evaluate risks related to CIs and the community. Therefore,
the FMECA methods and tools are essential in evaluating and ranking risks and providing a
reasonable method to rank risks “based on their magnitude value within the traditional risk
assessment method” (Ongkowijoyo & Doloi, 2017, p. 5). In addition, the probabilistic
framework considers synergistic effects and noisy probabilities, can be used to evaluate common
causes of failures, and can support decisions relevant to single risk evaluations; for example,
when there is a lack of considering the domino effect in risk assessments and CI risks. According
to Ongkowijoyo and Doloi (2017), this can impact the degrees of dependency placed on the
community and identify uncertainty among various stakeholders and levels of perceptions in the
decision-making process to mitigate risk and determine resilience and risk prevention processes.
Conclusion
In HLS, the concept borrows from other disciplines and theoretical perspectives to
address the many needs of federal agencies within the DHS. According to Comiskey (2018), the
field of HLS lacks a specific theory and framework, and DHS represents multiple fields of study
and disciplines. The role of many federal agencies with DHS is to examine all probabilities,
risks, and vulnerabilities to “prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the
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threats and hazards that pose the greatest risks to the Nation” (Comiskey, 2018, p. 29). In HLS,
many of the theories used in the field are related to risk management, security theory,
technology, and theories on terrorism and the radicalization process, leadership and management
theories, critical theory, and probability theories (Comiskey, 2018). Considering all probabilities
related to risk assessment and management in HLS requires developing a methodology for risk
identification and assessment for CIs such as natural gas pipelines and electrical grid power
systems’ critical infrastructures.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Overview
Chapter Four comprises PRA measures to mitigate high-rise buildings with potential
mixed-use tenants (residential and commercial tenants). The research methodology consists of
PRA and Bayesian networks and other measures. The research study also includes a framework
for fire safety to preserve life and property. According to Tan et al. (2020), the framework can be
applicable to HLS agencies and local fire departments in jurisdictions and geographical locations
in a systematic approach “based on a comparative expected risk-to-life (ERL) methodology”
(Tan. et al., 2). In addition, the research study provides an integrative quantitative framework in
comprehensive risk models that address technical risk factors and factors related to safety and
human life.
Design
The research design and theoretical perspectives presented in the research study related to
PRAs have effectively understood how to mitigate risk in risk management and present a
comprehensive quantitative research study. In the case study, according to Tan et al. (2020),
PRAs are used as a methodology that “incorporates technical, human, and organizational risks”
(T-H-O-Risk; p. 1); for example, in fire safety in a high-rise apartment building. An incremental
approach to risk can increase and quantify the “impact of human and organizational errors”
(HOEs) (Tan et al., 2020, p. 1) when fire safety involves different measures and fire safety
systems when human and organizational factors (HOFs) are essential variables in assessing fire
risk. Tan et al. explained that when assessing probabilities, the “Bayesian belief network” is a
technique used to model human and organizational factors related to predictive modeling, and
“human risk assessments” (HRAs) are factors related to human factors and risk (p. 3). THOR
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features include variations that evolve over a period of time and use system dynamics to model
risk comparisons. For example, changes in building management behavior in high-rise buildings
can create risk and risk to life variations and “expected risk to life due to technical, human, and
organizational risk factors” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 1). In addition, Tan et al. noted that “80% of
accidents” are caused by HOEs, and “fire safety designs that do not consider “human and
organizational errors (HOEs) underestimate overall risk by approximately 20%” (p. 2). The term
HOE is defined as characteristics that represent “collective departures from acceptable or
desirable behavior by an individual or groups of individuals that may result in unacceptable or
undesirable outcomes” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 2).
In high-rise buildings that house residents and critical infrastructure services and
resources, fire systems are both active and passive emergency systems that can contribute to
HOE and response to emergency incidents. An active system can include automatic fire
suppression and detection systems such as sprinklers and fire alarms. Passive systems are
designed to “suppress or slow the spread or contain fires and can include fire detectors, and
smoke control systems” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 2). Tan et al. (2020) also suggested there is a
probability of a mismatch between human and task-oriented functions during emergency
incidents or in response to an emergency incident. Therefore, management staff and decisionmakers can evaluate performance-shaping factors (PSFs) when after-action reports and other
official reports are generated. The human error probability is calculated after the assessment and
becomes a part of the risk assessment (p. 3). In the T-H-O-Risk methodology, designing building
and performance metrics is an essential part of the process. It includes the deemed to satisfy
(DtS) solutions, ensuring the design complies with standards and performance metrics, ensuring
the relationship in each subsystem is tested and qualifies, and fire safety systems and preventive
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measures quantified in the F-N curve assessment. The framework ensures acceptability in the
design pattern and addresses performance issues concerning fire safety systems.
Research Questions
RQ1
RQ1: What is a theoretical approach to a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) homeland
security?
In HLS, fire departments, and critical infrastructure across the country, it is essential to
“accurately estimate the value of probability in performing and not performing fire drills,”
especially when it involves CIs and high-rise buildings with a mixture of occupants (Tan et al.,
2020, p. 2). Senior citizens often live on higher floors, and emergencies can hamper response
times. In a scenario involving emergency response in high-rise buildings, considerations
associated with several factors are relevant risks that can exceed an acceptable risk threshold.
The T-H-O-Risk model in PRAs addresses the gaps necessary to quantify factors related to
“technical, human, and organizational risks and uncertainties” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 25) related to
risk probabilities in high-rise buildings. The methodological approach can also apply in other
jurisdictions and geological locations. The Bayesian network incorporates HOEs and integrates
SD modeling to make comparisons and account for variation in risks (Tan et al., 2020, p. 25).
For each scenario related to a high-rise building in assessing probabilities, there is an event tree
that illustrates five potential events that can occur as follows:
•

The initial emergency event and response is called “fire yes-P(f)” (Tan et al., 2020, p.
6)

•

Fires detected and “detection methods yes-P(d)” (p. 6)
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•

The ability to suppress fires is referred to as “fire suppression systems yes-P(Su)” (p.
6)

•

Spread of fires and warning systems for building occupants—“warning system yesP(BOWS)” (p. 6)

•

High-rise buildings that have “egress protection systems” allow for “fire department
response P(Fdr)” (p. 6)

In these types of scenarios, probabilities are the product of the emergency event as a “single
event: P(Sc) = P(f)P(d)P(Su)P(SC)P(BOWS)P(Fdr)” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 6).
RQ2
RQ2: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) applied in risk management?
Probabilities uncertainty is a primary concern in risk management and should be viewed as a
fundamental aspect of risk management assessment. An example is risk management in a fire
scenario involving probabilities, in which the probability is P-1, and C1 represents consequences
or the number of injuries or deaths resulting from Scenario-1. The N represents the number of
scenarios where there is mitigation. Therefore, a risk definition of probability viewed from two
perspectives are expected outcomes and risk as uncertainty, and a risk-based method will require
an analysis of uncertainty. In this type of fire scenario, occupants of high-rise buildings are a
priority, and risk management is an essential function in building management practices. In
PRAs and risk management, HOEs, and SD, some variables are reliant on the “maintenance
regime as a subsystem linked with other subsystems” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 8) in building
management processes and organizational cultures. The SD model is a 2-step process, and the
first step is the causal loop in the system comprised of causal relationships. These elements
represent interactions in systems where feedback loops and delays in the time frame play an
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integral part. The second step is the “stock and flow diagram” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 8) and
involves quantitative analysis. A stock is an entry flow that involves increasing “the value of a
stock, and a flow exiting a stock decrease” over time (Tan et al., 2020, p. 6). The mathematical
computation illustrated that the stocks and flows are related: “Stock =Z t 0 (Entry_ flow - Exit_
flow) dt” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 8).
RQ3
RQ3: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) used to compare risk in critical
infrastructures?
In the PRA, when comparing risk associated with fire safety and fire fatalities in CIs and highrise residential buildings, data extrapolated in other countries such as Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the UK indicate a range between “7.3 x 10 -6 to 1.3 x 10 x -5 deaths and year” (Tan
et al., 2020, p. 17). When a high-rise residential building does not have active fire systems, the
ERL is “1.68 x 10 - 3 to 8.38 x 10 - 3”; in a residential building that does not have an active
system; the ERL is higher (Tan et al., 2020, p. 17). The T-H-O-Risk methodology and the ERL
provide an alternative solution to make comparisons that are deemed to satisfy (DtS) with a
solution integrated into the F-N framework and curves acceptable in the design. The F-N
represents the frequency (F), and the (N) represents probabilities related to a cause or fatalities.
The T-H-O-Risk methodological approach and ALARP principles contribute to comparative
calculated risk values. The primary steps in the T-H-O-Risk methodological approach used in
making comparisons involve data collection methods and analysis processes. These methods
involve determining credible fire scenarios, performing risk assessments and scenario analysis,
ranking risk and comparing fire scenarios, and performing a quantitative and qualitative risk
analysis. In PRAs, comparing risks requires generating a fundamental equation in the first step,
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and the equation should highlight probabilities and consequences. Risk to occupants can be
“calculated based on probable fire scenarios leading to the computation of ERL” (Tan et al.,
2020, p. 9), and the ERL is compared to the HOE to determine the overall risk and compared to
industry standards, according to Tan et al. (2020). Further, Tan et al. suggested the BN can
provide data on calculated ignition frequencies and analyze global ERLs to understand the
“dynamic effects of time-varying parameters effects of time-varying parameters” (p. 9).
According to Tan et al., in the research study, seven building designs were chosen in
different geographical locations involving various climatic conditions to assess and compare
HOE risk factors associated with residential high-rise fires. The study design focused on “active
fire safety systems in high-rise residential buildings” (p. 25) and to determine the best approach
to fire safety systems and understand the impact of HOEs on sprinklers systems, smoke
detectors, “building occupant warning systems (BOWS), and smoke control systems” (Tan et al.,
2020, p. 25). In addition, a focus is also placed on building risk level benchmarks, assessing
human and organizational errors, and determining if the specific factors exceed the threshold for
acceptable risk. Key assumptions introduced were based on risk estimations, calculations, and
design perimeters based on probability and an estimation of the potential consequences.
Hypotheses
The null hypotheses for this study are relevant to the research questions listed below:
RQ1: What is a theoretical approach to a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) homeland
security?
H01: In CIs and homeland security, PRAs and the T-H-O-Risk methodology can be
essential for emergency response plans and training.
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According to Tan et al. (2020), in a theoretical approach to risk assessments that includes
a PRA, the T-H-O-Risk methodology can be applied in other jurisdictions if the HOE utilizes the
BN and sees risk variations in SD modeling. For example, in SD mapping, nonlinear factors can
impact BN and the HOE variables in data analysis. It can include deficiencies in training,
inefficient emergency plans, non-compliance with standards, no check rules, deficiencies in
maintenance procedures, incorrect risk assessment, not following predetermined standards, and
an improper safety organizational structure.
According to Huse (2018), in HLS, as well as critical infrastructures and building
structures, targeted violence and public safety are a significant concern for HLS agencies and
law enforcement because of the probabilities associated with “single-attacker events, whether
assassinations, school shootings, or lone-wolf terrorist attacks” (p. 17). In some cases, agencies
use registered probabilities to analyze hypothetical scenarios in super-forecasting. In the case of
super-forecasting, in the process, a group engages in analytical processes to evaluate threats
“compared to a single-agency method” (Huse, 2018, p. 17). Probabilities receive scores
according to the level of binary accuracy based on whether occurrence did or did not occur. For
example, suppose a forecaster ranks a 75% probability of an event occurring. In that case, the
forecaster will receive a higher score than a forecaster who ranked an outcome of 60%
probability outcome. Huse’s hypothesis suggests that ranking probabilities using a superforecasting methodological approach will provide a “more thorough, accurate, and predictive
analysis than a single organization” (p. 41). In super-forecasting acts of targeted violence
involving critical infrastructure, there is a probability of “inherent institutional and cognitive
vulnerabilities” due to inadequate data and information and failure to properly investigate and
detect probabilities of an event within a single organization (Huse, 2018, p. 42). Data sources are
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used to conduct quantitative statistical analysis for super-forecasting probabilities concerning
targeted violence and lone actor attacks; research sources will include publicly available data.
Information can be obtained from unclassified sources such as the “START Global Terrorism
Database” and data compiled from case studies to create a scored and analyzed synopsis (Huse,
2018, p. 42).
RQ2: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) applied in risk management?
H02: In risk management, CIs, and homeland security, a quantitative analysis is
essential in addressing HOE and understanding the role of PRAs to protect
infrastructure from failures and domestic threats and provide safety in high-rise
buildings.
According to Tan et al., in PRAs and risk management, human and organizational errors (HOE)
are significant when addressing the complexity of the fire system. For example, the expected
risk-to-life (ERL) can influence safety provisions, leading to a 33% increase with a more
straightforward design, and a new sprinkler system can lead to a “+20 increase in the ERL” (Tan
et al., 2020, p. 25). In PRAs, building design can involve different human characteristics and
organizational scenarios, designs, and organizational standards such as maintenance procedures,
safety systems, and emergency planning. In some cases, there can be a positive correlation
between the ratio in HOE and ERL based on the number of active systems, and values in HOE
may “range from 8–13% and increase to 25–38% when all four active systems are present in the
trial design” (Tan et al., 2020, p. 25).
According to Valentin Torres (2020), the BN theoretical approach can be instrumental in
making predictions, management decisions, risk evaluations, and strategic planning in risk
management. In addition, the approach can also help predict casual relationships in BN risk
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evaluations and “improve network performance” (Valentin Torres, 2020, p. 4). In assessing
probabilities, a fault tree analysis (FTA) is referred to as a visual approach designed to “break
down the failure of a system into source events trees using event and gate symbols to structure
cause and effect relationships of a failure” (Valentin Torres, 2020, p. 20). An FTA is a technique
used to reflect a logical sequence to failures or the probability of failure.
In addition, according to Valentin Torres (2020), malicious software can exploit critical
infrastructure and network devices and require a fundamental framework designed to provide
adequate cyber-security to prevent CIs from becoming infected, damaged, disruptions, and
suffering a loss of control systems. In one hypothesis presented by Valentin Torres, a correlated
analysis of system networks in risk management suggests probabilities and predictions are reliant
on network performance status. Valentin Torres suggested network risk occurrences and how
challenges are “correlated to the network performance is reliant on performance values with less
than 0.5 with a confidence interval of 95% and p-value less than 0.05” (p. 66). For example,
calculating probability in an FTA can be calculated based on the output event if an event applies
to the analysis. The FTA calculation and results can also include factors related to Poisson
density function (PDF), gamma Poisson distribution (GPD), and generalized linear model
(GLM) to help determine the impact network risk incidents can have on performance to achieve
a “confidence interval of 95% and p-value less than 0.05” (Valentin Torres, 2020, p. 66).
According to Valentin Torres, “correlation analyses do not predict the likelihood of network
performance and do not show significant evidence to reject the null hypotheses, because of the
confidence interval of 95% and p-value less than 0.05” (p. 67).
RQ3: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) used to compare risk in critical
infrastructures?
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H03: In risk management, PRAs and quantitative analysis are essential in
comparative analysis related to pipeline safety and assessing electrical power grid
systems and power stations.
According to Karki (2020), in protecting CIs such as natural gas pipelines and electric
power grid systems, risk management is a process that involves future assessment to protect
these resources from failure and domestic terrorists by creating better design, construction, and
preventive measures. With CI risk assessment, a quantitative analysis is performed on system
functions to calculate and compare differences in factors related to the pipeline’s age. An
example is two different scores compared to determine the differences in number scores to
determine if “the pipeline is older or more recent in age” (Karki, 2020, p. 11). In conducting a
risk assessment on pipeline crossings, a risk analysis tool follows “Guidelines for Utility
Encasement Policy for Highway Crossings” (Karki, 2020, p. 24). The process provides a
comparative corrosion analysis using the casing corrosion direct assessment (CCDA). In
conducting risk assessments, a second process includes “a general system of relative risk scores”
(RRS; Karki, 2020, p. 11). The goal is to categorize probable pipeline failures. For example, to
determine the null hypothesis related to “the output of the average nearest neighbor tool,” the
process includes observing the “mean distance and expected mean difference, nearest neighbor
ratio, z-score, and p-value” (Karki, 2020, p. 40). The z score and p value can help determine if
the null hypothesis is rejected and if the rejection is related to the means if the z score and p
value are not part of the data set and the data set is not part of a random pattern. According to
Karki, conducting a risk assessment on probability can help determine if “a random process
creates the observed spatial pattern” (p. 41) when the probability consider as a small p-value
output, according to Karki (p. 41). Scripture teaches, “according to all that I am to show you, the

152
pattern of the tabernacle and the pattern of all its furniture so that you can construct it” (King
James Bible, 1769/2021, Exodus 25:9).
Descriptive Statistics
According to Langat et al. (2019), studies involving hydrological environments utilize
descriptive statistics applicable in designing models, organizational planning, and managing
water systems, critical infrastructures, and ecosystems. In these studies, probability distribution
models are used to conduct analysis. Depending on the choice of model and the frequency
analysis, critical analysis can include “an event-descriptive variable” and a distribution model to
assess historical data (Langat et al., 2019, p. 2). In some cases, a distribution model can include a
“best-fit probability distribution” (Langat et al., 2019, p. 2) and perimeters that estimate certain
factors. In classical descriptive statistics, a prerequisite can include probability distribution and
determining the type of analysis.
Langat et al. (2019) noted an example is the water distribution systems, where descriptive
statistics can include factors relative to “maximum streamflow, minimum streamflow, and mean
streamflow” (p. 9). Datasets provided through streamflow datasets are used to conduct an
“extreme flood analysis, contribute to drought investigations, reservoir volumes studies, and
time-series modeling (Langat et al., 2019, p. 9). In quantitative research, descriptive statistics
summarize specific datasets or samples represented by a variable mean, standard deviation, or
frequency level and are used to understand elements of a dataset or collective properties. In some
cases, a distribution with specific graphical functions illustrates the goodness of fit. To plot a
graphical representation and visualization of the goodness of fit, quantile–quantile (Q–Q) plots
construct a graphical assessment and visualization of the goodness of fit. In descriptive statistics,
a probability-probability (P–P) plot is a simple way to construct a graphical procedure that
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assesses a “forecast prediction and assesses the forecast uncertainty” based on probability values
(Langat et al., 2019, p. 13). For example, Figure 2 illustrates a “normal distribution with
uncertainty or skewness and kurtosis estimated by bootstrap” that illustrates extreme floods
(Langat et al., 2019, p. 11).
Figure 4
Cullen and Frey Graphs Showing Streamflow
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In CI water distribution systems, the best-fit-model probability distributions and the null
hypothesis testing based on the minimum Akaike information criterion (AIC) value calculated
and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), according to Langat et al. (2019, p. 9).
According to Che-Castaldo et al. (2021), an electric power grid system is considered an
essential resource in society that connects multiple infrastructures. Other CIs are also
interconnected through the power grid system. Across critical risk indicator (CRI) domains, there
is a diverse number of CIs and these power grid systems are guided by “human activity and
public policy” in terms of supply and demand (Che-Castaldo et al., 2021, p. 594). Che-Castaldo
et al. noted that electric power grid systems are emerging as a class of human and natural
systems that involve complexity and independence. The primary function and processes are
controlled through computers and communication network systems. Descriptive statistics
illustrate the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) in electric power grid
systems. This data process uses “metrics to quantify disturbances on the power grid” (CheCastaldo et al., 2021, p. 608).
The IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices also employs metrics
to quantify the average amount of time customers are without power or the amount of time for
system disruptions. According to Che-Castaldo et al., risk measures that involve probabilities
aim to focus on measures such as systemic risk measures: marginal expected shortfall (MES),
SRISK, turbulence measures, and network connectedness methods” that can include statistics to
highlight processes and to capture “systemic risk in human and natural systems” (p. 612). In
addition, measures related to descriptive statistics can also include variables associated with
stakeholders, stockholders, reservoir operators, CIs, civil infrastructure streamflow, and
monitoring future risk and monthly outlook distribution datasets based on raw data, according to
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Che-Castaldo et al. Scripture teaches “Who has measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, or
with the breadth of his hand and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of
the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hill in a balance” in (King
James Bible, 1769/2021, Isaiah 40:12).
Results
H0 1
According to Huse (2018), in the decision-making process, simulations contribute to an
awareness of threat assessments and provide a 2-part survey highlighting the strengths in threat
assessments, identifying uncertainties and what is statistically unpredictable, and providing a
multidisciplinary method to conduct analysis. In viewing five scenarios relevant to targeted
violence, hypothesis testing involves Monto Carlo methods in a time series autocorrelation
analysis to conduct tests. The aim was to conduct tests involving pattern detection to determine if
specific patterns emerge and justify any rejection of the hypothesis concerning lone wolf actors’
targeted violence over time to determine randomness. Huse noted no correlation in statistical
testing in the hypothesis generated by the scenarios, and there were “weak correlations noted
between latitude data and lags of t-1 and t-2” (Huse, 2018, pp. 82–83). A quantitative analysis of
violent attack data includes an experimental survey, and the super-forecasting methodological
approach uses a Brier score evaluation information. Information suggests “the hypothesis that the
networked interagency analysts produce results that are significantly different from investigative
agencies,” and the survey instrument produced output data for the analysis to help determine
how analysts reach decisions (Huse, 2018, p. 20)
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H0 2
According to Valentin Torres (2020), in conducting quantitative research, the multiple
logistic regression (MLR) results suggest that probabilities and predictive modeling can help
predict the impact of network performance. In some situations, the MLR and network
performance can affect the “current status, customer impact, and network failure related to
network risk incidents” (Valentin Torres, 2020, p. 72). For example, it can lead to the likelihood
of failure for a source of impact when there is “a 95% confidence interval and a p value less than
0.05” (Valentin Torres, 2020, p. 72). Therefore, according to Valentin Torres, the results suggest
there was no reason or evidence to reject the third null hypothesis. The reason was that the
“confidence interval of 95% and a p value less than 0.05” (Valentin Torres, 2020, p. 68) and
there was no likelihood of failure in network performance. In addition, a descriptive analysis
establishes the “minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, and variance of the independent
and dependent variables” to determine six independent variables in network performance
(Valentin Torres, 2020, p. 36).
H0 3
According to Karki (2020), the author asserts that the null hypothesis is directed toward
analyzing patterns in the toolset to determine spatial randomness in data. To determine if there is
probability in p values observed in spatial patterns and to illustrate when there is a small amount
of probability in p values. The spatial statistics were calculated before the confidence level was
obtained based on a 99% confidence level to represent a conservative case to reject the null
hypothesis. Statistical data can be retrieved from the global information system (GIS) to focus on
mapmaking and comparison of data, “data analysis, and statistical analysis,” according to Karki
(p. 45). The goal is to understand probabilities and uncertainties and conduct a “risk analysis of
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pipeline, characteristics of pipeline failure,” the importance of the age factor in pipeline failures,
and the significance of “GIS spatial analysis and methods to improve pipeline design and
regulations” (Karki, 2020, p. 45). Scripture teaches, “It is the Glory of God to conceal a thing,
but the honor of kings is to search out a matter” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, Proverbs 25:2).
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Overview
The purpose of Chapter Five is to provide a clear interpretation of probabilistic risk
assessments (PRAs) in critical infrastructure (CI) and homeland security and express the
importance of considering PRAs in addressing issues, problems, and uncertainties associated
with risk and threats as well as in providing protective measures for infrastructures. The chapter
also includes the overall context of the research and the significance of research findings.
Discussion
The research methodology utilized PRAs, Bayesian networks, and other concepts. The
aim of this research study was to provide a PRA framework for fire safety to preserve life and
property and mitigate human and organizational errors (HOEs) and threats posed by domestic
terrorists and violent extremists. These factors play a significant role when assessing PRAs to
protect human life, critical infrastructure, and homeland security elements. According to Suave
and Van Acker (2021), when modeling uncertainties in PRAs, a life cycle assessment may be
conducted. The goal is to address uncertainties, vulnerabilities, and risks when there is a lack of
or limited knowledge about a system and inherent consideration given to spatial and temporal
variability in the stochastic process. In some instances, an assessment can require an “integrated
life cycle assessment (LCA) and quantitative risk assessment (QRA)” (Suave & Van Acker,
2021, p. 591). For example, to understand the likelihood of an event, crisis, occurrence, and
consequences, the process can include integrating tools and developing a framework design to
provide probability estimates weighed in various scenarios to improve the overall spatial and
temporal factors. The process can also include developing an event tree design to provide the
basis to understand the probability of occurrence in each scenario. According to Suave and Van
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Acker, test applicability will require computing all values and standard deviations in each
scenario to determine if the impact is related to cumulative probability. These factors will help
determine if the PRA data and information obtained from existing conditions can have future
implications.
According to Glette-Iversen et al. (2022), in a comparative view of quantitative risk
analysis and assessments, plausibility is considered an example of uncertainty similar to
probability in meaning. The concept is also referred to when analyzing a scenario when there is
an emerging risk. On the other hand, plausibility is considered a tool for measuring uncertainty
in a qualitative approach, but risk and uncertainty must be clarified. Another definition of
probability is incomplete knowledge, limits that lack accuracy, and an assumption that is
misleading and lacks transparency. On the other hand, a suitable term for probabilities is the term
that can be defined as a subjective judgment or subjective probability and the likelihood of risk.
A significant factor in distinguishing the difference between plausibility and probability is
applying the terms in scenarios and forecasts. It depends on how risks are characterized
according to feasibility or plausibility versus the likelihood of an occurrence. Glette-Iversen et al.
suggest that if probabilities cannot be used to quantify or measure a scenario, a body of evidence
may be used to measure outcomes in “terms of plausibility or convincingness of the evidence”
(p. 6). In addition, the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) provides a generalization of the Bayesian
theoretical perspective that represents subjective probability, which suggests probability is a
belief function and features of plausibility provide measures of uncertainty. The DST is also
considered an evidence theory, and it is a theoretical approach that focuses on reasoning with
elements of uncertainty through evidence. The Scripture teaches, as evidenced in the Bible, “All
Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction,
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and for instruction in righteousness that the man of God may be thoroughly furnished onto all
good works” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, 2 Timothy 3:16-17).
According to Zio et al. (2022), in probabilistic risk assessments, the Bayesian belief
network is a graphical model designed to provide data to represent conditions related to
dependencies and random variables. Through the model, probabilities are quantified based on a
set of nodes and propagated evidence gathered from network elements. Furthermore, the network
is designed to model systems complexities and include multiple scenarios, and the inference may
be listed as forward, backward, or intercausal formation. In some instances, joint computing
probabilities can involve estimating marginal probabilities, and setting perimeters can include
“examining the maximum likelihood” (Zio et al., 2022, p. 6). Elicitation can require an expert in
a specific field, and through an expert, conditional probabilities information obtained may
provide recorded data, analytical design, framework, and perimeters; missing data concerning the
conditions and the environment, and preliminary testing.
In some cases, an expert compiles marginal and conditional probabilities using a
probability scale and in conditional probability table (CPT) highlighting the states of different
nodes. In some case studies, the quantitative part of a conditional probability table requires the
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) to assign probabilities and perimeters. Additional time may
require calibrating the weights to target specific probabilities. In some cases, the aim may be to
reduce probability uncertainties that may require reassessing probabilities to determine levels of
uncertainty.
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Research Questions
RQ1
RQ1: What is a theoretical approach to a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in
homeland security?
According to Cheng et al. (2022), probability methods such as Bayesian networks,
stochastic theories, and resiliency are essential in homeland security. Assessing the performance
of CIs is vital to ensure the normal operations of systems and networks that are interconnected
and interdependent. Cheng et al. suggest maintaining resiliency and minimizing hazards require a
framework to address all-hazards systems face and countermeasures to mitigate hazards. To
quantify hazards in some instances will involve a subject matter expert (SME) for the
“construction of probability distributions and risk calculations” to develop resiliency metrics
(Cheng et al., 2022, p. 596). In homeland security, metrics for CIs can include factors relative to
the “probability of performance recovery” (Cheng et al., 2022, p. 598). In the approach, the goal
is to focus on the system’s ability to absorb hazards and resume normal operations, redundant
functions, and resources to recover from hazards and system failures.
PRAs will also include metrics to assess performance recovery time. Depending on the
CI target to protect the recovery process will involve a stochastic process. The main goal is to
ensure an available recovery source and assess the hazard’s severity and occurrence based on
probabilities. In CIs, probabilistic metrics can specifically include the following:
•

The probability performance function is restored to normal functions within a
level period.

•

Reliability will complement probable failure.

•

Performance and recovery must meet specific thresholds.
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•

Conditional probability must ensure performance recovery will be within a level
period.

•

Multiple indicators will be assessed based on the “sum of reliability and
recovery ability” (Cheng et al., 2022, p. 599).

CI resiliency and PRAs can be formulated conceptually, qualitatively, and quantitatively in
research studies to address elements of resiliency and, in a general or specific context, to address
the needs of CIs, community resilience, and engineering resilience.
RQ2
RQ2: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRA) applied in risk management?
According to Silva et al. (2021), in risk management, evaluating risk a PRA can involve
Bayesian theorem, Monte Carlo simulation, and other analytical processes that evaluate and
identify risk and occurrences that have probable consequences and negative consequences
connotations. In some elements of risk management, it is the belief that the impact of risk and
probabilities are independent. Risk management in some supply chains believes risks are a
cascading effect and observe risk to mitigate the problem. Silva et al. suggest that in measuring
risks, conditional factors should be incorporated, and the probability of the occurrence must be
calculated conditionally. Measuring risk involves two components: (a) the probability of an
event and occurrence and (b) the assessed consequences and the impact of the risk. Silva et al.
suggested that some managers are not comfortable with probability estimates in supply chains. In
other situations, managers of companies’ data are not available or scarce and are unaware of how
to “estimate the variables through subjective judgments” (Silva et al., 2021, p. 2962).
According to Winterfeldt et al. (2020), a risk-informed benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is
necessary for homeland security in risk management. Tools applicable in risk management are
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designed to integrate functions related to analyzing risks, making decisions, and examining a
BCA. In risk management, probability and consequences are measured by objective decisionmakers to model value, and outcomes can be based on a specific scenario. In addition, these
factors can also be reliant on an alternate case to produce specific results. In some situations, a
BCA can retain probability and consequences as a driver for change and make critical decisions
and tradeoffs according to estimates and valuations. In some elements of homeland security, the
decision-making process for detecting threats and improving threat detection will involve threat
probability, assessing the threat landscape, baseline reductions, and detection probability. The
process can also include implementing programs that will help to reduce false alarms and
contribute to an increase in detection measures or counterterrorism efforts. In modeling
probability, an assessment can include analyzing uncertainties and consequences. The PRA
analysis process can include one variable at a time and model “probability distributions of net
benefits calculated using standard probabilistic simulation software” (Winterfeldt et al., 2020, p.
460).
RQ3
RQ3: How are probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) used to compare risk in critical
infrastructures?
According to Chatterjee et al. (2021), in homeland security and CIs, an analysis is
conducted to identify risks, threats, and vulnerabilities when comparing risks. Critical systems
are analyzed to determine how hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities evolve. In PRAs,
comparisons can include incorporating strategies and risk assessments to update data from
SMEs. To compare PRAs in CIs, the risk management staff determines if the analysis will
include qualitative, semiquantitative, or quantitative methods and adopt probabilistic assessments
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and various theoretical perspectives. In HLS, to meet the security challenges to protect CIs can
require comparisons and editing of PRA methods to meet the challenges to provide “new
applications of security risk analysis methods” (Chatterjee et al., 2021, p. xxvi). In some cases, in
managing CIs, preventive measures can be compared to allocated resources to reduce the
probability of disruptions, system failures, preparation, and the consequences associated with an
event.
According to Flage et al. (2018), making a comparison between a “probability bounds
analysis and a subjective probability” would involve assessing epistemic uncertainties to help
determine unknown perimeters in probability models (p. 1). The process can include a subjective
probability approach and developing a probability structure to illustrate and quantify
uncertainties or a modeled set of perimeters. An essential criticism is that subjective probability
distributions are based on unjustified assumptions if data and information are insufficient and no
proper analysis is conducted. A probability bounds analysis (PBA) is a process that is considered
a “marriage between probability theory and interval analysis” (Flage et al., 2018, p. 2), and
deviation in assessments uncertainties can be related to (a) distribution patterns and perimeters,
(b) the shape of the distribution, (c) the interconnectedness of the variable dependence, and (d)
the model of the structure. There are two approaches to making probability comparisons. The
first, subjective probability, involves a crude assessment, perimeter estimates are modeled, and
the model uses perimeter distributions. The second approach is a PBA, which requires detailed
assessments in both stages. In comparison, assumptions are a part of risk assessments and should
be given attention in the “assessment phase and the follow-up phase” (Flage et al., 2018, p. 9).
In conflicting views on PRAs in large infrastructures, Oliva et al. (2021) suggested that
risk assessment can help guide construction sites but requires an estimation of probabilities to
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assess the likelihood of an event and when an event is likely to occur. In some cases, this can be
difficult because of limited knowledge about an attacker, and there may be limited historical and
reliable data. Some situations will require SMEs to meet with security personnel, risk
management staff, and members of academia, industry, and local law enforcement to compare
and contrast a “multi-criteria decision model” (Oliva et al., 2021, p. 1).
Implications
In viewing future implications of measuring probabilities and uncertainties, according to
Logan et al. (2021), the Society of Risk Analysis’s glossary characterizes risk as consequences
and uncertainties involving an event, hazard, damage, and vulnerabilities that exist related to
activity and can be measured by probabilities. In PRAs and risk assessment, the implications are
in understanding the “choice of the temporal intervals for observing the activity” (Logan et al.,
2021, p. 1967) and considering the consequences. In managing risk in HLS and CIs, Logan et al.
suggested the implications are far-reaching; for example, how to effectively manage community
risk and communicate through a framework where there is intergenerational decision-making
and how to function under specific circumstances and conditions to assess risk uncertainties and
provide adequate protective and preventive measures. Other implications relate to reducing risks
for future generations and encouraging risk reduction in future generations to mitigate threats
and vulnerabilities and emerging uncertainties in society relative to human life and CIs and HLS.
According to Fjaeran and Aven (2021), the social amplification of risk framework
(SARF) is a process used to compare traditional methods of risk assessments from an
“uncertainty-based risk perspective” to support assigned probabilities (Fjaeran & Aven, 2021, p.
673). In this process, PRAs identify problems according to their complexity, level of uncertainty,
and whether or not there are conflicting values. In addition, the implications of risks can include
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both the attenuation and amplification process, and PRAs can be conducted to avoid an
“uncertainty-based understanding of risk that prevents attenuation in risk assessment and
management” (Fjaeran & Aven, 2021, p. 675).
Limitations
According to Winterfeldt et al. (2020), limitations are often consistent with views on
lessons learned from the most recent model and the details offered through a risk value model
about data and parametric assumptions and comparisons with an existing model. Winterfeldt et
al. stated that the most challenging part of the deterrence process is deterring threats to CIs and
HLS because of the “complex behavioral response between the defender’s actions and the
attacker’s response” (p. 472). In some cases, limitations are placed on research products and in
measuring probabilities, and the most significant “uncertainty comes from the variables that
influenced the success of implementation, and in some cases from the variables that
characterized unintended consequences of the implementation” (Winterfeldt et al., 2020, p. 473).
In HLS agencies, PRAs and lessons learned to address uncertainties can contribute to existing
and future applications.
According to Suo et al. (2021), research studies have highlighted the importance of CI
risk factors and provided PRA models for CIs and data sources that help reference specific
historical data and information for CIs. However, there are limitations related to the following:
•

The vast multiplicity of risk factors,

•

The interdependencies among some CIs,

•

CIs that lack dynamic stochasticity, and

•

CIs that lack multisource data can pose a challenge in quantifying problems
associated with CIs.
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Sou et al. noted that their research study’s primary purpose was to help develop a model to help
overcome limitations and reduce barriers by acquiring additional information through data and
information obtained from sampling, text mining, statistical, and simulation tools on expert
subjective judgment. Suo et al. suggested that to help overcome internal and external challenges
and limitations, factors to be considered in an effective PRA model should integrate multisource
data and conduct multidimensional analysis from data collected from PRA scenarios. Therefore,
the model includes “scenario elements, scenario evolution, and scenario effects” in a dynamic
stochastic probability model (Suo et al., 2021, p. 2).
According to Ongkowijoyo and Doloi (2017), in homeland security, another model can
consist of the domino effect integrated into a probabilistic framework that considers factors such
as synergistic effects of risk, noisy probabilities, and assessing the common causes of failures.
Ongkowijoyo and Doloi stated that risk assessments in CIs require an organization-wide
approach and involve risks that impact the organization and the potential impacts of
interconnected external organizations. Traditional risk assessments involve specific risks within
the scope of the community, and conventional risk assessments are more directed toward security
threats outside the normal scope of threats that can impact society as a whole based on a specific
analysis, according to Ongkowijoyo and Doloi.
Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Research
According to Aven (2008), PRAs and probability should not be viewed as a perfect tool
to address uncertainty, but knowing how to measure probabilities is advisable. Knowing the
basic tenets of probability, theoretical perspectives, and statistical analysis is also advisable.
Probability dimensions in a description of risk are viewed as
•

Probability versus consequences measured on four levels,
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•

The high probability is 50%,

•

The probability is 10 to 50%,

•

The unlikeliness is negative at 2%.

The risk matrix can be set up to identify various risk categories and probabilities and risk
descriptions and identify the main safety functions
•

To prevent escalation of an event or threat,

•

To maintain load barring specifications based on probabilities,

•

To protect the environment and to prevent accidental events;

•

To protect CI and HLS facilities in safe areas from attackers, predators, and imminent
danger or threats;

•

To conduct PRAs on “evacuation, facility safe areas, and safety personnel rescue”
(Aven, 2008, p. 26).

The risk matrix today is supported by more sophisticated methods for risk assessments.
In PRAs today, new models have been created to provide more advanced methods to
conduct risk assessments; these categories are essential to provide adequate protection and
preventive measures for CIs and HLS governed by public policy and new standards. According
to Picoco et al. (2020), to meet the future demands for PRAs, robust computational tools and
advanced technological resources have led to improvements in “dynamic methodologies for the
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of nuclear power plants” (p. 1). Tradition methods in PRAs
involved the event tree method, and today the safety of CIs and elements of HLS involves
“dynamic probabilistic risk and safety assessment (DPRA/DPSA) methodologies” (Picoco et al.,
2020, p. 1). DPRA models are integrated with probabilistic perspectives to fashion systems and

169
networks related to aleatory events, uncertainties, system failures, system recoveries, and other
challenges and problems. To be used in future PRAs are
•

The thermal-hydraulic model in PRAs provides perimeters for reactor design to
support plant efficiency and the cooling ability in systems and assess “arbitrary time
intervals” (Picoco et al., 2020, p. 6).

•

A DPRA is used in accident scenarios, and simulations provide a large amount of
data, are observed visually, and involve DPRA analysis and framework.

•

A dynamic event tree (DET) is “viewed as a combination of PRA methods with
deterministic and thermal-hydraulic (TH) studies” (Picoco et al., 2020, p. 2). The
DET is also applicable in PRA methods, peer-review studies, and quality assurance.

•

Statecharts are used to check the “Unified Modeling Language (UML) language”
(Picoco et al., 2020, p. 2).

•

The YAKINDU State Chart Tools (YSCT) is a verification strategy to help develop a
graphical representation of the state chart.

•

In PRAs, the graphical model provides a view and visualization of the simulator so
the analyst can understand how processes evolve.

In many of the models used in these applications, the aim is to provide the analyst with sufficient
knowledge of how systems perform, observe the appropriate system behavior, and understand
the uncertainties, “whether safety systems for mitigation will operate or not, and quantify the
likelihood of an occurrence. Scripture teaches, “The Lord shall fight for you, and ye shall hold
your peace” (King James Bible, 1769/2021, Exodus 14:14).
The Homeland Security Affairs (HAS) (2020) suggests in an article titled, “Enhancing
the Organization of the United States Department of Homeland Security to Account for National
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Risk” (HAS, p. 1). To be effective in homeland security and national security requires a
proactive approach nationwide to allocate and relocate resources, ensure resources provide the
best support to mitigate risks, take an all-hazard to the nation’s challenges and problems, and
prioritize risk related to CIs and HLS. In addition, to be effective, the DHS must realign
resources and promote networking among stakeholders in an effort designed to enhance
organizational structures in DHS mission areas. Finally, it will require assessing risks and
categorizing hazards. The risk methodology should include identifying risk as a function related
to “threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (Risk = F (T, V, C)” (HSA, 2020, p. 2). In
addressing external and domestic terrorism elements in the U.S., which are far more complex,
probabilities and consequences must be rooted in historical data from past experiences, which
can require multiple approaches to deal with the complexities. Theoretical perspectives and
models can also include
•

Agent-based models

•

Bayesian belief networks

•

Bayesian event trees

•

Decision trees

•

Fault trees

•

Game theory

In conducting probabilistic risk assessments in HLS, the future implications should consider the
drivers for change and a “historical-trends analysis to determine future requirements” (HAS,
2020, p. 10). Scripture teaches, “I know the plans, I have for you, declares the Lord, plans to
prosper you, and not to harm you and plans to give you a hope and a future” (King James Bible,
1769/2021, Jeremiah 29:11).
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